












































































































The! Brazilian! electricity! market! is! characterized! by! having! around! 75%! of! installed! capacity!
coming! from! renewables! and! a! large! share! of! hydros!with!multiple! agents! coexisting! in! the!
same!hydro!cascades.!Currently,!it!also!contains!certain!particularities!that!distinguish!it!from!
other! markets.! Nevertheless,! the! conciliation! between! commercial! commitments! and! the!




In! order! to! overcome! these! issues! this! thesis! proposes! a! new!market! design.! The! proposal!
demands! the! deployment! of! a! more! marketSoriented! framework! based! on! the! concept! of!
energy!right!account,!which! is!designed!to!represent!how!much!energy! is! ‘virtually’!stored! in!
the!reservoirs.!It!aims!at!enhancing!the!flexibility!to!enable!market!participants!to!endure!their!
contracts,!while! still! ensuring! the!efficient!use!of! the!energy! resources! in! the!hydro! cascade!
and!maintaining! the! current! security! supply! level! of! the! country.! In! this!market! two!worlds!
would!coexist:!the!real!one,!associated!with!the!power!system!and!with!physical!effects;!and!







market! ceiling! price! and! the! electricity! demand.! Considering! an! entire! year,! their! goal! is! to!
optimize!their!monthly!revenues!(i)!avoiding!negative!exposures!in!case!of!ending!up!providing!
successful! bids! lower! than! bilateral! contracts! and! (ii)! getting! extra! profit! in! the! shortSterm!
market!when!there!is!more!energy!than!the!exSante!contracts.!The!simulations!used!real!data!
from!the!Brazilian!power!system!embracing!3!years!(2012,!2013!and!2014)!and!more!than!125!
hydro!power!plants,! representing!more!than!98%!of! the! total!hydro!capacity! installed!of! the!
country.!
The! results! indicate! that! the! proposed! market! design! maintains! the! current! levels! of! the!
efficiency!and!security,!while!enhancing!the!agents’!level!of!flexibility!to!sustain!contracts.!As!a!
consequence,!the!management!of!(virtual)!reservoirs!is!under!the!responsibility!of!each!hydro,!
which! could! (virtually)! save! water! according! to! their! own! risk! perception.! In! doing! so,! the!
operation!of!the!physical!system!is!not!affected,!ensuring!the!efficiency!of!the!hydro!cascades!



















O! mercado! de! energia! elétrica! brasileiro! é! caracterizado! por! possuir! cerca! de! 75%! da!
capacidade!instalada!proveniente!de!fontes!renováveis,!e!tem!a!especificidade!de!apresentar!
muitas! centrais! hidroelétricas! pertencentes! a! diversos! proprietários! dentro! das! mesmas!









de! direito! de! energia,! que! pretendem! representar! a! energia! que! se! encontra! 'virtualmente'!
armazenada! nos! reservatórios.! Esse! projeto! de! mercado! visa! dar! flexibilidade! às! centrais!
hidroelétricas!para!suportarem!os!seus!contratos,!e!ainda!garantir!o!uso!eficiente!dos!recursos!
energéticos! das! cascatas! e! manter! o! atual! nível! de! segurança! energética! do! país.! Neste!
mercado!dois!mundos!coexistem:!o!real,!associado!ao!sistema!elétrico!e!com!efeitos!físicos;!e!
o! virtual,! relacionado! com! o! sistema! de! liquidação! e! com! efeitos! comerciais.! Finalmente,! a!




reforço!Q&Learning.! As! empresas! preparam! as! suas! propostas! em! função! do! nível! de! seus!
reservatórios,! da! quantidade! de! energia! comprometida! por!meio! dos! contratos! bilaterais,! e!
dos!meses! do! ano,! que! está! associado! com!entradas! de! água! no! sistema,! do! preço! teto! do!
mercado! de! curto! prazo! e! da! demanda! de! eletricidade.! ConsiderandoSse! um! ano! inteiro,! o!
objetivo!das!empresas!é!otimizar!as!suas!receitas!mensais!ao!passo!que!atuam!para!(i)!evitar!as!
exposições! negativas! oriundas! de! propostas! vencedoras! mais! baixas! do! que! os! contratos!
bilaterais!e!(ii)!obter!lucro!extra!no!mercado!de!curto!prazo!quando!há!mais!energia!do!que!os!
contratos! exSante! demandam.! Nas! simulações! realizadas! foram! utilizados! dados! reais! do!
sistema! elétrico! brasileiro! abrangendo! 3! anos! (2012,! 2013! e! 2014)! e! mais! de! 125! centrais!
hidroelétricas,!o!que!representa!mais!de!98%!da!capacidade!total!instalada!das!hidroelétricas!
do!Brasil.!
Os! resultados! indicam! que! o! projeto! de! mercado! proposto! mantém! os! atuais! níveis! de!
eficiência! e! segurança,! ao! passo! que! melhora! a! flexibilidade! dos! agentes! para! suportar!
contratos.!Como!consequência,! a!gestão!de! reservatórios! (virtuais)!é!da! responsabilidade!de!
cada! hidroelétrica,! que! pode! (virtualmente)! armazenar! a! água! de! acordo! com!a! sua! própria!
perceção!do!risco.!Com!isso!a!operação!do!sistema!físico!não!é!afetada,!garantindo!a!eficiência!
na!cascata!de!hidrelétricas!e!mantendo!o!atual!nível!de!segurança!energética!do!sistema.!Os!
















































2.3.1!Market!design! completeness! in! the! shortSterm:!How! is!obtained! the!conciliation!
between!the!dispatch!schedule!and!the!commercial!commitments?!..............................!60!





























































































































































































































































































































































































The! electricity! industry! has! been! changing! over! the! years! around! the! world! from! vertically!
integrated!utilities!to!more!decentralized!structures!and!competitive!electricity!markets.!These!
changes!mainly! aim!at! improving! the!efficiency!of! the! sector,!which! contributes! to!decrease!
price! through! the! increasing! of! the! competitiveness! levels! of! the! electricity!market,! notably!
regarding! the! generation! and! retailing! activities,! once! the! distribution! and! transmission!
activities!remain!as!natural!monopolies.!!
Ever!since,!several!electricity!market!structures!are!being!designed!and!tested!to!ensure!free!
access,! guarantee! fair! competition,! foster! higher! efficiency! and! decrease! price,! while!
maintaining! or! improving! reliability! and! security! of! operation.! Although! Brazil! has! made!
significant! progresses! towards! liberalization,! the! shortSterm! market! prices! result! from!
computational!models!driven!by!a!minimal!cost!dispatch!approach.!The!two!main!models!used!
nowadays!are![CEPEL,!2013]:!
• NEWAVE! (Strategic! Model! for! Hydrothermal! Generation! by! Equivalent! Subsystems),!
which! uses! stochastic! dual! dynamic! programming! to! perform! studies! up! to! five! years!
ahead!with!an!aggregated!representation!of!hydropower!plants! (equivalent! reservoirs)!
in! order! to! determine! the! share! of! hydro! and! thermal! generation! that!minimizes! the!
expected!value!of!the!operation!cost;!and!





in! a! sequential! way)! is! the! Operational! Marginal! Cost! (in! Brazil! known! as! CMO),! which!
represents!the!variable!cost!of!the!most!expensive!dispatched!generation!resource.!Then,!the!
shortSterm! price! (known! in! Brazil! as! PLD! –! the! Price! of! the! Differences! Settlement)! is!
determined! weekly! based! on! the! CMO! calculation! (and! with! the! removal! from! the!
computation!models! of! the! internal! submarket! constraints! and! possible! test! generation).! In!
PLD! calculation! the! maximum! and! minimum! shortSterm! price! limits! set! annually! by! ANEEL!
(Brazilian!Electricity!Regulatory!Agency)!are!also!considered.!
So,!as!it!can!be!observed,!it!is!not!the!market!through!the!interaction!between!its!participants!
that! determines! the! electricity! shortSterm! price,! but! basically! two! computational! programs!
that! value! the! present! electricity! cost! considering,! among! other! issues,! future! scenarios! of!
water!inflows.!The!water!inflows!are!very!crucial!in!these!models!because!the!Brazilian!power!
system!presents!a!massive!penetration!of!hydros:! around!75%!of! the!electricity!produced! in!
Brazil! comes! from! hydropower! plants.! Notwithstanding,! during! the! years! of! 2007! and! 2011!
relevant!problems! related! to! inconsistencies! in! these!models!were!detected,! causing!a! large!





problems! since! the! software! codes! have! intellectual! property! rights! and,! therefore,! are!
unknown!by!the!market!participants!and!the!authorities1.!
The! Brazilian! power! system! is! largely! dominated! by! hydro! companies! that! usually! establish!
longSterm!contracts!to!build!and!operate!power!plants,!and!regarding!which!once!a!year! it! is!
allowed! to! perform! the! seasonalization! process.! Through! the! seasonalization! process,! the!
companies!can!set!the!monthly!amount!of!the!contracted!energy!and!the!monthly!amount!of!
the! physical! guarantee.! The! physical! guarantee! corresponds! to! the! maximum! energy!
production!that!can!be!maintained!almost!continuously!over!the!years,!and!it!has!the!value!of!
a! certificate! that! determines! the! total! amount! of! energy! that! can!be! traded! in! the!Brazilian!
electricity!market.!
So,! there! is! an! annual! “window”! to! monthly! distribute! the! physical! guarantee! and! the!
contracted!energy!and,!given!that!the!centralized!dispatch! is!carried!out!by! the! Independent!
System!Operator!(ISO)!who!doesn’t!consider!the!signed!contracts,!generators!are!not!allowed!
to!decide! their!own!generation! in!order! to! sustain!with! their! contracts.!This! fact! can!expose!
them! to! the! risk! of! having! to! buy! electricity! in! the! shortSterm! market! at! volatile! prices! to!
complete!the!energy!committed!in!their!contracts,!if!they!are!not!dispatched.!
Because! of! this,! there! is! a!mechanism! to! share! among! the! hydros! the! aforementioned! risk.!
Nevertheless,! this! mechanism! (known! as! MRE! –! Mechanism! for! Energy! Reallocation)! is!
automatically! performed,! and! the! conciliation! between! the! physical! dispatch! of! the! power!












• In! the!medium! and! shortSterms,! generators! are! not! allowed! to! define! or! adjust! the!
amount!of!energy!to!endure!with!their!contracts.!
A! solution! typically! adopted! in!other! systems! is! the!employment!of! a!more!market!oriented!











Indeed,! there! is! a! proposal! from! the! Electric! Power!Commercialization!Chamber! (CCEE)! that!
aims!at!adopting!market!mechanisms! including! [CCEE,!2012b]:! (i)! shortSterm!prices! closer! to!
real! time!operation,! like!a!daySahead!market;! (ii)! products! traded! in!organized!markets;! and!
(iii)!a!centralized!clearing!and!settlement!procedure!performed!by!an!entity!that!should!be!also!
in! charge!of! the!monitoring!of! the!participant’s! financial! situation.! If! implemented,! this!new!






The!presence!of!several!owners! in! the!hydro!cascades!endorses! the!market!design!based!on!








schemes! that! lead! to! the! cascade’s! optimization.! However,! this! thesis! innovates! when!
addressing! this! issue! in! order! to! reinforce! the! freedom! for! both! (i)! the! operation! of! the!
hydrothermal! power! system! carried! out! by! the! ISO! and! (ii)! the! bidding! strategies! and!
commercial!commitments!of!the!market!participants.!
Regarding! the! enhancement! of! the! flexibility! to! enable! market! participants! to! uphold! their!
contracts,! while! still! preserving! the! capacity! of! the! system! to! efficiently! use! its! energy!
resources! and! ensuring! the! current! level! of! the! security! of! supply,! it! was! developed! a! new!
market! design! to! be! applied! to! hydrothermal! systems! with! a! large! share! of! hydros.! The!
conceptual!market!structure!developed! in! this! thesis! is! supported!by!the! following!proposed!
virtual!reservoir!model:!
• Each! hydro! has! a! virtual! account! (like! an! energy! rights! account)! that! represents! how!
much!energy!is!virtually!stored!in!his!reservoir;!























Through! this!market!design,!hydros!would!be! responsible! for!deciding,! in! commercial! terms,!
how! much! they! want! to! withdraw! from! their! virtual! reservoirs! to! meet! their! contracts.!
Thereby,!each!generator!will!manage!his!contracts!more!efficiently,!without!affecting!the!real!
operation!of!the!physical!system.!Furthermore,!this!model!promotes!a!monitoring!of!the! ISO!
performance! based! on! comparisons! between! his! decisions! (the! physical! world)! and! the!
decisions!of!market!participants!(virtual!world).!!
At!the!end!of!this!process,!the!price!no!longer!primarily!results!from!a!chain!of!computational!
software! that!may!eventually! present!problems! related! to! inconsistencies! and! transparency,!
but! it! is!obtained!through!the!combination!of!thermal!costs!originated!from!the!ISO!dispatch!
and!the!shortSterm!price!coming!from!the! liberalized!hydro!shortSterm!market.!Thereby,! this!
research! addresses! wholesale! markets! associated! with! power! systems! with! high! share! of!





and! more! researchers! have! developed! electricity! market! models! with! adaptive! software!
agents.! This! field! of! research! is! still! growing! and! maturing,! and! many! researchers! have!
managed!to!replicate!core!characteristics!of!the!today’s!electricity!markets!using!models!with!
adaptive!and!selfSseeking!agents.!
So,! the!main! contribution! of! this! thesis! can! be! outlined! in! two!ways:! first,! it! designs! a! new!
electricity!market! for!hydros! in!Brazil,!which! is!based!on!a!decoupling!between!physical! and!
virtual!reservoir!management! in!order!to!guarantee!the!proper!energy!security! level!and!the!








The!main! objective! of! this! research! is! to! develop! a! new!market! design! based! on! bids! to! be!
applied! to! power! systems! having! a! large! share! of! hydros.! In! order! to! achieve! the! main!
objective!stated!above,!this!work!pursuits!the!following!specific!objectives:!
• Develop! the! virtual! reservoir! model! designed! to! enhance! the! flexibility! of! market!
participants!to!comply!with!their!contracts!while!ensuring!the!same!levels!of!security!of!
supply!and!efficiency!in!the!use!of!energy!resources;!
• Implement! a! proper! agentSbased! simulation! model! focused! on! the! behavior! of! the!
agents!in!the!new!proposed!shortSterm!market;!and!
• Analyze! the! performance! of! the! proposed! model! taking! into! consideration! real! data!
from!Brazil.!
According! to! [Li! et! al.,! 2011],! since! electricity! markets! are! still! under! construction,! many!




Particularly,! the!proposed!model! intends! to! improve! the!Brazilian! shortSterm!market! (where!
the! differences! between! the! contracted! energy! and! the! amount! of! generated! /! consumed!
electricity! are! calculated! and! settled),! by! adding! the! virtual! electricity! hydro! shortSterm!
market.! Finally,! the! proposed! model! is! integrated! with! the! already! existing! combination! of!















2! In!Brazil,! the!ACR!corresponds!to! longSterm!contracts,!usually!up!to!35!years,!established!by!a!PPA!S!Power!PurS
chase!Agreements,!signed!between!generators!and!distribution!companies!if!generators!are!successful!in!a!national!










In!this!chapter!(Chapter!1)! it! is!presented!an! introduction!to!problems!that!are!recognized!in!
the! current! Brazilian! electricity!market! and!which!motivated! this! research,! as!well! the!main!
objectives,!concerns!and!the!proposal!that!was!developed!to!address!these!issues.!
Chapter! 2! provides! the! fundamental! knowledge! regarding! electricity! markets.! Thus,! it!
theoretically! discusses! four! electricity! industry! structures,! the! sequence!of!markets,! and! the!
relation! between! electricity! markets! and! the! physical! operation! of! the! power! systems.! The!
analysis!of!this!relation!is!divided!in!two!parts:!market!design!completeness!in!the!shortSterm!
(i.e.!how!is!the!conciliation!between!the!dispatch!schedule!and!the!commercial!commitments!
obtained?),! and! the!market!design! adequacy! in! the! longSterm! (i.e.! how!does! the! shortSterm!
market!allocate!feasible!technologies!in!order!to!add!new!capacities?)!
Then,! Chapter! 3! focuses! on! the! Brazilian! electricity! market,! and! its! features! are! broadly!
discussed.! Besides! a! wide! presentation! about! this! market,! including! the! recent! electricity!
reforms,! its! current! quantitative! aspects,! and! the! legal! and! institutional! frameworks,! it! is!
performed! a! specific! analysis! of! the! Brazilian! case! regarding! the! conciliation! between! the!
electricity! markets! and! the! physical! operation! of! the! power! system.! Then,! focusing! on! this!
power! system,! three! concerns! are! discussed:! efficiency! in! the! use! of! the! energy! resources;!
security!of!supply!and!some!capacity!mechanisms;!and!the!need!to! improve!the! flexibility! to!
enable! generators! to! comply! with! their! signed! contracts.! At! the! end,! both! the! market!
adequacy!and!completeness!are!also!examined.!
Considering! some! elements! of! a! centralized! and! decentralized! marketSbased! economy,! the!
proposed!model! (Virtual!Reservoir!Model! S!VRM)! is!developed! in!Chapter!4.! It! is!designed!to!
enhance!the!flexibility!of!market!agents!to!uphold!their!contracts!while!ensuring!efficiency!and!
security! of! supply! of! the! power! system.! Moreover,! some! modeling! alternatives! to! better!
understand! generators’! behavior! are! discussed! and! the!AgentSBased!Model! (ABM)! including!
the!QSlearning!technique!is!deeper!studied.!Finally,!it!is!established!the!algorithm!to!simulate!
the!generators’!behavior.!
Chapter! 5! details! the! validation! of! the! developed! algorithm! and! presents! results! obtained!
withseveral!simulations!of!the!Brazilian!electricity!market.!Scenarios!were!implemented!in!the!









The!electricity! sector! is! a! complex! industry!and!greatly!differs! from!other!markets! since! it! is!
required! to! balance! the! demand! and! production! at! every! moment! and! to! deal! with! the!
inevitability! of! equipment! failures! that! request! resources! backup! (generation! capacity! and!
electricity! transmission! and! distribution! infrastructures).! Moreover,! since! several! countries!
embarked!on!a!path!characterized!by!market!liberalization,!the!electricity!markets!around!the!
world!are!continuously!evolving!and!their!social,!economic!and!political!particularities!play!an!
important! role!on! this!evolution.!As!pointed!out! in! [IEA,!2005],! the!establishment!of!market!
institutions!that!effectively!serve!their!purpose!largely!depends!on!the!point!of!departure!with!
each!country,!and!this!process!has!not!yet!been!completed!anywhere!in!the!world.!
The! objective! of! this! chapter! is! to! consolidate! the! fundamental! knowledge! regarding! the!
electricity!markets! in! order! to! enrich! the! comprehension! of! realSworld! cases! and! deal! with!




Brazilian!electricity!market! (which! is! the!case!of! study!used! in! this! research)! starts!here,!but!
under!a!general!perspective.!
In!addition,!given! the! research!of! the! thesis,! the! focus!will!not!be!on! transmission!activities,!
but! on! the! electricity! producers! and! sellers! (generation)! and! their! potential! buyers!
(distribution! companies,! retailer! companies,! and! consumers),! especially! considering! the!
transactions!into!the!electricity!market.!
2.1.Four.electricity.industry.structures.
The! liberalization! of! the! electricity! market! is! a! pathway! to! promote! a! higher! economic!




transition! from! the! Welfare! State! to! the! Deregulated! State,! which! brought! changes! in!
numerous!economic!sectors.!Regarding!the!electricity!sector,!and!as!ascertained!by![Sioshansi,!












service”,! federal! laws3! were! elaborated! also! to! seek! low! tariffs,! and! this! was! done! by!
consolidating! the! coined! concept! of! “principle! of! reasonable! tariffs”.! Thus,! the! two! main!
improvements!to!the!society!particularly!considered!in!the!analysis!of!this!research!(which!can!




• increase! of! the! private! capital! to! the! operation,! maintenance! and! expansion! of! the!
power! system,!which! for! the! society! it! is! connected!with! the! pursuit! of! sustainability,!
resilience!and!efficiency!of!the!electricity!service!in!the!longSterm.!
Among!!the!incentives!that!have!the!purpose!to!promote!and!consolidate!the!pathway!to!more!
liberalized! systems,! above! all! there! is! the! introduction! of! competition! between! the!market!










This! classification! of! electricity! industry! structure! tracks! the! philosophy! of! the! electricity!
market! liberalization!and!can!also!be!viewed!as!a!process!that!starts! introducing!competition!
into!a!certain!part!of!the!value!chain!to!further!enlarge!it!as!many!as!possible.!By!doing!so,!it!is!
important!to!highlight!that!the!price!must!be!seen!as!the!connecting! link! into!the!market.! In!
other! words,! prices! direct! decisions! and! efficient! decisions! depend! on! correct! price! signals.!




also! crucial! to! decrease! the! transaction! cost,! otherwise! the! developing! of! the! next! level! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!The!relevant!federal!laws!particularly!relate!with!the!principle!of!reasonable!tariffs!in!the!electricity!sector!are:!Law!
8987/1995,!which! regulates! the! system!of! concessions! and!permission! regarding! the! provision!of! public! services!
provided! in! the! Federal! Constitution;! Law! 9074/1995,! which! sets! standards! for! grants! and! renewals! of! the!
concessions! and! permissions! of! the! public! services;! Law! 9427/1996,! which! establishes! the! Brazilian! Electricity!
Regulatory!Agency! (ANEEL);!Law!10438/2002,!which,!among!other!points,!provides!guidelines! for!universal!public!
service! of! electricity! and! creates! the! PROINFA! energy! renewable! program! and! the! CDE! energy! development!
account;! Law! 10848/2004,! which! provides! rules! regarding! the! commercialization! of! electricity;! and! Law!









In! addition,! another! feature! of! this! process! is! the! increased! level! of! complexity! that! arises!
when! the! market! rules! should! substitute! the! centralized! planning! management.! So,! new!




and! control! hierarchy,! then! a! reserve! market! must! be! created! to! occupy! this! “space”.!
Therefore,!the!price!signal!from!this!specific!market!should!now!substitute,!for!instance,!some!
instructions! and! procedures! specified! in! the! grid! code.! The!more! a!marketSbased! electricity!
industry!is!implemented,!the!more!market!tools!are!needed.!Then,!a!dilemma!in!designing!new!
markets! appears!when! the! increase!of! complexity,! detail,! accuracy! and! sensitivity!of!market!
signals!also!rise!the!potential!for!economic!abuse!by!certain!players![Harris,!2006].!Again,!it!is!
also!vital!to!develop!organized!and!transparent!market!to!deal!with!such!issue.!
At! a! certain! point! of! this! ongoing! change! from! a! centralized! planning! management! to! a!
marketSbased!economy,!it!can!be!seen!as!a!matter!of!faith!that!things!will!work!appropriately!








order! to! consider! the! context! of! the! current! market! design! and! the! advantages! and!
disadvantages!of! the! further!model! for!one!particular!electricity!market.!As!noticed!by!some!
authors! [Harris,!2006;! IEA,!2005],!differing!nature!of!drives! in!different!countries!means! that!
there!is!not!a!oneSsizeSfitsSall!solution.!
2.1.1%Model%1:%Vertically%integrated%utility%






The!utility!has! the!monopoly!over! the!production,! transmission!and!distribution!activities.! In!























for! efficiency! and! innovation.! The! process! to! achieve! low! tariffs! is! ruled! by! the! costSbased!
principle,! which! can! include! some! incentive! regulation! approaches,! but! essentially!
remunerates!the!company!providing!a!return!on!the!assets!and!an!amount!in!order!to!recover!
the! incurred! costs.! Thus,! the! quest! for! low! tariffs! will! not! occur! through! marketSbased!
principles,!when!market!rewards!are!reached!when!one!company!performs!better!than!others,!




[Sioshansi,!2006]!observes!that! in!this!model!taxpayers!bear!all! investment!risks!and!there! is!
generally! little!or!poor!accountability.!Moreover,!there! is!not!a!effective!pressure!to! improve!
customer!service!or!engage!in!technological!innovation.!Thus,!vertically!integrated!companies!
tend! to! be! overSstaffed! and! inefficient,! and! with! scant! financial! scrutiny! the! statedSowner!
companies!tend!to!underperform.!
In! addition,! and! taking! into! consideration! the! history! of! the! electricity! sector4,! this!model! is!
dominated!by!the!public! investment.! In!other!words,! it! is! the!State!budget!that!provides!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4! Typically! the! electricity! sector! around! the! world! started! small,! where! the! purpose! was! just! supply! a! city,! and!
usually!operated!by!a!private!company.!As!it!was!enlarging!and!connecting!with!other!power!system!(achieving!thus!










financial! resources! to! expand! the! power! system.!However,! one! of! the! reasons! that! justified!
switch!over! from!this!model,!as!mentioned! in! the!Section!2.1,!was! the!need! to!have!private!
investments! to! expand! the! electricity! infrastructure.! This! is! a! fundamental! and! challenging!
issue,!mainly! to! developing! economies! that! need! to! add! large! amounts! of! installed! capacity!
into!the!electricity!matrix!every!year!to!meet!the!growing!electricity!demand.!To!move!forward!
in!the!liberalization!process!it!should!be!considered!that,!beyond!a!certain!point,!the!State!may!
not! be! in! charge! of! the! energy! security! of! supply! of! the! country.! Rather! than! this,! it! is! the!
marketSbased! economic,! considering! essentially! the! price! signals! and! the!market! efficiency,!
that! will! determine! when! and! where! new! power! plants! will! be! built,! and! what! kind! of!
technologies!and!fuels!these!power!plants!will!use.!!
In!order!to!advance!to!the!next!models,!it!is!necessary!to!implement!the!unbundling!process!in!
the! electricity! sector.! The! vertically! integrated! company! must! be! divided! to! promote!
competition! where! it! is! possible! (namely! in! generation! and! retailing! activities,! since! the!
distribution!and!transmission!activities!typically!remain!as!natural!monopolies).!!
By! doing! this,! contracts! must! substitute! the! command! and! control! management! of! the!
vertically! integrated! company! (i.e.! contracts! should! somehow! mimic! the! structure! of! an!
integrated! company).! In! addition,! contracts! are! also! used! to! manage! the! market! risks! (by!




With! the! implementation! of! the! unbundling! process,! new! agents! known! by! Independent!
Power!Producers!(IPP)!arise!and!become!crucial.!These!new!companies!have!free!access!to!the!
transmission!and!distribution!lines!as!prerequisite!to!allow!them!to!sell!electricity!and!promote!
a! fair! competition.! Besides! that,! it! is! expected! the! divestiture! of! the! vertically! integrated!
company!(at!least!a!segregation!in!accounting!terms)!in!the!following!independent!companies:!
generation!company!(Genco),!transmission!company,!and!distribution!company!(Disco).!
Apart! from! the! promotion! of! competition,! the! unbundling! between! distribution! and!
generation! activities! is! also! relevant! to! avoid! the! perverse! selfSdealing! of! a!Disco! that! owns!
generators! and!will! prefer! to! purchase! from! their! affiliates,! even! if! the! price! is! higher! than!




with! the! function! of! transmitting! electricity! from! the! generation! to! the! distribution! centers.!
Like! the! distribution! wiring! activity,! this! activity! is! seen! as! natural!monopoly,! and! over! this!
condition!it!remains!regulated.!
Another! agent! that! appears! in! this!model! is! the!Purchasing!Agency,! normally! carried!out! by!
public!administration.!Figure!2.2!presents!a!schematic!representation!of!this!model! (the!gray!





electricity! (i.e.!a!wholesale!purchase)! from!the! IPPs!on! the!basis!of! longSterm!contracts!with!
defined!date!and!terms!of!delivery![Belyaev,!2011],!and!at!a!price!that!can!be!determined!by!a!
competitive!mechanism5!being!conducted!by!the!State!taking!into!consideration!a!centralizing!
energy!planning.! So,! the!Purchasing!Agency!exercises!a!monopsony,!being! the!only!buyer! to!
purchase! energy! from! all! generators.! In! Brazil,! the! figure! of! the! Purchasing! Agency! is!















As! the! cost! to! generate! electricity! is! around! 50S60%! of! the! final! tariff,! excluding! tax! and!
subsidies,! Model! 2! enables! the! realization! of! the! main! part! of! the! potential! effect! of!
competition! [Belyaev,! 2011].! In! Brazil,! not! considering! sector! charges! and! taxes,! generation!
costs!represent!about!50%!of!the!final!consumers!tariff!(plus!10%!from!transmission!and!40%!
from!distribution)![ANEEL,!2014c].!If!compared!with!the!Model!1,!the!advantage!of!Model!2!is,!
due! the! implementation!of!public! auctions,! to!bring! competition! to! the! tariff! formation! and!
substantially!to!incentive!lower!tariff.!
The!mentioned!longSterm!contracts,!known!as!PPA!(Power!Purchase!Agreements),!enable!the!
generation! and! distribution! companies! to! contract! in! advance! for! several! years.! The! main!




















term,! the! availability! payment! must! be! linked! with! the! actual! availability! of! the! plant.!
However,!if!the!power!plant!is!not!actually!running,!it!is!difficult!to!assess!its!availability,!which!
can!require!an!oversight!effort!of!the!regulator!over!the!facility.!
From! the! producers’! point! of! view,! to! contract! in! advance! means! to! close! agreements!
(defining,!among!other!conditions,!the!price,!date!to!start!the!delivery!of!electricity!and!period!




financial! modeling! that! enables! entrepreneurs! to! take! loans! and! leave! as! a! guarantee! the!
future! revenues! of! these! contracts.! Comparing! with! Models! 3! and! 4,! Model! 2! facilitates!
generators!to!raise!capital.!
From! the! consumers’! point! of! view,! these! longSterm! contracts! represent! a! mechanism! to!
address! the! security! of! supply! once! new! capacity! is! added! to! the! power! system.! In! other!
words,! the! longSterm! contracts! with! availability! payments! can! be! seen! as! a! capacity!
mechanism,!which!is!used!to!conciliate!the!generation!expansion!with!the!demand!growth.!!




To! leave!Model!2!and! to!adopt!Model!3! there! is!a! change! in! the! type!of! competition!at! the!
wholesale! level.! This! change!corresponds! to! the! switch! from!a! single!buyer! (the!monopsony!




!The! Discos! have! to! buy! electricity! on! behalf! of! their! consumers,! and! still! maintain! the!
monopoly! over! the! retail! energy! sale,! which! guarantees! that! the! Discos! are! the! unique!
retailers! into! the!market.!By! the!way,! if! competition! is!allowed! in! the! retail! level,! the!Discos!
should!not!have! the!monopoly!over! the! final! consumers,! then! these! consumers! could! freely!
choice! their! electricity! supplier,! and! there! would! be! competition! in! the! retail! level,! which!
defines!Model!4.!Nevertheless,!in!realSworld!electricity!market!both!Model!3!and!Model!4!can!




participants! into! the! market.! However,! by! doing! so,! there! may! be! a! weakening! at! the!
consumers’! side! since! one! single! buyer! (a!monopsony)! can! have!more! bargaining! power! to!
















market! risk! is! with! the! consumers.! This! occurs! because! longSterm! contracts,! in! one! hand,!
reduce!the!risk!of!generators!losing!their!market!when!new!technologies!enter!into!the!market!




to! a!more!marketSdriven! situation! (stronger! presented! in!Model! 3! and!Model! 4).! On! other!
hand,! longSterm! contracts! will! also! limit! the!market! power! of! the! producers! [Rangel,! 2008]!
[Karthikeyan!et.+al.,!2013]![Brunekreeft!et!al.,!2005].!!
Liberalized! markets! create! a! new! investment! paradigm! in! which! decisions! are! taken! under!
competitive! pressure.! So,! regarding! the! security! of! supply,! when! risks! are! moved! from!
consumers!to!producers,!capitalSintensive!technologies!with!long!construction!times!are!view!
with!great!skepticism,!even!if!running!cost!are!low.!Then,!market!players!prefer!projects!with!
short! time! implementation! that! can! be! built! in! smaller! units,! and! competition! also! pushes!









clarify! why! nowadays! capacity! mechanisms! are! in! the! agenda! debate! of! policy! makers,!
regulators!and!entrepreneurs.!
Another!particularity!of!Models!3!and!is!the!fact!that,!since!the!market!doesn’t!recognize!fuel!
poverty! (i.e.! the!market! doesn’t! act! considering! strategic! policies! for! the! country! regarding!















Agency! to! try! to! sell! electricity.! If! the! bid! is! a! successful! one,! then! they!will! sign! longSterm!
contracts! with! the! distribution! companies.! This! structure! is! known! as! “competition! for! the!
market”.! In!Models! 3! and!4! there! is! an! organized!market! in!which! they! can! try! to! sell! their!
electricity,!which!is!recognized!as!“competition!in!the!market”.!So,!unlikely!Model!2,!which!is!






that! the! tariff! of! the! final! consumers! can! be! designed! to! be! the! weighted! average! of! the!
successful!bids!in!the!public!auctions,!and!not!the!clearing!price!of!a!shortSterm!market!based!
on!Models!3!and!4.!In!the!former,!buyers!pay!according!to!each!successful!bid!(i.e.!paySasSbid),!




the!remuneration!paid!by!consumers! to! the!producers,!and!the!hatched!area!represents! the!
producer! surplus! when! it! is! assigned! to! the! consumers.! So,! regarding! the! tariff! of! the! final!
consumers,!the!equations!2.1!and!2.2!represent!these!two!approaches.!!"##$%!"#$%!! = ! !!×!! !!!!!! ! ! !!!! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!(2.1)!









This! issue! is! further! discussed! in! Section! 2.3.2,! when! addressing! the! cost! structure! of! one!




























Bring! competition! to! the! last! level,! the! retail!market,! final! consumers! have! the! freedom! to!
choose!their!suppliers.!As!noticed!by![Hunt!&!Shuttleworth,!1996],!Model!4!differs!from!Model!










In!Model!3!Discos!have! the!monopoly!over! the!consumers,!while! in!Model!4! the!consumers!
can!freely!choose!their!electricity!supplier,!which!can!be!a!generator!or!a!retailer!company.!In!
Model! 4,! the! competition! in! the! retail! level! implies! the! separation! between! electricity!
distribution!wiring!business!and!the!retail!business.!This!segregation!will!be!done!by!divesting!
the! existing! distribution! companies! in! two! different! business:! the! operation! of! the! network!
(just! concerning! the! distribution! “wires”),! and! the! retailing! function! (sale! of! “electricity”! to!
consumers).!Thus,!the!distribution!companies!(Discos)!will!not!be!allowed!to!sell!electricity!to!
the! consumers.! Instead! of! them,! Retailing! Companies! (Retailers)!will! be! in! charge! of! buying!
electricity!in!the!markets!and!to!do!these!sales.!
This!situation! is!shown!in!Figure!2.5!by!replacing!all!Discos!by!the!Retailers! in!the!same!level!




























applied! for! Model! 4:! the! construction! of! new! power! plants! depends! on! the! market! price!
signals! and! there! is! not! a! central! planning!mechanism! to! determine!where,!when! and!what!
kind!of!resource!should!be!deployed;!!if!applied!the!uniform!price!settlement,!the!consumers!
lose!the!“producer!surplus”!(dotted!area!in!Figure!2.4)!since!the!tariff!will!be!composed!by!the!
payment!according! to! the!marginal! cost!of! the! last!dispatched! resource;!and! the!absence!of!
longSterm! contracts! also! increase! the! opportunities! to! exercise! market! power! by! the!
producers,!while!the!loss!of!the!monopsony!(single!buyer!model)!can!decrease!the!bargaining!
power! of! the! consumers.! Additionally,! both! the! wholesale!market! (Model! 3)! and! the! retail!
market!(Model!4)!are!not!perfect!markets,!and!this!fact!cannot!be!neglected.!
Nonetheless,!some!issues!of!Model!4!really!stands!out!if!compared!to!Model!3.!The!monopoly!
of! the! Discos! present! in!Model! 3! doesn’t! give! incentives! to! the! Discos! to! buy! the! cheapest!
electricity! since! in! any! case! its! cost! is! passed! on! to! the! consumers! [Belyaev,! 2011].! Thus,!
usually! in! Model! 3! the! demand! curve! is! inelastic! and! the! bid! of! the! Discos! only! includes!
quantities.!On!other!hand,!once!consumers!can! freely!choose!their!suppliers! (Model!4),! they!
should!be!more!active!into!the!market!and,!as!a!consequence,!more!aware!of!the!market!price!
fluctuations.!There!is,!therefore,!a!higher!chance!to!effective!demand’s!responses.!
However,! the! sharp! increase! of! the! number! of! buyers! also! complicates! the! activities! of! this!
market!structure,!and!what!must!be!seen!as!a!bottleneck!here!is!the!eventual!increase!of!the!
transaction! cost.! The! transactional! cost! is! strictly! associated! with! the! development! and!
implementation! of! all! necessary! technologies! and! the! transformation! of! the! culture! and!
behavior!by!the!consumers,!particularly!the!small!ones,!in!order!to!allow!the!wellSfunctioning!
of!Model!4.!Consumers!cannot!be!expected!to!respond!before!prices!rise!sufficiently!to!offset!
transactional! cost.! Finding! a! way! to! take! the! wholesale! price! to! the! doorsteps! of! smaller!
commercial!and!residential!consumers! is,!however,! full!with! technical!and!economic!barriers!





information! that! they! need! to! respond! to! price! variations.! To! achieve! this! objective,! price!
variation!must!be!seen!by!the!consumers!into!short!time!intervals!in!order!to!enable!them!to!
the!move!their!consumption!to!periods!with!lower!price.!
Traditional! electricity! metering! is! generally! performed! monthly,! and! it! doesn’t! take! into!
account! the! consumption! during! the! hours! of! the! day.! Regarding! the! operation! cost! of! the!
power! system,! in! some! countries! the! tariff! remains! the! same! during! a! entire! year.! In! other!









the! best! time! (lowest! prices)! into! to! next! hours! or! days! to! perform! certain! tasks! (and! then!
consume! the! electricity! that! is! needed).! With! an! hourly! price! profile! available,! consumers’!
consumption! is! more! manageable.! In! summary,! if! (i)! consumers! have! the! information!
regarding!price!some!hours!in!advance,!(ii)!the!price!is!settled!hourly,!(iii)!electricity!is!metered!
by!hour,!and!(iv)!the!cost!of!operation!of!the!power!system!is!passed!on!to!the!tariff!on!a!more!
frequent!basis,! consumers!have! the! incentives!and!can!manage! their! consumptions! to!move!
them!to!the!cheapest!hours!of!the!day.!
So,!both!the!development!and!implementation!of!smart!technologies!and!the!implementation!







successful! bids! of! these! markets.! Therefore,! these! shortSterm! market! structures! closely!





fixed! cost! and! an! energy! payment! to! cover! the! variable! cost! when! the! power! plant! is!
dispatched.!The!consumers!always!pay!the!fixed!cost! in!their!tariff,!plus!the!variable!costs!of!
those!power!plants! that! are!dispatched! in! that!period.! So,! again! the!point!here! is!when! the!
tariff!is!adjusted!to!capture!the!real!operation!cost!of!the!power!system,!and!in!which!interval!




should!not! be! seen! as!mutually! exclusive.!Overlays! between! these!models! can!occur,! in! the!
sense!that!a!combination!of!aspects!of!!Model!2,!Model!3!and!Model!4!are!possible!since!each!
model! can! be! applied! to! different! consumers’! categories.! Nevertheless,! the! organization! in!









point! it!can!be!possible!to!better!deal!with!a!number!of!questions! like!the!different! levels!of!
competition! and! its! consequence! over! the! tariffs! and! over! the! security! of! supply.! Thus,! this!




to! cover! all! the! possible! variants! regarding! classifications! and! types! of! markets.! Electricity!
markets!have!being!particularly!dynamic!and!since!the!liberalization!process!these!markets!are!
constantly!evolving.!Nevertheless,!it!is!intended!to!present!a!comprehensive!view!of!the!most!




allows! buyers! and! sellers! of! a! particular! good! or! service! to! interact! in! order! to! facilitate! an!








Having! in!mind!the!characteristic!of! the!power!system,! this!classification! is!not! linked!with!a!
physical!marketplace!such!as!physical!location!where!peoples!and/or!firms!meet!to!do!trades.!
Rather! than! that,! it! is! where! market! participants! trade! with! each! other! through! various!
communication! platforms! such! as! electronic! trading! systems.! Following! this,! [Nasdaq,! 2014]!
defines! OverSTheSCounter! (OTC)! as! a! decentralized!market! where! geographically!
dispersed!dealers!are!linked!by!telephones!and!computers.!!
Indeed,!OTC! is!a!case!where!market!participants!act!quoting!prices,!and!trades!are!executed!
between! two!participants.! This!negotiation! is!based! in! relations! rather! than! in!market! rules.!
Furthermore,!OTC!cannot!offer! standard!products.! In! this! case,! the!market!deals!with! tailorS
made! products,! which! means! that! buyers! and! sellers! should! negotiate! all! the! items! of! the!
trade!by!themselves!(it!can!be!a!time!consuming!task).!Once!they!agree!with!these!terms,!they!
sign! a! contract! that! defines,! among! other! conditions,! the! electricity! price,! data! to! start! to!










of! the! power! exchange! as! an! available! trading! platform! where! electricity! is! traded! as! a!
commodity! at! the! wholesale! level! and! where! participants! such! as! generators,! retailers! or!








seen! as! electronic! trading! platform! for! longSterm! contracts! where! trades! occur! in! a!
intermittently! way.! It! is! intermittent! because! it! doesn’t! take! place! in! consistent! basis! as! it!
happens! in!power!exchanges! (e.g.! regularly! every!day),! but! sporadically! over! a! year!or! even!
within!longer!periods.!This!discontinuous!bidding!system!is!achieved!by!an!electronic!system!to!
support! the! auction! scheme,! and! each! auction! can! be! designed! to! have! different! rules.!




time! (e.g.! daily,! weekly,! monthly! or! several! years).! Basically,! for! the! shortSterm! market,!
products!have!to!be!immediately!delivered!or!delivered!in!a!short!period!of!time.!Examples!of!
types! of! market! that! deal! with! this! these! products! are! the! “daySahead”! and! “intraday”!
markets.! Regarding! the! medium! and! longSterm! markets,! products! are! traded! through!
contracts!with!a!promise!of!future!delivery!at!a!specified!price.!
As! reported!by! [CCEE,!2012a],! short!and! longSterms!markets! respond! to!different!needs!and!
they! are! complementary! markets:! while! shortSterm! contracts! are! mostly! used! to! hedge!
volume! risk,! longSterm! contracts! are! applied! to! hedge! price! risk! and! to! create! the! stability!
conditions!to!make!new!investments!to!assure!the!security!of!supply.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6! It! should! be! commented! that! a! “power! pool”! is! also! an! organized! market! similar! to! a! “power! exchange”.!
Nevertheless,!the!term!“power!pool”!is!more!related!to!the!early!stage!of!the!electricity!market!liberalism,!where!an!







Lastly,! it! is! worth! making! a! few! comments! about! the! expression! “spot! market”.! [Hunt! &!
Shuttleworth,! 1996]! explains! that! spot! transactions! are! sales! of! an! asset! for! immediate!
delivery,!and!that!spot!sales!are!often!not!accompanied!by!the!creation!of!any!formal!contract!











by! [Hunt! &! Shuttleworth,! 1996]:! when! the! final! consumer7! is! the! buyer,! transactions!
correspond! to! retail! transactions;!when! the!buyer! is! a!Disco!or! a!Retailer,! it! is! the! case!of! a!
wholesale! transaction.! As! addressed! in! Section! 2.1.3,! Model! 3! illustrates! the! case! of!
competition! in! the! wholesale! market,! since! the! Discos! have! the! monopoly! over! the! final!
consumers,!and!Model!4!represents!the!competition!in!the!retail!market,!once!it!is!broken!the!
monopoly! that! Discos! had! over! the! final! consumers,! and! then! these! consumers! can! buy!
electricity!from!generators!or!retailers.!
Because! in! the!wholesale!market! the!buyer! is!a! retailer! there! is!a! large! turnover! involved! in!
each!trade.!In!the!retail!market,!the!volume!of!electricity!bought!in!each!trade!depends!on!the!
size!of!the!buyer.!For!instance,!if!the!final!consumer!is!a!small!consumer!like!a!household!or!a!





world,! it! is! possible! to! distinguish! two!main! types! of!market! organization:! ! (i)! decentralized!
market!or!bilateral!contract!model;!and!(ii)!centralized!market!or!pool!model.!!
In!the!decentralized!market,!transactions!are!freely!negotiated!between!the!participants,!while!
















they! should! close! a! contract! (setting! price! and! quantity).!When! two! parties!mutually! agree,!
then!the!contract!is!signed.!
In! this! decentralized! market,! traders! can! make! deals! for! physical! delivery! of! electricity,!
scheduling!those!trades!with!the!market!operator8,!and!having!the!operator!working!to!deliver!
the! scheduled! power! [Hunt! &! Shuttleworth,! 1996].! In! order! to! have! their! commitments!





means! that! generators! decide! the! dispatch! of! their! own! generating! units! by! informing! the!
market!operator!the!amount!bilaterally!contracted.! In!addition,!buyers!will!pay!to!the!sellers!
the!price!previously!agreed!in!these!contracts.!
In! centralized!markets,! the!approach!envisages! that!buyers!bid! to!purchase!products,! sellers!
bid! to! have! their! products! delivery/dispatched,! and! the! market! operator! will! dispatch! the!
generating!units!in!order!of!the!bids![Hunt!&!Shuttleworth,!1996].!!In!other!words,!producers!
submit!their!offer!in!the!pool,!which!produces!a!stack!and!with!this!the!market!operator!sends!




may! not! consider! the! contracts! signed! out! of! the! pool.! Therefore,! considering! only! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8! In!many!market! designs,! the! company! that! acts! as! a! transmission! provider! also! acts! as! a! dispatcher! and! as! a!
market! operator.! In! the! Brazilian! case,! there! are! three! different! players:! transmission! provider! operates!

























out! of! the! pool! for!market! risk!management! purposes,!which! transforms! these! contracts! in!
financial! hedges.! So,! in! this! case,! these! contracts! are! called! “financial! contracts”! as! a!
counterpoint! to! the! “physical! contracts”! mentioned! in! the! decentralized! market! approach.!
Furthermore,!in!the!centralized!market,!buyers!pay!the!price!that!come!from!the!pool,!which!
can!be!formed!by!different!kinds!of!mechanisms.!
However,! as! point! out! by! [Barroso! et.+ al.,! 2005],! both! market! models,! though! so! much!
different,! can! coexist:! a! pool! could! have! bilateral! contracts! alongside! of! it! and! in! a! bilateral!
contacts!market!a!voluntary!power!exchange!could!be!considered.!
So,!the!difference!between!the!decentralized!market!(or!bilateral!model)!and!the!centralized!
market! (or! pool!model)! can! be! deeply! associated!with! the! dispatch! procedure:!while! in! the!
decentralized! market! participants! are! free! to! negotiate! between! them! in! order! to! close!
contracts,! and! these! closed! contracts! strongly! influence! the! definition! of! the! amount! of!
electricity! that! will! be! produced! and! consumed! by! each!market! participant,! shaping! it! as! a!
“selfSdispatch”;! in! the! centralized!market! sellers! and!buyers! submit! their! bids! into! the! pool,!
and! it! is! through! these! bids! that! it! is! defined! the! generation! of! the! producers! and! the!!
consumption! of! the! consumer,! which! is! summarized! as! the! “central! dispatch”! of! the!
generation!units.!
2.2.1.5+Price+formation+mechanism:+bilateral,+tight+pool+or+loose+pool+
In! the! decentralized!market! approach! (or! bilateral! model),! each!market! participant! pays! or!
receives!in!accordance!to!their!contracts.!So,!a!buyer!must!pay!to!the!seller!the!price!agreed!in!
the! contract,! and! a! seller! will! be! remunerated! considering! the! price! of! the! contract.! As!
previously! explained,! in! this! case! sellers! and! buyers! will! submit! notifications! to! the!market!
operator.! So,! taking! into! consideration! these! notifications,! the! market! operator! runs! the!
dispatch!that!aims!to!minimize!the!difference!between!the!contract!signed!by!the!agents!and!
the!effective!generation![Zucarato,!2003].!Therefore,!the!function!of!the!market!operator!is!to!
close! the! balance! between! load! and! generation! and,! if! there! are! congestions! in! the!
transmission! lines,! this! problem! is! solved! by!modifying! the! notifications! as! little! as! possible!



















the!reservoirs!of! the!hydro!power!plants!has!an!opportunity!cost! linked!with! the!cost!of! the!
fuel! of! the! thermal! power! plants.! In! this! case,! it! is! necessary! to! run! a! computational!
optimization!model! in!order! to!minimize! the!expected!value!of! the!operating!costs!over! the!




computational! optimization! model! [Zucarato,! 2003].! Regarding! the! price! formation,! in! this!
case! the!price!can!be!defined!by!an!uniform!price!or!by! the!paySasSbid! rules.! In! the!uniform!
price!procedure,!as!previously!mentioned,!all!sellers!receive!the!same!price!to!every!accepted!
bid,! and! the! payment! is! done! using! the! marketSclearing! price,! which! is! defined! by! the!
equilibrium! between! supply! and! demand.! In! the! paySasSbid! procedure,! each! seller! is!




the! marginal! cost! of! supplying! the! next! increment! of! electric! energy! demand! at! a! specific!
location! or! node.! When! there! is! transmission! congestion,!electricity! cannot! flow! freely! to!
certain! locations.! In! that!case,!moreSexpensive!electricity! is!ordered!to!meet! that!demand! in!
some! locations.! As! a! result,! the! LMP! is! higher! in! those! locations! [PJM,! 2014a].! Thus,! nodal!
prices!send!clear!signals!to!market!players!regarding!the!location!of!a!new!generating!capacity!
or! transmission! lines,! but! can! also! allow! generators! to! exercise! market! power! if! they! are!




The! market! characteristics! discussed! above! can! be! combined! to! design! different! types! of!
electricity!markets!to!trade!both!energy!and!power!in!order!to!provide!reliability10!and!supply!
adequacy11! of! the! system.! This! section! describes! several! markets! that! emerged! with! the!
market!liberalization:!daySahead,!intraday,!balancing,!forward,!future!and!options!markets.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
powering!water!into!the!reservoir!or!thermal!generation!can!by!not!consuming!the!fuel.!Thus,!the!market!operator!




11! Supply!adequacy! is! connected!with! the! longSterm!ability!of! a!power! system! to!match!demand!and! supply!and!







the! imperfect! coordination! between! them.! There! may! be! weak! links! between! forward! and!
shortSterm! markets,! as! well! as! between! the! distinct! markets! for! electricity! and! reserves.!





instruments! between! production! and! retailing.! These! authors! emphasize! that! markets! are!
incomplete!when! perfect! risk! transfers! between! the! agents! is! impossible.! Thus,! in! practice,!
markets! are! never! complete! since! not! all! risk! factors! are! traded! on! a! market.! In! addition,!
welfare!in!an!incomplete!market!is!lower!than!in!a!complete!market!because!not!all!risks!are!
perfectly!allocated!to!the!participating!agents.!
Nevertheless,! the! approach! propose! by! [Wilson,! 1999]! solves! the! problem! of! market!
incompleteness! relying! on! the! fact! that! repeated! trading! of! few! simple! contracts! can!
approximates! a! complete! market! to! contingent! contracts,! and! that! more! frequent! trading!
opportunities!enhance!the!completeness!of! the!market.!Thus,! total!welfare!can!be! improved!
by!a!sufficient!number!of!additional!markets!until!the!market!is!virtually!complete.!As!!noticed!
by![Hunt,!2002],!a!fully!competitive!market!requires!a!“complete!market”,!that!is,!a!full!set!of!
forward! and! shortSterm! markets! and! riskSmanagement! tools! for! each! specific!
product/time/place.!
Finally,!as!illustrated!in!Figure!2.7,!these!types!of!markets!(forward,!future,!options,!daySahead,!







































renewable! sources! are! connected! to! power! systems! such! as! wind! power! and! PV! systems,!
intraday! markets! are! becoming! increasingly! important.! And! the! reason! is! that! the!
unpredictable!nature!of!these!sources!provokes!imbalances!between!daySahead!contracts!and!
the!real!generated!volumes!that!often!need!to!be!offset!in!intraday!markets.!










prices! exhibit! specific! characteristics! such! as! seasonality,! spikes! and! a! complex! timeSvarying!
volatile! structure.! For! those! producers! that! didn’t! make! a! previous! commitment! to! deliver!
electricity!at!a!certain!price,!there!is!a!chance!to!benefit!from!momentarily!manipulating!that!
price!to!a!higher!level.!!
Taking! into! consideration! this! picture,! [Conejo! et.! at.,! 2005]! states! that! producers! need! to!
forecast!marketSclearing!prices! to! respond!optimally! to! the!pool!and! to!efficiently!engage! in!
bilateral!contracts.!In!the!shortSrun,!a!producer!with!low!capability!of!altering!marketSclearing!
prices!(priceStaker!producer)!needs!daySahead!price!forecasts!to!optimally!selfSschedule!and!to!
drive! its! bidding! strategy! in! the! pool.! In! the! mediumSterm,! a! priceStaker! producer! requires!
marketSclearing! price! forecasts! of! several!months! ahead! in! order! to! sign! favorable! bilateral!
contracts.!Retailers!and!large!consumers!need!daySahead!price!estimates!for!the!same!reasons!
as! producers.! These! price! forecasts! constitute! fundamental! information! for! the! retailers! to!
selfSschedule!and!to!bid!efficiently!in!the!pool,!and!to!engage!in!profitable!bilateral!contracts.!
Consequently,!as!stated!by![CCEE,!2012a],!in!most!of!the!electricity!markets!in!the!world,!the!
daySahead!price! reference! is!of!great! importance! for! the!wholesale!market.!Since!daySahead!







Given! that! electricity! is! not! storable! in! meaningful! quantities,! the! instantaneous! balance!
between! demand! and! supply! is! a! core! concern! of! system! operators.! Regarding! the! physical!
operation,! it! is! almost! inevitable! that! imbalances! occur! due! to! the! stochastic! nature! of! the!
demand,! unpredictable! plant! outages,! or! fluctuating! renewable! energy! production.! Thus,!
reserves! are! needed! to! correct! any! imbalances! in! real! time! and! to! ensure! the! security! and!
quality!of!electricity!supply.!
As!reported!by![Zhang!&!Lo,!2009],!in!the!traditional!vertically!utilities!this!service!is!provided!
by! additional! generations! (the! reserves)! from! the! cheapest! to! the!most! expensive! available!
source,! and! the! price! to! supply! the! imbalances! is! already! preSfixed! through! the! bulk! supply!
tariff.! With! market! liberalization,! the! provision! of! these! reserves! has! been! increasingly!





ahead! or! intraday! markets).! In! other! words,! the! system! operator! acquires! the! right! to! use!
capacity! in! the! balancing! markets! in! order! to! perform! the! secondSbySsecond! balancing! of!
demand!and!supply.!
So,! in! order! to! have! reserves! to! handle! with! the! random! deviations! between! the! energy!
scheduled!and!the!actual!operation,!system!operators!buy!the!provision!of!reserves!from!the!
market!participants!(i.e.!the!system!operator!contracts!various!parties!for!delivery!of!balancing!
services! such! as! primary! reserve! and! secondary! and! tertiary! reserves).! Thus,! in! consonance!
with! [Weber,! 2010],! the! balancing! markets! are! asymmetric! by! design,! and! this! is! one!
fundamental! conceptual! difference! between! the! balancing! markets! and! the! daySahead! and!
intraday!markets.!In!other!words,!ancillary!services!are!solely!the!responsibility!of!the!system!
operator.!Therefore,! this!entity! is! the!single!purchaser!party! in!procuring!reserve!auctions!to!
meet!its!reliability!obligations![Singh,!1999].!
The! demand! on! balancing!markets! only! stems! from! grid! operators,! whereas! generators! are!
solely!acting!on!the!supply!side.![Weber,!2010]!recalls!that!this!is!the!first!phase!of!this!market,!
which! is! named! marketSbased! reserve! procurement.! System! operators! use! the! procured!




In! order! to! ensure! a! stable! operation! of! the! transmission! network,! the! system! operator!
continually! levels! imbalances! out! by! maintaining! the! generated! electricity! at! a! constant!











divided! into! primary,! secondary! and! tertiary! control.! The! balancing! qualities! of! the! three!
stages!differ!in!terms!of!the!activation!method!and!the!response!speed.!In!each!stage!control,!
the! system! operator! provides! a! certain! amount! of! incremental! and! decremental! capacity,!
which!is!held!by!reserve!for!when!deviations!occurs.!The!function!of!these!three!control!stages!




take! several! minutes! to! occur,! with! a! maximum! of! 5! min.! Tertiary! control! reserve! (also!




can! be! separately! procured! by! specific! auctions.! The! aforementioned! author! describes! the!
example!of!the!Germany!balancing!market:!
• An! InternetSbased!balancing!power!market!was!established!by! the! system!operator! to!
acquire! the! three! types! of! balancing! services! by! singleSside! auctions.! Primary! and!
secondary! reserve! capacity! is! procured! twice!per! year! for! sixSmonth!periods,!whereas!
tertiary!reserve!auctions!take!place!on!a!daily!basis;!
• Primary!reserve!bids!consist!of!the!offered!quantity!(capacity)!and!of!the!price!asked!for!
the! electricity! that! is! actually! deployed.! In! contrast,! selling! bids! for! secondary! and!
tertiary! reserve! contain! two! price! bids12:! the! capacity! price! (paid! for! holding! the!
specified! generation! capacity! in! reserve,! and! then! lose! the! opportunity! to! sell! this!
electricity! elsewhere)! and! the! electricity! price! (paid! for! the! electricity! that! is! actually!
deployed!for!balancing!purposes)13;!
• Then,!the!scheme!adopted!to!remunerate!successful!bids!is!the!paySasSbid!settlement.!






















To! sum! up,! in! order! to! balance! the! supply! and! the! demand! taking! into! consideration! the!
framework!of!the!market!liberalization,!several!market!that!impose!physical!delivery!of!energy!
are! running:! daySahead,! intraday! and! balancing! markets.! The! balancing! markets! address,!





at! an! agreed! price.! However,! despite! forward! and! future! contracts! are! similar! in! that! they!
specify!an!agreed!price!and!future!date!for!delivery!of!the!product,!they!differ!in!other!terms.!
Forward! contracts! are! traded! via!OTC! at! a! fixed! price! established! on! the! date! at!which! the!
contract!is!originated!and!with!settlement!at!the!time!of!delivery![Platts,!2014].!Thus,!there!is!
no!cash!paid!initially,!and!the!contract!price!is!paid!only!at!the!time!of!delivery,!when!the!asset!
is! received.! Any! difference! between! the! market! value! of! the! product! (e.g.! the! price! of!
electricity!in!the!daySahead!market)!and!the!contract!price!at!the!date!of!delivery!represents!a!
profit!or!loss!for!the!parties!involved!in!the!contact![Hunt!&!Shuttleworth,!1996].!Furthermore,!
in! contrast! to! futures! contracts,! forward! contracts! are! tailorSmade! products! rather! than!
standard!products,!and!are!not!transferable![CME!Group,!2014].!
Future!contracts!are!generally!traded!on!a!power!exchange!at!a!price!agreed!upon!at!the!time!
of!dealing! [Platts,!2014],!and!with!continuous! settlement!of!differences!between! the!agreed!

















to!offset!his!obligations! [Hunt!&!Shuttleworth,!1996].!Moreover,! futures! contracts!deal!with!
relatively! shortSterm! transactions! (1S3!months)! if! compared! to! forward! contracts! [Nakamura!
et.+al.,!2006].!
While! forward! contracts! can! be! customized! to! suit! the! specific! needs! of! the! two! involved!
counterparties,!the!future!contracts!add!liquidity!to!the!market!since!they!enhance!the!ability!
of!the!market!to!facilitate!a!product!being!sold!quickly.!So,!various!forms!of!forward!and!future!
contracts! are! widely! used! in! electricity! markets! to! manage! financial! risks! associated! with!




on! the! producers.! Despite! these! contracts! have! taken! various! forms,! they! all! have! one!
important! feature! in! common:! they! commit! producers! to! receive! a! fixed! price! for! a! certain!
fraction! of! their! output! before! wholesale! market! competition! takes! place! [Frutos! &! Fabra,!
2012].!!
Besides! the! market! power,! there! are! other! concerns! that! can! be! enhanced! by! forward!
contracts,!such!as!risk!and!investment.![Ausubel!&!Cramton,!2010]!defend!the!thesis!that!the!
goals! of! electricity! market! design! are! better! met! when! the! shortSterm! market! is!
complemented!with! two! forward!markets,! one!mediumSterm!and!one! longSterm.! They! start!
underlining! that! a! wellSdesigned! shortSterm! market! is! necessary! for! efficiency,! but! is! not!




fluctuations! of! the! shortSterm! price! (i.e.! it! addresses! the! market! risk)! and! mitigates! the!
incentive!to!distort!bids!(i.e.!it!addresses!the!market!power).!In!longSterm,!a!forward!reliability!
market!assures!that!adequate!resources!are!available!when!they!are!needed!(i.e.!it!addresses!
the! security! of! supply).! So,! forward!markets:! reduce! risk! for! both! sides! of! the!market,! since!
they! reduce! the! quantity! of! energy! trades! at! the! shortSterm! price;! prevent! market! power!
because!suppliers!are!in!roughly!balanced!positions!when!they!enter!in!the!shortSterm!market!
and,! thus,! their! behavior! in! this!market! is! likely! less! extreme;! and! coordinate! investment! in!
new!resources,!assuring!the!supply!adequacy.!
2.2.2.4+Options+market+
In! deregulated! electricity! markets,! both! consumers! and! producers! of! electricity! can! better!










Intraday,! daySahead,! forward! and! futures! contracts! are! all! agreements! to! deliver! a! fixed!
quantity!at!a!defined!time!in!the!future.!However,!since!many!traders!prefer!to!retain!a!degree!
of!flexibility!to!future!deliveries,!the!option!contracts!allow!for!a!trader!to!decide!whether!or!
not! the! electricity! should! be! delivery! at! a! later! date! [Hunt! &! Shuttleworth,! 1996].! Unlike! a!
forward!or!future!contract,!an!option!contract!does!not!oblige!the!holder!to!buy!the!asset.!!
According!to![IEA,!2005],!this!notion!of!“value!of!optionality”!(i.e.!the!felling!that!an!option!of!
postponing! an! action! has! a! value)! is! becoming! more! and! more! recognized! in! many! risky!
business!environments,! including!electricity!markets.!This!author!observes!that! it! is!valuable:!
for! the! trader! who! owns! a! future! contract! to! be! able! to! postpone! the! decision! to! sell! the!
contract! until! he! knows! how! the! price!will! behavior;! for! the! investor! to! build! a! new! power!
plant! in! small! steps,! once! he! can! be! able! to!wait! until! the! option! is! called! or! the! project! is!




consumer)! the! right! to! buy! the! asset! (electricity)! at! a! specified! price! at! some! time! in! the!











power! plant! (cost! per! KWh! produced),! and! the! holder! can! call! options! in! order! to!
dispatch!the!power!plant!when!the!market!price!is!above!the!exercise!price;!and!
• The!fixed!premium!(or!option! fee),!which! is! the!price!to!purchase!the!option!contract,!
can! correspond! to! the! fixed! cost! of! the! power! plant! (cost! per! installed! kW),! and! the!
issuer!can!sell!options!in!order!to!support!investment!in!new!generation!capacity.!
By!doing! so,! the!generator! is!demanding! (and!customer! is!willing! to!pay)! a! fixed! revenue! to!
recover!the!power!plant! investment,!and!the!revenues!obtained!when!the!option!contract! is!
exercised! will! recover! the! generator’s! variable! cost! for! running! the! power! plant.! Thus,! this!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!










modeling! related! to! the! construction! of! the! project.! In! addition,! these! longSterm! contracts!
have!clauses!that!contain!an!explicit!“availability!payment”!(or!“capacity!payment”)!to!recover!
the!fixed!cost,!and!an!“energy!payment”!to!recover!the!variable!cost!when!the!power!plant!is!
running.! However,! the! option! contracts! cover! risks! and! foster! efficiency! in! a! different! way:!
through! mediumSterm! contracting! (instead! of! longSterm! contracting)! that! takes! place! in! a!
shorter!time!interval.!
[Vazquez!et.+al.,!2002]!report!that!in!an!organized!market!where!reliability!contracts!based!on!
financial! call! options! are! auctioned,! both! the! total! amount! of! money! to! be! pay! to! the!
generators! (in! exchange! for! their! availability)! and! its! allocation! among! the! different! power!




financially! exercised.! Physical! exercise! entails! delivery! of! the! contracted! energy! by! the!
counterparty! (by! scheduling! as! a! bilateral! contract),! and! financial! exercise! entails! a! financial!






• Initially,! the! regulator! sets! the! basic! parameters:! i)! strike! price;! ii)! total! amount! of!
options!to!be!bought,!Q,!which!depends!on!the!expected!demand!and!on!the!adopted!
reliability!criteria;!iii)!value!of!the!explicit!penalty;!and!iv)!time!horizon!of!the!auction;!
• The! generators! submit! their! bids! (each!of! them! is! a!pair! of! price! and!quantity)! to! the!
auction.!The!quantity! in! the!bid!expresses! the!capacity! that! the!generator! is!willing! to!














contract! an! explicit! obligation! associated! to! the! physical! delivery! of! the! committed!
capacity:!the!additional!penalty;!and!
• The! buyer! of! the! option! receives! from! the! seller,! for! each!MW! purchased! under! the!














by! the! system!operator! (ISO! –! Independent! System!Operator! or! TSO!–! Transmission! System!
Operator),! especially! regarding! the! dispatch! schedule! procedure,! and! the! electricity!market,!
particularly! concerning! the! commercial! commitments! and! investment! of! the! market!
participants.!In!other!words,!the!analysis!in!this!section!focuses!on:!
• How!is!the!meet!between!the!physical!dispatch!(that!is!designed!to!achieve!the!minimal!
operational! cost! in! each! account! period,! as! it! occurs! in! the! centralized!market,! or! to!
minimize! the!difference!between! the!contracts! signed!and! the!effective!generation,! in!
the!decentralized!market)!and!the!commercial!commitment!of! the!market!participants!
and!their!decisionSmaking!process!for!investment!in!new!capacities.!
Regarding! only! the! physical! operation,! concerns! related! to! the! performance! of! the! power!
system!can!be!address!by!the!evaluation!of!the!power!grid!stability.!These!concerns!deal!with!
quality! indicators!which!refer!to!technical!phenomena!such!as!variations! in!frequency,!shortS






commercial! commitments! of! the!market! participants! and! their! capacity! to! deliver! the!
contracts! through! their! own! generation.! In! this! sense,! it! can! be! expected! a! smooth!
combination! between! the! dispatch! schedule! procedure! executed! by! the! market!
operator! and! the! ability! of! the!market! design! to! allow! the! agent! to! take! part! on! the!














So,! just!as! it! is! important!to!have!quality! in!physical!operation!of!the!power!system,!it! is!also!
crucial!to!have!quality!regarding!the!market!design!of!the!electricity!sector.!The!market!design!
completeness! in! the! shortSterm! is! discussed! in! Section! 2.3.1,! while! the! market! design!
adequacy!in!the!longSterm!is!discussed!in!Section!2.3.2.!
Apart! from! the! imbalances! discussed! in! the! balancing! market! (Section! 2.2.2.2),! which! are!
inevitable! to!happen!due! the!unpredictable!nature!of!events! such!as! the! stochastic!demand!
pattern,! power! system! equipment! unexpected! failures! and! volatility! of! renewable! energy!
production,! because! of! the! incompleteness! and! failures! of! market! designs! it! may! occur:!
exposure!to!the!imbalance!price!due!the!absence!of!flexibility!to!enable!agents!to!endure!their!
contracted!positions! through! their!own!generation! (Section!2.3.1);!and! lack!of! investment! in!
the!system!expansion!due!the!absence!of!generators’!interest!(Section!2.3.2).!
Moreover,! while! the! unpredictable! “energy! imbalances”! can! cause! loss! of! stability! of! the!
power! grid,! the! aboveSmentioned! “exposed! position”! and! “lack! of! investments”! can!
undermine!or!destabilize!the!electricity!market.!In!order!to!clarify!these!issues,!equations!2.3,!
2.4!and!2.5!expresses!the!energy!imbalances,!exposed!positions!and!lack!of!investments.!
!"#$%&!!"#$%$&'(! = !"#$!!"#$%&'(#) − ! !"ℎ!"#$!!!"#$%&'(#) !! ! !!!!!! !!!!!(2.3)!
!!"#$%&'!!"#$%$"&! = !"#$!!"#$%&'(#) − ! !"#$%&!$'(!!"!#$% ! ! !!!!!! !!!!!(2.4)!
!!"#$!!"!!"#$%&'$"&!~! !"!#$!!"#$%&&'(!!"#"!$%& − !"#$!%!!!"#$%! ! ! !!!!!(2.5)!
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the! market! participants! are! active! in! the! dispatch! procedure,! and! generators! have! the!
possibility! to! repetitively! adjust! their! bids! and! thus! avoid! energy! imbalances! and! exposed!
positions.! In! this! case,! since! the! commercial! committed! that! comes! from! the! DA! and! ID!























be! active! in! order! to! comply! with! their! contracted! positions.! Nonetheless,! when! longSterm!
contracts!are!concluded,!and!the!scheduled!production!takes!place!without!considering!these!
commercial!commitments,! large!differences!between!the!energy! imbalance!and!the!exposed!










case18.! Furthermore,! in! the! Brazil! generators! are! allowed! to! set! once! a! year! the! monthly!














































Therefore,! some! mechanism! for! sharing! this! risk! can! be! implemented,! and! this! is! what!
happens!in!Brazil.!The!mechanism!designed!particularly!to!share!this!kind!of!risk!is!translated!in!
rules! that! run! in! the! settlement! process! and! are! applied! automatically! to! all! market!
participants.!As!a!result,!this!is!not!endowed!with!flexibility!in!a!sense!that!generators!cannot!




a! slightly! broader! outlook! on! the! problem.! This! table! intends! to! examine! the! conciliation!
between!the!market!designs,!considering!some!markets!and!their!elements,!and!the!physical!
operation!of!the!power!system,!in!particular!with!the!dispatch!schedule.!Thus,!it!addresses!the!
divergences! that! can! exist! between! the! ISO/TSO! duties! and! the! market! participants!
commercial! commitments.! Moreover,! this! table! focuses! on! markets! for! electricitySrelated!
commodity!and!ancillary!services,!and!the!last!column!does!not!include!taxes!or!subsidies!that!
usually!compose!the!tariff!of!the!final!consumers.!!
Model!1!doesn’t!deal!with! contracts! since! this! industry! structure! is! related! to! the! command!




In! the! Brazilian! case,! which! contains! Model! 2! coexisting! with! Model! 4,! generators! are! not!
active!in!the!centralSdispatch!procedure!and!the!ISO/TSO!dispatches!the!power!plants!without!
considering! the! quantity! committed! through! the! longSterm! contracts.! Generators! have! no!
alternatives!to!manage!their!contracted!positions,!and!thus!they!can!be!exposed!to!the!risk!of!
Significant  

























































































































































































































Consequently,! what! happens! in! Brazil! is! that,! although! the! trades! are! made! by! longSterm!
contracts!(PPA),!for!the!case!of!Regulated!Contracting!Environment!–!ACR,!or!by!mediumSterm!
contracts! usually! via! OTC,! as! occurs! in! the! Free! Contracting! Environment! –! ACL+ (both!
“contracting! environment”! are! discussed! in! Chapter! 3),! it! is! inevitable! that! the! amount!





physical! notifications! to! the! ISO/TSO,! and! the! ISO/TSO! works! to! minimize! the! difference!
between!these!notifications!and!the!real!generation.!In!the!pool!model,!generators!submit!bids!
into! the! power! exchange,! and! the! dispatch! of! the! ISO/TSO! aims! to!minimize! the! operation!
cost,!which! is!done!by!dispatching!the!generators!that!had!successful!bids.!However,! in!both!




designed! to! rely!on!bilateral! trades! [Joskow,!2008].!Prior! to!2001S2002,! the!Texas!wholesale!
market!was!designed!to!foster!bilateral!contracts!between!the!generation!companies!and!the!
retail! suppliers! in! order! to! reduce! consumer! exposure! to! hourStoShour! fluctuations! of!
electricity! prices.! In! this! market! design,! the! ISO! does! not! operate! a! centralized! shortSterm!
market! for! electricity,! but! he! does! operate! a! balancing!market!with! some! similar! attributes!
[Zarnikau,!2005].!
Instead!of!the!centralized!market,!the!ISO!required!to!the!Qualified!Scheduling!Entities!(QSEs)!
to! submit! ‘‘balanced! schedules’’! on! a! daySahead! basis! to! ensure! that! these! entities! had!
arranged! for! sufficient! generation! resources! and! ancillary! services! to! meet! the! expected!
demand!they!had!committed!to!serve![Zarnikau,!2005].! In!the!end!of!2002,!balance!schedule!








2003,! which! is! named! Wholesale! Power! Market! Platform! (WPMP).! The! WPMP! consists! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!







centralized! energy!markets! (such! as! daySahead!market! and! a! realStime!market20),! balancing!
market!for!ancillary!services,!financial!transmission!rights!market,!and!!some!mechanisms!such!
as!capacity!markets!to!ensure!supply!adequacy.!!
Beside! the! priceSsensitive! bids! that! are! submitted! to! the!market! operator! in! the! centralized!
market! that! follows! the! WPMP,! it! is! possible! for! the! generators! to! selfSschedule! their!
generation.!This! selfSscheduling! is!used! to!support!bilateral! trades,!both! financial! (essentially!
Contracts!for!Difference!–!CfD21)!and!physical!ones.!This!is!done!by!separately!submitting!selfS
schedule! bids! to! the! market! operator,! then! it! is! run! the! pool! clearing! algorithm! which!
automatically! accepts! selfSschedules! subject! to! transmission! constraints! and! then! issues! the!
final!schedule!including!feasible!selfSschedule.!
In!Europe,! the!European!Regulator’s!Group! for!Electricity!and!Gas! (ERGEG)! launched! in!2006!
the! Electricity! Regional! Initiatives! (ERI),! which! were! designed! with! the! ultimate! goal! of!
implementing! a! panSEuropean! electricity! market! called! Electricity! Market! Target! Model!
(EMTM)![Imran!&!Kockar,!2014].!With!similarities!in!relation!with!the!WPMP!designed!by!FERC,!
this! emerging! design! for! the! European! market! consists! of! four! basic! components:! forward!
market,! daySahead! market,! intraSday! market! and! balancing! market.! Besides! that,! capacity!
mechanisms!are!also!a!concern!among!European!countries.!
In! addition,! some! nuances! can! be! found!when! comparing! the!market! design! named!WPMP!
(FERC’s! proposal)!with! that! one! called! EMTM! (ERGEG’s! proposal),! and! these! differences! are!
presented!in!Table!2.2.!Nonetheless,!in!both!WPMP!and!EMTM!proposals!there!is!a!smoothly!





In! markets! as! daySahead,! intraday! and! balancing! markets,! players! are! more! active! in! the!
definition!of!the!merit!order!on!daySbySday!basis!and!so!they!have!more!opportunities!to!cover!
their! positions! engaged! by! bilateral! contracts.! This! fact! can! be! viewed! as! a! higher!

























































2.3.2%Market% design% adequacy% in% the% longVterm:%How%does% the% shortVterm%market% allocate%
feasible%technologies%in%order%to%add%new%capacities?%
Once! addressed! the!market! design! considering! a! shortSterm!perspective! in! order! to! analyze!
the!completeness!of!the!market!design,!it!will!now!be!addressed!the!supply!adequacy,!i.e.!the!
ability! of! a! power! system! to! match! demand! and! supply! taking! into! consideration! the!
investment! decisions! of! the! market! participants.! Moreover,! this! issue! is! related! to! the!
decisionSmaking! process! of! participants! in! a! longSterm! perspective.! To! do! so,! it! is! also!
necessary! to! have! in! mind! the! price! formation! mechanism,! the! dispatch! procedure,! and!
particularly!the!inherent!investment!cost!of!the!power!plants.!!
Thinking! about! the! market! liberalization! and! the! restructuring! of! the! electricity! sector,!
especially! the!move! from!Model! 1! to!Model! 2,! 3! or! 4,! the! connection! between! the!market!
design! and! the! physical! operation! of! the! power! plants! is! relevant! because,! as!mentioned! in!





22! To! recapitulate,! liberalized! markets! create! a! new! investment! paradigm! in! which! decisions! are! taken! under!
competitive!pressure.!In!consequence,!Models!3!and!4!will!break!up!the!centralized!decisionSmaking!process!that!is!








In! the! end,! one!wants! to! avoid! the! “lack! of! investment”! (already!mentioned! in! Section! 2.3,!
equation!2.5).!Thus,!the!analysis!of!this!section!focuses!on!the!following!questions:!Are!there!in!
the!market! design! enough! incentives! to! provide! adequate! investment?!Will! the! response!of!
generators! regarding! the! shortSterm! prices! come! in! the! form! of! new! facilities?! Should! a!
capacity!mechanism!be!added!to!the!market!design?!
Let’s! start! supposing! that!generators!should!sell! their!electricity!only! through!the!shortSterm!
market.!This! scenario!corresponds! to! the!case!of!Models!3!and!4!admitting! that!participants!
trade! in! a! centralized!market! only! via! a! power! exchange! in! a! daySahead!market.! As! already!
mentioned,! in! this! condition! competition! continuously! occurs! on! a! daySbySday! basis.! In!
addition,!it!is!assumed!that!the!price!formation!mechanism!is!the!loose!pool!(all!agents!submit!
bids! under! the! form! of! pairs! of! prices! and! quantities),! and! the!market! operator,! aiming! to!
minimize!the!operation!cost,!will!dispatch!the!generating!units!in!order!of!their!prices!bid!from!
the! lower! to! the! higher! one! until! the! demand! is! met.! Finally,! in! order! to! remunerate! the!
successful! bids,! it! can! be! chosen! either! the! paySasSbid! or! the! uniform! price! settlement!
procedures.!Lastly,!for!the!time!being!let’s!assume!that!this!market!design!adopts!the!uniform!
price!procedure.!
To! support! this! analysis,! it! is! useful! to! address! the! cost! structure! of! the! generation,! i.e.! the!
Total! Cost! (TC),! Fixed! Cost! (FC),! Variable! Cost! (VC)! and!Marginal! Cost! (MgC).! The! fixed! cost!
does! not! depend! on! the! production! volumes,! and! consists! of! depreciation! charges,! lease!
payments,! insurance! premiums,! interest! on! loans,!wages! of! the! permanent! staff,! and! some!
other! expenditures;! while! the! variable! cost,! on! contrary,! vary! with! the! change! in! the!
production!volumes,!and!consists!of!expenditures!on!material,!fuel,!a!certain!part!of!labor!and!
similar!variable!resources![Belyaev,!2011].!
In! particular,! averageScost! data! are! more!meaningful! for! making! comparisons! with! product!
price,!which!is!always!calculated!on!a!perSunit!basis.!Moreover,!a!company!decision!regarding!
what!should!be!the!level!of!production!is!typically!a!marginal!decision.!Thus,!the!marginal!cost,!
which! is! defined! as! the! additional! cost! in! producing! one!more! unit! of! the! output,! is! also! a!
crucial!concept.!As!explained!by![McConnel!et.+al.,!2009],!marginal!cost!designates!either!the!





AVC),! that! is! for! a! specified! quantity! q! the! corresponding! ATC! is! the! sum! of! AFC! and! AVC!













Concerning! the!decision! to! shut!down!a!power!plant!or! to!produce!electricity! in! this!market!
design,!as!shown!by![Belyaev,!2011],!generator!face!the!following!situation:!
A. At!the!market!price!that!is!below!the!value!at!point!A,!that!is!below!p1,!the!power!plant!
cannot! recover! even! its! variable! cost,! and! thus! the! generator! should! shut! down! the!
power!plant;!
B. At!the!market!price!between!the!values!at!point!A!and!point!B,!that!is!between!p1!and!
p2,! the! power! plant! recovers! its! variable! cost,! but! the! fixed! cost! is! incompletely!
recovered,!and!then!the!power!plant!cannot!operate!for!long;!
C. At!the!market!price!equal!to!the!value!at!point!B,!that!is!p2,!it!is!profitable!for!the!power!






value! at! point! A! (MgC! crossing! AVC),! if! they! expect! that! their! fixed! cost! will! be! recovered!
somehow23,! or! at! least! equal! to! values! at! point! B! (MgC! crossing! ATC),! if! they! are! trying! to!
recover!both!the!variable!and!fixed!costs!in!the!shortSterm!market.!So,!the!question!from!now!
on!is:!how!can!the!fixed!cost!be!recovered!in!this!example!of!market!design24?!
First! of! all,! it! must! be! said! that! some! energy! market! supporters! indicate! that! revenues!

























market! contains! participants! that! own! several! types! of! power! plants! from! different!
technologies.!Power!plants!of!diverse!types!differ!in!their!mix!of!costs!(fixed!and!variable),!not!
to! mention! operating! conditions! and! other! issues.! Considering! the! postulate! stated! in! the!
previous!paragraph,!these!agents!will!submit!bids!to!recover!the!AVC!(point!A),!and!wait!that!
the! shortSterm! price! reaches! higher! values.! During! these! periods,! since! an! uniform! price!














In! the! long! run,! according! to! the! classical! economic! theory,! the! market! will! reach! an!
equilibrium,! and! then! the!mix! of! technologies!will! be! chosen! by! the!market! itself:! i)! power!








VC,!and! thus,! from!the!perspective!of! the!shortSterm!market,! the!vertical!axis!of!Figure!2.14!
will!have!ATC!instead!of!AVC.!




















In!addition,! if! later!on! the!market!price!p*! is! so!high!and!above! the!point!B!during! so!many!
periods! that! it! will! give! to! some! generators! an! “economic! profit”,! then! more! of! these!
generators!will!enter!into!this!market,!and!the!market!in!long!run!will!reach!a!new!equilibrium.!
This!process! is! illustrated! in!Figure!2.15!through!the!following!steps:! first!some!power!plants!
are! implemented!because!they!are!attracted!by! the!economic!profit! (in! this!example:!hydro,!
nuclear! and! coal);! thus,! the! supply! curve! shifts! to! the! right! (from! S1! to! S2);! and! then! the!















prevent! the! construction! of! certain! kinds! of! power! plants,! such! as! the! infraSmarginal!
generators!(i.e.!those!that!are!below!the!marginal!resource!in!the!merit!order).!!Among!these!
constrains! one! can! mention:! political,! social! and! environmental! limitations! to! deploy! new!
hydro!and!nuclear!power!plants.!In!these!situations,!considering!only!the!economic!theory,!this!
electricity! market! may! not! work! efficiently! because! the! market! cannot! efficiently! allocate!
feasible!technologies!in!order!to!add!new!capacities!to!the!power!system.!
Beyond! that,! the!market! can!pass! through! a! learning! period!until! producers! and! consumers!
understand!the!risk!involved!and/or!the!market!rules!become! suitable! and! trustful.! But! this!
learning! process! can! be! long! and! painful,! which!may! include! several! rationing! periods,! and!
politicians!can!intervene!before!the!market!complete!its!learning.!
Moreover,! it! should! be! recalled! that! when! risks! are! shifted! from! consumers! to! producers,!
power! plants! with! large! fixed! cost! and! with! long! construction! times! are! viewed! with! great!






















3! or! Model! 4! (the! wholesale! and! retail! competition,! respectively).! However,! while! under!
certain!circumstances!of!Models!3!and!4! (where!there! is!a!marketSbased!economic!and!then!
the!decision!to!invest!is!decentralized)!there!may!be!reluctance!of!the!entrepreneurs!to!invest!








as! to! if! and!when! investors!will! build! new! generation! capacity,! has! compelled! a! number! of!
Members! States! of! the! European! Union! to! intervene! by! introducing! Capacity! Mechanisms!
(CMs)! in! order! to! provide! additional! stimulus! to! investors! and! to! ensure! that! a! sufficient!
amount! of! capacity!will! be! available”.! A! variety! of! CM!mechanisms! have! been! proposed! by!
ACER.!As! reported!by!ACER,! five!different! types!of!CM!can!be!defined!according! to!whether!











25! A! similar! classification! is! found! in! [FSR,! 2014a]! since! these! mechanisms! are! grouped! in:! “capacity! markets”,!
defined!as!volumeSbased!mechanisms!in!which!a!fixed!amount!of!capacity!is!predetermined!(under!this!scheme!the!





















Strategic! reserve! contracts! can! contain! provisions! for! notification! time,! duration! of!
activation,!etc.;!
• Capacity%obligation:!It!is!a!decentralized!scheme!where!obligations!are!imposed!on!large!
consumers!and!on! load!serving!entities!to!contract!a!certain! level!of!capacity! linked!to!
their!selfSassessed!future!consumption!or!supply!obligations.!The!parties!can!fulfill!their!
obligations!through!ownership!of!plants,!contracting!with!generators/consumers!and/or!
buying! tradable! capacity! certificates! (issued! to! capacity! providers).! These! capacity!







of! the! total! demand.! This! entity! calculates! how! much! generation! capacity!
consumers/suppliers! require! based! on! the! expected! total! peak! demand.! The! total!
required!capacity!is!set!several!years!in!advance!and!procured!through!an!auction!by!the!
independent!entity.!Contracted!capacity! should!be!available!according! to! the! terms!of!
the!contract;!
• Reliability% option:! It! is! an! instrument! similar! to! call! options.! In! this! mechanism,!
consumers!or! an! independent! entity! on! their! behalf! buy!options.!As! it!was!previously!
discussed!when!addressing!the!option!market!(Section!2.2.2.4),!when!the!market!price!




their! future! consumption! or! supply! obligations,! which! becomes! similar! to! a! scheme!
based!on!capacity!obligations;!
• Capacity% payment:! The! simplest! type! of! capacity! mechanism! is! to! provide! direct!
capacity!payments.!The!capacity!payment! is!defined!and!controlled!by!an! independent!
entity,!and!there!are!different!methods!of!calculating!the!level!of!payments!and!how!to!




As! we! have! seen! previously,! in! order! to! address! the! problem! regarding! the! generation!
adequacy! in! the! longSterm! under! a! market! environment,! it! can! be! relevant! to! implement!
capacity! mechanisms.! The! basic! motivation! underlying! these! schemes! is! to! provide! extra!
income! for! generators! that! cannot! recover! their! fixed! costs! through! the!difference!between!
the!market!prices!and!the!generation!costs.!Moreover,!these!capacity!mechanisms!can!ensure!








the! sequence!markets,! and! the!meet! between! the!market! design! and! the! operation! of! the!
power! plant! regarding! completeness! in! shortSterm! and! adequacy! in! longSterm,! it! is!
summarized!in!this!section!the!mains!points!and!findings.!
To!bring!the!chapter!to!a!close,!Table!2.3!details!a!number!of!relevant!issues!of!the!preceding!
sections,! including! those! two! raised! in! Section! 2.1! regarding! the! ultimate! goals! of! the!
restructuring! of! the! power! sector:! decrease! of! prices! and! tariffs;! and! sustainability! and!
resilience! of! the! industry.! In! addition,! this! table! highlights! aspects! from! Models! 1! to! 4!
concerning! competition,! low! tariffs,! completeness! of! the! market! and! security! of! supply.!
Bearing! these! themes! in!mind,! the! last! column! includes!main! conclusions! and! tradeSoffs! of!
models.!Besides! that,! to!contextualize! the!case!of! study,! it! is! indicated! in! this! table!where! is!
Brazil!in!this!overall!picture!and!essentially!how!this!market!design!works!nowadays.!
Model!1!has!clear!disadvantages! if! compared!with! the!others.!Despite! the!possibility! to!gain!
efficiency! with! economies! of! scale,! a! striking! feature! of! this! model,! in! practice! it! has! been!
noted!that!negative! factors!overcome! it.!Examples!of! such! factors!are! the! inefficiency!of! the!
statedSowned! players! and! the! inability! of! the! government! to! deal! with! the! growing!
complexities! of! forecasting,! financing,! constructing,! operating! and! maintaining! the! power!
system.!When!leaving!Model!1!we!are!also!eliminating,!for!the!generation!activity,!the!need!to!
deal! with! the! costSbased! and! incentive! regulation.! Moreover,! if! we! move! to! Model! 2!
competition!is!added!in!the!generation!activity,!and!this!activity!represents!around!50S60%!of!
the!electricity!bill!paid!by!end!consumers.!
The!move! from!Model!2! to!Models!3! and!4! is!marked!by! tricky! tradeSoffs.! First!of! all,! to! go!
further! in! the! liberalization! process,! market! should! be! mature,! i.e.! with! wellSdesigned!
institutional! arrangements,! stable! rules! and! favorable! political! environment.! Thus,! for! some!
situations,! it! is! important! to! have!mechanisms! to! address! the! supply! adequacy,! and! Section!
2.3.2!describes!useful!mechanisms!to!attract!investments!for!Models!2,!3!and!4.!
Model!2! implements! the!“competition! for! the!market”!while!Models!3!and!4! implement! the!
“competition! in! the!market”.! The! former! is!put! in!place! through!public! auctions! that!ensure!
winners!to!sign!a!contract!for!a!long!period,!and!the!latter!handles!with!more!diverse!types!of!
contracts!and!stimulates!the!innovation!through!competition!that!continually!occurs!on!a!dayS
bySday! basis.! However,! the! absence! of! longSterm! contracts! increases! the! opportunities! to!
exercise!market!power,! and!when! shifting! from!Model!2! to!Models!3!and!4! consumers!may!
lose!the!bargaining!power!coming!from!the!single!buyer.!
In!Model!2!the!producer!surplus!is!captured!by!the!consumers,!once!during!the!public!auction!
the! paySasSbid! procedure! can! be! adopted! and! the! tariff! can! be! designed! to! capture! the!
weighted! average! of! each! successful! bid.! A! parallel! approach! can! occur! in!Models! 3! and! 4!
when! applying! the! paySasSbid! settlement! in! a! shortSterm!market,! but! with! opportunities! to!
generator! to!cheat.!However,! in!Models!3!and!4!with!a!centralized!market! like!a!daySahead,!


























































































































































































































Moreover,! it! is! worth! reporting! that! no! single! design! or! solution! is! likely! to! work! in! all!





Regarding! the!Brazilian!case,! it! can!be!noted! that! there! is! investment!commitment!once! the!
successful! generators!of! the!public! auction! sign!a! longSterm!contract! to!build! and!operate! a!
power!plant!in!advance.!So,!regarding!the!adequacy!of!the!market!design!for!Brazil,!this!issue!is!
fostered! through! longSterm! contracts! with! availability! payment! and! a! mandatory! bilateral!
contracting! scheme! with! physical! backing.! In! other! words,! this! corresponds! to! the! capacity!






























































In! the!Brazilian!electricity!market,! generators!assume! their! commercial! commitments!mainly!
through! longSterm! contracts,! and! through! the! seasonalization! process! of! the! contracted!
energy! they! are! allowed! to!monthly! distribute! the! energy! committed! by! exSante! contracts.!
However,! they! are! not! allowed! to! decide! their! own! generation! in! order! to! endure! their!
contracts,! which! can! expose! them! to! the! possibility! of! buying! electricity! in! the! shortSterm!
market! at! its! volatile! prices.! Finally,! as! the! ISO! dispatch! is! performed! in! a! centralized! way!
without! considering! closed! contracts,! a! mechanism! for! sharing! the! risk! of! exposition!
automatically!takes!place!in!the!accounting!and!settlement!process!of!the!Brazilian!electricity!






In! the! next! chapter! a! more! detailed! description! about! the! Brazilian! electricity! market! is!
provided,!and!relevant!concerns!are!examined!in!order!to!implement!a!more!marketSoriented!
approach.!In!Chapter!4,!a!new!market!design!is!proposed!to!enhance!the!flexibility!for!hydro!to!































of! the! service! with! lower! tariffs,! has! gone! through! two! large! institutional! and! regulatory!
reforms! in! the! last! twenty! years.! Nowadays,! it! contains! certain! processes,!mechanisms! and!
instruments! that! distinguish! it! from! other! markets.! All! these! features! make! this! case! an!
intriguing!one.!




sector! in! order! to! provide! an! overview,! particularly! regarding! the! reforms! that! were!
implemented! and! the! current! status! quo! (Section! 3.1.1),! quantitative! aspects! of! the! power!
system! (Section! 3.1.2),! the! legal! framework! (Section! 3.1.3),! which! aims! at! providing! a!
normative! background! for! the! participants’! act,! and! the! institutional! framework! (Section!
3.1.4),! i.e.! the!governance!system!and!the!powers!and!duties!of! the!main! institutions!of! this!
sector.!
3.1.1%The%reforms%in%the%electricity%sector%and%the%current%status%quo%





• Unbundling!of! generation,! transmission! and!distribution! activities! in! order! to! enhance!
tariff!transparency!and!implement!competition;!
• Reduction!of!the!role!of!the!stateSowned!companies!by!the!privatization!process;!







Initially! this! reform! promoted! a! transition! to! a!market! where! agents! could! freely! negotiate!
contracts! (Law!9074/1995;! Law!9648/1998),! i.e.! to!a! “free!market!model”! close! to!Models!3!






2006].! During! this! time,! Brazil! had! a! decentralized! energy! planning,! but! with! an! indicative!
energy!planning!conducted!by!the!National!Council!for!Energy!Policy!(CNPE).!
Then,! in! 2001!Brazil! experienced!a!major! electricity! supply! crisis,!which! led! to! an! aggressive!
energy! rationing!programme!experienced! from! June!2001! to! February! 2002.! The!2001/2002!
electricity! rationing! had! major! economic! and! political! impacts.! This! rationing! encompassed!
about!80%!of!population,!GDP!and!electricity!consumption![Maurer!et.+al.,!2005].!Besides!that,!
opposition! parties! identified! the! rationing! as! an! evidence! of! bad! government!management,!
which! led!President!Cardoso!not! to!assure! the!election!of!his!preferred!successor!during! the!
election!campaign!of!2002,!that!lead!to!the!election!of!President!Lula![Rosa!et.+al.,!2013].!
After! examining! the! energy! crises! that! occurred! in! a! number! of! countries,! [Maurer! et.+ al.,!
2005]!stated!that!the!main!causes!of!the!Brazilian!rationing!are:!!
• A!sequence!of!years!drier!than!usual!(the!system!was!and!still! is!mostly!constituted!by!






• The! false! sensation! that! supply! and! demand! were! “physically”! balanced.! From! a!
contractual! standpoint,! Discos! had! energy! to! meet! their! current! and! future! market!
requirements.!Therefore,!no!new!contracts!seemed!to!be!necessary.!However,!the!ISO’s!
predecessor! overestimated! the! volumes! of! available! physical! energy! specified! in!
contractual!arrangements!when!those!contracts!were!put!in!place.!
Consequently,!the!last!two!reasons!stated!above!led!to!insufficient!investments!in!generation,!
i.e.! the! “lack! of! investment”!mentioned! in! the! Section! 2.3.! This! severe! energy! rationing! is! a!
significant! historic! fact! to! understand! the! currently! Brazilian! electricity! model,! since! the!
misbalance!between!the!supply!and!the!demand!was!the!main!motivation!for!the!revision!of!
the! previous! model! and! the! implementation! of! what! became! recognized! as! the! “second!
reform”!of!the!electrical!sector.!
This! second! reform! was! an! electoral! commitment! of! President! Lula! and! it! took! Brazil! to! a!
structure! corresponding! to! Model! 2! (single! buyer! model),! but! preserving! some! features! of!
Model! 4! (competition! in! the! retail! market).! In! practice,! a! new! regulatory! framework!
(introduced! by! Law! 10848/2004)! was! implemented! in! 2004,! which! brought! back! some! old!
fundaments!while!adding!new!guidelines:!
A. Reintroduction! of! the! longSterm! centralized! planning! conducted! by! the! federal!
government!to!address!the!security!of!supply.!Thus,!the!expansion!of!the!system!doesn’t!
rely!on!a!marketSbased!economy;!!








D. Requirement! that! consumers! must! be! fully! supplied! by! energy! and! power! purchase!
contracts,! and! all! contracts! must! be! registered! with! the! Brazilian! market! operator!
(CCEE);!
E. Requirement! that! sellers!must!provide!“physical! coverage”! ! for! the!sale!of!energy!and!
power!to!entirely!ensure!their!contracts;!and!!
F. Restructuring! of! the! retailing! processes! by! the! creation! of! two! contracting!
environments:!a!“regulated”!one!related!to!the!captive!consumers,!which!is!entitled!ACR!
S!Regulated!Contracting!Environment!(similar!to!Model!2),!and!another!one!where!free!






contracting! scheme! (item!D)!with! physical! backing! (item! E)! were! adopted! to! guarantee! the!
return!of!investments!and!to!address!the!security!of!supply.!
Regarding! item!D,! it! is! relevant! to! reinforce! that! the! electricity! demand!of! both!distribution!
utilities!(on!behalf!of!captive!consumers)!and!free!consumers!must!ensure!the!compliance!of!















































associated! with! each! power! plant! project.! Relating! to! a! hydropower! plant,! the! physical!
guarantee! corresponds! to! the! maximum! energy! production! that! can! be! maintained! almost!
continuously! over! the! years,! simulating! the! occurrence! of! thousands! of! inflow! sequences!




By! requiring! that! all! energy! contracts! are! "backed"! to! an! effective! generation! capacity,! it! is!




Moreover,! in! order! to! implement! the! centralized! planning! (items! A! and! B),! the! following!








• strategic! reserve:! it! is! passed! on! to! the! final! consumers! tariff! until! 105%! of! the! total!
amount!of!electricity!purchased!by!Discos!to!meet!their!annual!load!(Decree!5163/2004,!
art! 38º)! and! specific! national! public! auctions! are! implemented! to! contract! reserve! of!
energy!(Law!10848/2004,!art!3º,!§!3º,!and!art!3ºA,!regulated!by!!Decree!6353/2008);!and!
• capacity! payment:! in! the! case! of! auctions! for! availability,! after! the! national! public!














































































All! these! reforms! came! after! the! adoption! of! the! liberalization! of! the! electricity! market.! It!






















Brazil! has! a! large! hydrothermal! power! system! with! strong! predominance! of! hydro! stations!




in! the! main! river! and! its! tributaries.! Examples! of! such! cascades! are! provided! in! Figure! 4.1!
(Section!4.1).!!
Figure%3.3%–%Energy%integration%of%the%Brazilian%interconnected%power%system%[ONS,%2015a]%
These! interconnections! have! historically! been! focused! on! exploiting! the! country’s! vast!
hydroelectric! potential,! typically! located! far! away! from! consumption! centers,! and! to! take!
advantage!of!energy!complementarities!between!regional!hydro!areas!(if!there!is!a!drought!in!
one! geographic! area,! other! areas! can! compensate! it! by! facing! a! wet! season)! [Rosa! et.+ al.,!
2013].!!!
This!power! system!has!more! than!100,000!km!of! transmission! lines! [ANEEL,!2014b],! ranging!
from!138!kV!to!750!kV,!as!shown!in!Figure!3.4.! In!addition,!there!are!68!transmission!agents!














The!Brazilian! population! surpassed! 200!million! in! 2013! [Estadão,! 2014].! The!main! electricity!
consumption!centers!are!interconnected!through!the!SIN,!which!supplied!440!TWh!of!demand!
in!2012![EPE,!2013].!The!SIN,!due!transmission!constraints,!is!divided!in!four!submarkets:!South!
(77.50! TWh! in! 2012),! Southeast/Midwest! (269.12! TWh! in! 2012),! Northeast! (63.89! TWh! in!
2012),! and! North! (29.77! TWh! in! 2012).! In! addition,! in! the! last! 10! years! the! electricity!
consumption!of!the!SIN!has!increased!on!average!4.5%!a!year.!
Only!around!1%!of! the!electricity!demand!required!by!the!country! is! located!outside!the!SIN!
[ONS,! 2015c].! These! very! small! and! isolated! power! systems! are! distributed! in! an! area!
corresponding! to! 45%!of! the!national! territory,!mainly! dispersed! in! the!Amazon!area.! These!
Isolated!Systems!serve!about!1.2!million!consumers![Eletrobras,!2014b],!which!corresponds!to!
less!than!1%!of!the!population.!
Regarding! the! generation! segment,! Table! 3.2! presents! a! summary! of! the! generation!mix! in!
operation! and! under! construction.! As! can! be! noted,! nowadays! the! Brazilian! hydrothermal!






































Nuclear! 2! 1,990! 1.44! 1! 1,350.00! 6.31!
Wind! 269! 6,586.13! 4.74! 111! 2,724.98! 12.74!
Solar! 27! 25.23! 0.02! 0! 0! 0.0!
Hydro!
+CGH:!very!small!!!! 522! 363.32! 0.26!
65.23!
1! 0.84! 0.0!
73.31!+PCH:!smallSmedium! 468! 4,834.57! 3.48! 34! 416.40! 1.95!
+UHE:!largeSvery!large! 197! 87,699.90! 61.49! 11! 15,269.14! 71.36!
Total% 4,258% 142,483.71% ! 178% 21,396.01% !
!
This!market! comprises!more! than! 4,000! generation! agents,! and! the! stateSowned! companies!
are!still!dominant! (only!2!of! the! top!10!are!private!companies).!Table!3.3! lists! the!10! largest!
companies!in!Brazil!in!terms!of!the!installed!capacity.!As!can!be!seen,!if!considering!the!share!








1º Chesf! 10,615! 7,5!
2º! Furnas! 9,919! 7,0!
3º! Eletronorte! 9,199! 6,5!
4º! Tractebel! 7,323! 5,1!
5º! Itaipú! 7,000! 4,9!
6º! Petrobras! 6,718! 4,7!
7º! Cesp! 6,649! 4,7!
8º! Cemig! 5,986! 4,2!
9º! Copel! 4,929! 3,5!











• PCH! or! smallSmedium! hydro:! The! category! “smallSmedium! sized”,! which! is! called! in!
Brazil! by!PCH! (Small! Hydropower),! is! related! to! those! units!with! an! installed! capacity!
larger!than!1!MW!and!equal!or!lower!than!30!MW,!with!a!reservoir!area!lower!than!3.0!
km2,!as!defined!by!the!ANEEL!Resolution!652/2003.!




on!PCHs!and!UHEs).!Appendix!A!presents! the! list!of!all!hydropower!plants! considered! in! the!
simulation! of! the! thesis! (125! hydros),! embracing! 98%! of! the! total! installed! capacity! of! the!
country.!This! list!contains! information!regarding!the!first!year!of!operation,! installed!capacity!
and!physical!guarantee,!among!others.!





services! and!where! companies! signed! contracts!with!municipalities.! So,! the! activities! of! this!








In! the! same! legal! treadmill,! Brazilian! Federal! Constitutions! came! gradually! centralizing! the!
treatment!of!electricity.!In!1967!the!activities!related!to!electricity!were!introduced!into!the!list!
of!competences!of!the!Federal!Union28,!and!this!was!maintained!in!the!Federal!Constitution!of!
1988,! which! is! currently! in! force.! Then,! it! is! pertinent! to! point! out! that,! according! to! the!
Brazilian!Federal!Constitution!(b,!Section!XII,!Article!21):!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28! Brazil! is! organized! as! a! federative! republic! where! 26! states,! 1! federal! district! and! several! municipalities! selfS






“It! is! the! responsibility! of! the! Union! to! operate,! directly! or! through! authorization,!





The!provision! of! electricity! distribution! service! is! done! through! concession! or! permission.! In!
the!case!of!generation,!exploitation!occurs!through!concession!or!authorization.!Moreover,!a!
generation! company! can! be! entitled! as! a! selfSproducer,! independent! producer! or! public!
service:!
• SelfSproducer:! a! generator! that! uses! the! energy! produced! for! own! consumption.! If!
approved,!it!can!also!sell!the!energy!surplus;!!
• Independent! producer:! a! generator! that! intends! to! sell! all! or! part! of! the! energy!
produced!by!his!own!risk;!and!
• Public! service! generator:! a! generator! that! produces! electricity! whose! destination! is!
classified!as!a!public!service.!
Furthermore,! regarding! the!hydropower!plants!and!according! to! the! current! legislation! (Law!











Additionally,! in! this!scenario!both!stateSowned!(from!the!state!and!federal! level)!and!private!
companies! act! in! the! generation,! transmission,! distribution! and! retail! activities,! and! all!
electricity!produced!is!consumed!by!three!types!of!final!consumers:!













The! special! consumers’! category! was! implemented! with! the! purpose! of! encouraging! the!
development!of!such!alternative!renewable!energy!sources,!since!both!special!consumers!and!
generators! take!advantage! from!a! reduction! in! the! fee! related! to! the!use!of! the!distribution!
and!transmission!networks.!
3.1.4%The%institutional%framework!!
Regarding! the! governance! system,! the! new!model! of! the! Brazilian! electricity! sector! created!












As!mentioned! in! Section!3.1.1,!Brazil! has!a! centralized!planning! regarding! the!energy! supply!
adequacy,! and! this! issue! has! been! a! constant! concern,! especially! after! Brazil! experienced! a!
serious! shortage! and! power! rationing.! Furthermore,! during! the! restructuring! process! of! the!
sector! in! 2004,! this! question!was! strongly! embedded!within! the! powers! of! institutions! that!
constitute! the! governance! system! of! the! Brazilian! electricity! sector! nowadays,! as! it! can! be!
clearly!seen!below.!
The!CNPE!(National!Council! for!Energy!Policy)! is! the!advisory! institutional!of! the!President!of!
the! Republic! and! has! the! assignment! to! propose! national! policies! and! specific!measures! to!
promote! the! rational!use!of! energy! resources! in! the! country,! to! regularly! review! the!energy!
matrices,! to! establish! guidelines! for! specific! programs,! and! to! suggest! the! adoption! of!
measures!required!to!ensure!the!supply!of!the!national!electricity!demand,!among!others.!The!
CNPE!was!created!by!Law!9478/1997,!it!is!chaired!by!the!Minister!of!Mines!and!Energy!and!it!
contains:! 9! ministers! of! states,! 1! representative! of! the! Brazilian! states! and! of! the! federal!
district,! 2! experts! in! the! energy! field! (one! related! to! the! civil! society! and! another! to!
universities),!the!executive!secretary!of!the!MME!and!the!CEO!of!EPE.!




















in! accordance! with! the! guidelines! defined! by! CNPE.! The! MME! is! also! responsible! for!




The! EPE! (Energy! Research! Company)! was! established! by! Law! 10847/2004! and! created! by!
Decree! 5184/2004.! It! is! a! stateSowned! company! linked! to! the! MME! with! the! purpose! of!
providing! services! to! support! the! energy! planning.! Among! others,! its! duties! include:! studies!
and! projections! of! the! Brazilian! energy! matrix,! and! the! identification! and! quantification! of!
energy!resources!potential,!including!studies!to!determine!the!optimal!utilizations!of!the!hydro!
energy!potential.!
The! CMSE! (Electricity! Sector!Monitoring! Committee)! is! responsible! for! supporting! the!MME!
regarding!the!monitoring!of!the!security!of!supply.!The!CMSE!was!created!by!Law!10848/2004!
as!a!body!established!under!the!MME!to!mainly!assess!the!conditions!of!supply!and!service!at!
predetermined! periods! (long,! medium,! short! and! very! shortSterm).! It! is! composed! by! the!
Minister!of!Mines!and!Energy,! the! committee! coordinator,! four! representatives!of! the!MME!
and!the!CEOs!of!the!following!institutions:!ANEEL!(Brazilian!Electricity!Regulatory!Agency),!ANP!




transmission,! distribution! and! commercialization! activities,! mediates! conflicts! of! interest!
between! agents! of! the! electricity! sector! and! between! them! and! consumers,! as! well! as!
stimulates! competition! between! agents! and! ensures! the! quality! of! service,! fair! tariffs,! the!
electricity! universalization,! among!others! duties.! ANEEL!was! created! by! the! Law!9427/1996,!
and!it!is!an!authority!over!special!arrangements,!linked!to!the!MME,!but!conceptually!designed!
to! have! independence! regarding! its! decisions! and! internal! administration,! and! financially!
supported!by!a! levy! included! in!electricity!tariffs.!ANEEL! is!headed!by!a!General!Director!and!
four! Directors,! under! a! board! committee.! Their! mandates! are! for! four! years,! and! one! only!
renewal! is!permitted.!The! five!directors!are!appointed!by! the!President!of! the!Republic,!and!
these!appointments!are!subjected!to!prior!approval!of!the!Senate.!
The!current!market!operator,!the!CCEE29,!was!introduced!by!the!Law!10848/2004!and!created!
by! the! Decree! 5177/2004.! It! is! a! nonSprofit! private! entity! under! ANEEL! regulation! and!
supervision.!The!CCEE!is!mostly!intended!to!facilitate!the!trade!of!electricity!in!the!SIN!in!both!



















Law! 9648/1998! and! regulated! by! the! Decree! 2655/1998,! which! was! amended! by! Decree!
5081/2004.! In! accordance! to! its! legal! duties,! the! ONS! must! be! focused! on! the! energy!
optimization! at! the! lowest! operation! cost! and! with! the! guarantee! of! quality! and! safety!








operate! in! the! generation,! transmission,! distribution! and! retail! activities,! plus! the! free! and!
special!consumers.!
Lastly,! it! is! also! worth! commenting! the! role! of! the! Eletrobras! company! in! the! Brazilian!






also! supports! government! programs! such! as! the! Program! of! Incentives! for! Alternative!
Electricity! Sources! (PROINFA),! the! Light! for! All! Program! (the! national! program! for! universal!
access! of! the! end! users! to! electricity),! and! the! National! Energy! Conservation! Program!
(PROCEL).! Besides! that,! Eletrobras! also! manages,! on! behalf! of! the! federal! government,! the!
financial! resources! soScalled! "sector! funds"! such! as! the!Global! Reversion!Reserve! (RGR),! the!
Energy!Development!Account!(CDE)!and!the!Account!of!Fossil!Fuel!Consumption!(CCC).!
3.2. From. Brazilian. market. results. to. the. physical. operation. of. the.
power.system.
To! recap,! Brazil! has! the! Model! 4! (competition! in! the! retail! market),! named! ACL,! for! those!









through! emerging! private! electronic! platform! such! as! the! BRIX! (Brazilian! Intercontinental!
Exchange)! [BRIX,! 2014]! and! the! BBCE! (Brazilian! Energy! Trading! Desk)! [BBCE,! 2014].! These!
platforms!provide!contracts!for!the!current!month!or!for!future!delivery!(monthly,!annual!and!
multiyear!term)!with!a!fixed!price!(R$/MWh)!or!a!variable!price!(PLD!+!premium).!Nowadays,!
the+ ACL! represents! around!30%!of! the!national! electricity!demand,!while! the!ACR! embodies!
70%![APINE,!2014].!
Additionally,!there!is!also!the!shortSterm!market,!in!Brazil!known!as!MCP,!which!is!designed!to!
account! and! settle! the! differences! between! the! contracted! energy! and! the!
generated/consumed!energy!amounts.!
As! the! focus!of! this! research! is!on! the!wholesale! level,! in!order! to!analyze! the!Brazilian!case!
from! its!market! results! to! the! physical! operation,! the! following! sections! cover:! the! national!
public! auctions!of! the!ACR! (Section!3.2.1);! the! seasonalization!mechanism,!which! allows! the!
monthly! distribution! of! the! physical! guarantee! and! the! energy! committed! by! the! exSante!








This! process! begins!when! Discos! submit! to!MME! their! demand! projections! over! a! five! year!
horizon.!As!mentioned!in!the!Section!3.1.1,!Discos!are!required!to!do!that!in!the!beginning!of!
each! year.! Then,!MME,! together!with! EPE,! set! the! total!market! volume! that!will! be! offered!
through! auctions.! In! the! sequence,! ANEEL,! or! CCEE! if! nominated! by! ANEEL,! coordinates! the!





These! auctions! have! solidified! the! second! structural! reforms! of! the! sector,! and! they! play! a!
central! role!with! regard! to! security! of! supply! since! it! is! through! them! that! the! government!
coordinates!the!expansion!of!the!electricity!generation!in!Brazil![Instituto!Acende!Brasil,!2012].!
In!order!to!achieve!their!purposes,!these!auctions!address!both!the!“new”!and!“old”!energy.!








(except! coal! and! nuclear),! while! large! hydro! (UHEs)! and! coal! thermal! power! plants! usually!
participate!in!AS5!auctions.!
Into! the! category!of! auctions!designed! to!buy! “new!energy”! there! are! also! specific! auctions!
promoted! to! contract! electricity! from! relevant! projects! classified! as! “strategic”! or! of! “public!
interest”! by! the! CNPE.! Because! of! that! they! are! known! as! “structuring! projects! auctions”.!
Usually,! this! typically! refers! to!project!associated!with!very! large!hydros! (UHEs)! such!as!Belo!
Monte!(11.23!GW),!Jirau!(3.75!GW)!and!Santo!Antônio!(3.15!GW)!hydropower!plants.!
Moreover,! there! are! also! specific! auctions! designed! to! buy! electricity! only! from! renewable!
energy! sources! such! as!wind,! PV,! biomass! and!PCH.! They! are! known! as! “alternative! source!
auctions”!and!were!created!to!encourage!the!diversification!of!the!national!energy!matrix.!
Auctions! that! intend! to! buy! electricity! from! power! plants! already! in! operation! (i.e.! existing!
generation!or!“old!energy”)!can!have!the!delivery!time!starting!just!one!year!after!the!date!of!
auction.!They!are!therefore!called!“AS1!auctions”.!Moreover,!they!can!be!in!place!in!the!same!
year! of! the! beginning! of! the! electricity! supply,! and! thus! they! are! identified! as! “adjustment!
auctions”.!!






































Furthermore,! these!auctions!are!designed! to!buy!either!energy!or!capacity! [Instituto!Acende!
Brasil,!2012]:!
• Quantity!type!contract:! In!this!case,! the!seller! (generator)!commits!to!deliver!a!certain!
amount!of!electricity!(MWh)!during!a!specific!period!at!a!preSdefined!price.!This!feature!
corresponds!to!a!typical!forward!contract.!As!a!rule!a!hydropower!plants!signs!this!kind!
of! contract.!Any!difference!between! the! contracted!energy! (exSante! contract)! and! the!
effective! generation! (real! production)! must! be! compensated! by! the! seller! by! the!
settlement!of! this!difference!at! the! shortSterm!market! (i.e.! the!generator!must!buy!or!
sell!this!difference!in!the!MCP);!!
• Availability! type! contract:! In! this! case,! the! seller! (generator)! receives! a! fixed!
remuneration!to!make!available!a!specified!capacity!(and!to!recover!its!fixed!cost),!plus!
an! additional! remuneration! for! each! effective! produced!MWh! (to! recover! its! variable!
cost).! In! other! words,! this! kind! of! contracts! corresponds! to! a! PPA! with! availability!
payment,!and!they!have!been!adopted!to!those!power!plants!with!larger!variable!costs,!
like! thermal! power! plants.! In! each! month! it! is! paid! the! availability! quota,! and! when!
dispatched!the!generator!receives!the!payment!for!its!generation!on!a!monthly!basis.%
Moreover,! to! compare! and! score! different! projects! from! the! availability! type! contracts! (i.e.!
thermal! power! plants! with! diverse! technologies! and! different! variable! costs),! the! auction!
system!uses! a! cost! benefit! index! (known! as! ICB),! that! considers! the! estimated! dispatch! and!
fixed!and!variable!costs!of!each!power!plant.!This! index! is! the!sum!of!the!fixed!cost! (paid!by!
consumers!for!the!availability!of!the!power!plant)!and!the!variable!cost!(forecasted!operation!
cost!based!on!dispatch!expectation)!divided!by!its!availability![Rego,!2013].!











New energy 19,987! 45.46! 1,612!
Old!energy! 22,478! 61.90! 6,728!
Alternative!source! 900! 74.05! 1,146!
Reserve!energy! 2,189! 72.83! 176!







Belo!Monte! hydropower! plant! is! a! case! of! a! structuring! project! auction.! It! has! an! installed!
capacity!of!11.23!GW,!it!was!auctioned!in!2010,!and!has!the!lowest!price!(US$!42/MWh).!!Wind!
price! evolution! is! noteworthy.! It! started! at! the! level! of! US$! 152/MWh! in! the! feed! in! tariff!








After! sellers! and! buyers! sign! PPAs! coming! from! the! public! auctions,! these! contracts! are!
registered! by! the! CCEE,! the! Brazilian! market! operator,! in! order! to! be! considered! in! the!
accounting! and! settlement! process! of! the! Brazilian! shortSterm!market! (MCP).! Besides! that,!
these! records! are! needed! also! due! to! the! calculation! of! penalties! for! insufficient! physical!
coverage! for! the! commercialization! of! the! energy! and! power.! Then,! when! a! power! plant!
becomes!available!for!operation!(i.e.!the!construction!phase!of!the!project!is!completed),!the!
CCEE!will! consider! its! physical! guarantee! available! to! be! settled! in! the!MCP.! Following,! the!























In! December! of! every! year,! generators! can! perform! a! seasonal! adjustment! of! the! physical!
guarantee![CCEE,!2012a].!This!mechanism!is!called!“seasonalization”!of!the!physical!guarantee,!
and!it!allows!generators!to!allocate!the!MWh!annual!amount!in!monthly!amounts.! If!they!do!
not! opt! to! perform! this! seasonal! adjustment,! the! seasonalization! is! performed! by! CCEE!
uniformly!throughout!the!year,!i.e.!according!to!a!“flat!profile”.!
Moreover,! if! a! change! of! the! physical! guarantee! of! a! power! plant31! occurs,! a! review! of! the!
seasonalization! should! be! performed.! If! there! is! an! increase! of! the! physical! guarantee,! the!
review! of! the! seasonalization! is! of! responsibility! of! the! agent.! If! there! is! a! decrease,! the!
revision! is! conducted! by! the! CCEE! proportionately! to! the! amounts! already! allocated! in! the!
seasonalization! process.! Besides! the! monthly! distribution! (seasonalization),! these!MWh! are!
also!allocated!in!hour!quantities,!in!a!process!called!“modulation”.!Thus,!through!this!process,!





365!days,! the!amount!of!physical!guarantee! is!equivalent! to!744,600!MWh! (85!MW!average!









31!The!Decree!2655/1995,! in! its!article!21,!§!4º,! states! that! the!value!of! the!physical!guarantee!allocated! to!each!
hydropower! plant! will! be! reviewed! every! five! years! (ordinary! review)! or! upon! the! occurrence! of! relevant! facts!











or! MCP),! the! actually! contracted! energy! can! also! pass! through! the! seasonalization! and!
modulation! process.! To! give! an! example,! let’s! consider! the! case! of! the! contracts! known! as!
CCEARs! (Contracts! to!Trade!Electricity! into! the!Regulated!Contracting!Environment),!which! is!






the! load!profile!declared!by! the!Disco!concerning! to! the!CCEAR+ [CCEE,!2008].!Moreover,! the!
modulation!of!this!kind!of!CCEAR!is!automatically!performed!every!month!taking!into!account!
the!remaining! load!profile!of! the!Disco! (i.e.! the!resulting! load!after! the!subtraction!of!all! the!
others!contracts!of!the!Disco)![CCEE,!2010].!Differently,!the!CCEAR!for!availability!must!always!
have! a! flat! seasonalization,! and! the! modulation! will! be! monthly! exSpost! calculated,! in!
accordance!to!the!actual!load!of!the!Disco.!
To!conclude,!from!the!point!of!view!of!generators:!in!one!hand,!they!are!allowed!to!define!the!
monthly! amount! of! their! physical! guarantee! (through! the! “seasonalization! of! the! physical!
guarantee”);!and,!on!the!other!hand,!they!can!also!try!to!come!to!an!agreement!with!the!Disco!
in! order! to! also! define! the!monthly! energy! committed! by! the!CCEAR! that! they! have! signed!
(through! the! “seasonalization! of! the! contracted! energy”).! Regarding! the! definition! of! the!
hourly! amount! and! concerning! physical! guarantees! and! CCEARs,! the! modulation! process! is!
automatically!performed.!
Therefore,! the! seasonalization! of! the! physical! guarantee! and! the! seasonalization! of! the!




the!“window”! that!generators!have! to!define,! for! the! subsequent!entire!year,! their! “profile”!
regarding! their! physical! guarantee! (production! that! can! be!maintained! almost! continuously!
over!the!years)!and!their!contracted!energy!(commitment!to!deliver!energy).!
3.2.3%The%centralized%dispatch%carried%out%by%the%ISO%

















if! the!hydrological! regime! is!contrary! to!what!was!being!planned.!The!second!one!also!has!a!
negative!effect:!an!energy!deficit!may!occur!if!it!was!used!water!in!the!present!and!the!future!
























































the! potential! energy! stored! in! the! reservoirs! installed! in! the! same!water! basin.! This! issue! is!
illustrated! in!Figure!3.11.! If! the!operation!of! these! three!hydros! is! centrally!coordinated,! the!
optimal!decision!is,!first!of!all,!to!generate!using!the!upstream!hydro!in!order!to!release!water!
(Q1).! Then,! this! water!will! reach! the! second! hydro,! raising! the! level! of! this! reservoir! (h2).! A!









Besides! these! issues,! the! Brazilian! hydrothermal! power! system! also! displays! an! energy!
complementarity! among! its! geographic! areas.! Just! concerning! the! renewable! energy,! these!
resources! are! roughly! distributed! throughout! the! country! as! follows:! the! Northern! area!
(surrounding!the!Amazon!area)!has!a! large!hydro!potential;! in!the!Northeast!there! is!a! lot!of!
wind,! sun,! biomass! and! a! few! strategic! hydros;! the!Midwest! and! Southeast! present! a! lot! of!
hydros! and!biomass,! and! the! Southeast! is! known!as! the! largest! “water! tank!of! the! country”!
since! it! concentrates! many! reservoirs! with! multiannual! capacity;! finally,! the! South! is!
characterized!by!some!relevant!hydros,!but!with!a!more!irregular!hydrological!regime!pattern.!
Moreover,! it! is! interesting! to!note! that!when! it! is! raining! (i.e.! high!hydro!production)! in! the!
South,!Midwest!and!Southeast,!it!is!the!dry!season!in!the!North!and!Northeast.!During!the!dry!
season!it!is!the!harvest!time!(thus,!biomass!can!be!used!to!produce!electricity),!and!it!is!when!
wind! is! stronger! available! (which!means!more!electricity! coming! from! the!wind! farms).!As! a!
result,! it! is! required! an! analysis! that! considers! transmission! constraints! and! the! energy!
complementary!regimes!between!these!areas.!
As! a! consequence,! the! dispatch! is! centralized! and! the! optimal! dispatch! problem! of! the!
Brazilian! hydrothermal! power! system! is! currently! solved! through! a! stochastic! dynamic!



























• NEWAVE! (Strategic! Model! for! Hydrothermal! Generation! by! Equivalents! Subsystems),!
which! uses! stochastic! dual! dynamic! programming! to! perform! studies! up! to! five! years!
ahead!with!an!aggregated!representation!of!hydropower!plants! (equivalent! reservoirs)!
in! order! to! determine! the! share! of! hydro! and! thermal! generation! that!minimizes! the!
expected!value!of!the!operation!cost;!!and!
• DECOMP!(MediumSTerm!Operation!and!Planning),! formulated!as!a! linear!programming!
problem! to! represent! individually! physical! and! operational! constraints! of! the! thermal!
and! hydropower! plants! in! order! to! determine! the! generation! target! for! each! power!
plants!for!the!next!12!months.!
The! water! value! in! the! hydro! reservoirs! is! the! main! variable,! and! it! is! set! by! the! ONS!!
examining,! among!other! issues,! the! forecasted!hydrology,! the!water! levels! in! reservoirs! and!








The!NEWAVE!model! is! run!once!a!month,!while! the!DECOMP!model! is! run!every!week.! It! is!
from!this!“chain!of!models”!(since!the!NEWAVE!and!DECOMP!are!run!in!a!sequential!way)!that!




Beyond! the!dispatch! schedule,! these! software! codes! also!provide! the! “Operational!Marginal!
Cost”! (in! Brazil! known! as! CMO),! which! represents! the! variable! cost! of! the! most! expensive!
dispatched!generation!resource!to!supply! the!next! load! increment.!Then,! the!Brazilian!shortS






























prices!have!been!equal! in! the! four! submarkets! for! 55%!of! the! time! [Rosa!et.+ al.,! 2013].! The!
major! transmission! constraint! is! between! Southeast/Midwest! and!North/Northeast.! Roughly!
75%!of!the!time!prices!are!equal!between!South!and!Southeast/Midwest!and!between!North!
and!Northeast.!
Additionally,! it! is! also! relevant! to! remark! that! the! centralized!dispatch!carried!out!by!ONS! is!
done! considering! a! Mechanism! of! Risk! Aversion! (MRA).! In! the! model! currently! in! use,! the!
problem!of!optimizing!the!hydrothermal!dispatch!was!designed!using!the!minimum!operating!
cost!criterion.!Its!goal!is!to!obtain!an!operation!policy!that!minimizes!the!expected!value!of!the!
thermal! generation! and! possible! load! shedding.! This! operation! policy! is! obtained! after! the!
evaluation! of! a! given! set! of! possible! scenarios! of! future! inflows! (2,000! scenarios! in! the!
NEWAVE! program! simulation).! The! impact! of! more! severe! hydrological! scenarios! on! the!





is! included! in! the! algorithms! [CNPE! Resolution! 3/2013].! This!MRA! aims! at! incorporating! the!
cost! of! the!most! critical! scenarios! in! the! calculation! of! the! operating! policy! jointly!with! the!
procedure! regarding! the!minimization! of! the! total! operating! cost.! In! the! end,! this!MRA! can!
represent!more!thermal!generation!dispatch!in!order!to!save!water!for!use!in!the!future,!when!
it!is!likely!to!have!critical!inflows!in!the!watershed.!
To! conclude,! it! is! not! the! market! through! the! interaction! among! its! participants! that!
determines! the! electricity! shortSterm! price,! but! computational! programs! that! value! the!
present!electricity!cost!considering,!among!other!issues,!future!scenarios!of!water!inflows!and!
a!mechanism!of!risk!aversion!to!protect!the!system!against!severe!hydrological!series.!
Since! the! shortSterm! price! is! a! result! of! computer! programs,! theoretically,! this! endogenous!
price!would! be! efficient! and! immune! to!market! failures,! particularly! the! use! of! asymmetric!
information!and!market!power![Santana,!2004].!However,!in!2007!and!2011!relevant!problems!
related! to! inconsistencies! in! these! models! were! detected,! causing! a! large! impact! on! the!
electricity! sector.! Moreover,! the! transparency! related! to! the! programs! is! also! a! constant!
concern!because!the!software!codes!have!intellectual!property!rights!and,!therefore,!they!are!
unknown! by! market! participants! and! authorities33,! which! induces! some! instability! in! the!
sector.%
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!









Table! 2.1! included! in! Section! 2.3.1! of! Chapter! 2! addresses! the! conciliation! between! the!
dispatch! and! commercial! commitment! considering! the! four! electricity! industry! structures!
described!in!that!section.!In!the!cell!related!to!Model!2!(the!Single!Buyer!Model!linked!with!the!
Brazilian! case),! it!was!mentioned! that! it! is!needed!a!mechanism! to! share! the! risk!associated!
with! the! fact! that! market! participants! must! uphold! their! closed! contracts! by! physical!








hydros!within! its!coverage,!and! they!should! take! into!account! the!existence!of!market!
zones!(i.e.!“submarkets”);!
• A! share! of! the! physical! guarantee! will! be! allocated! to! each! hydro! station! using! a!
compensation!mechanism!of!the!energy!that!is!actually!generated;!













In! Brazil,! due! its! large! territorial! dimensions,! there! are! significant! hydrological! differences!
between!regions.!The!dry!and!wet!periods!do!not!coincide,!i.e.!there!will!be!periods!with!low!
water!inflows!in!certain!water!basins!while!in!other!areas!of!the!country!it!is!the!season!of!high!
water! inflows.! Hydros! in! the! water! scarcity! area! will! be! compensated! by! the! others! larger!









the!power! system!also!prevents! the!agents! from!participating! in! the!decisions!of!how!much!
they!will!generate!to!meet!their!contracts.!As! it!was!presented! in!Section!3.2.1,! large!hydros!
participate! in!public! auctions! in! the!quantity! type!auctions,! and!by!doing! so! they! commit! to!
deliver!a!certain!amount!of!electricity!(MWh).!Once!generators!are!passive! in!the!centralized!
dispatch!process,! the!MRE! is! the!mechanism!for! sharing! the! risk!associated!with! this!market!
design.!
So,! the!MRE! is! a! financial!mechanism! that!aims!at!promoting! the! sharing!of! risks!associated!
with!the!centralized!dispatch!that! is!performed!by!the!ONS.!This!dispatch!aims!at!promoting!
the! optimization! of! the! hydrothermal! system! and! to! ensure! the! efficient! use! of! the! energy!
resources.! The! goal! of! the! MRE! is! to! ensure! that! all! its! members! receive! their! “physical!
guarantee”!level!regardless!of!their!actual! level!of!energy!production,!provided!that!the!total!
generation!of!the!MRE!participants!is!not!below!the!total!physical!guarantee!of!the!system.!In!
addition,! the! level! of! physical! guarantee! considered! here! is! the! value! that! comes! from! the!
seasonalization!and!modulation!process!(as!addressed!in!Section!3.2.2).!
All! generators! receive! their! contractual! payment! because! they! sell! the! “physical! guarantee!
assigned!to!them”,!and!not!because!they!sell!the!“actual!electricity!produced!by!them”.!Then,!
in!each!accounting!period,!the!MRE!reallocates!energy,!transferring!the!surplus!generated!by!
those! that! produce! beyond! their! physical! guarantee! to! those! that! produce! below! [CCEE,!
2014e].!!










Hydro!A! N! 50! 59! +!9!
Hydro!B! N! 40! 18! S!22!
Hydro!C! S! 20! 64! +!44!
Hydro!D! S! 30! 14! S!16!
Leftover!energy!!or!!secondary!energy!!!!!=! +!15!
!
The! allocation! of! energy! from! hydros! with! surplus! generation! regarding! their! physical!
guarantee!to!those!who!present!generation!deficit!is!primarily!made!among!hydros!located!in!
the!same!submarket.!In!this!example,!this!can!be!observed!in!the!first!step!of!the!process:! in!







of! energy)! is! given! to! hydros! located! in! deficit! submarkets! until! completing! their! levels! of!
physical! guarantee:! the! second! and! the! third! steps! show! that,! from! the! 28! surplus! units! of!













Thus,! now! all! hydros! have! at! least! the! same! amount! of! their! physical! guarantee.! However,!
there!are!still!15!extra!energy!units!in!Hydro!C.!This!happens!whenever!the!total!production!of!
electricity!of!MRE+hydros! is!higher!than!the!total!physical!guarantee!of!the!MRE+hydros.!This!




equivalent! percentage! deficit! (illustration! presented! in! Section! 3.3.3).! This! reduction! is!
accomplished!through!the!application!of!an!adjustment! factor.! In!situations! like! that,!usually!

















































The! electricity! production! allocated! through! the! MRE! is! valued! by! a! tariff! called! “Energy!
Optimization!Tariff”!(in!Brazil,!TEO).!This!tariff,!expressed!in!R$/MWh,!is!established!by!ANEEL!




should!be!also!considered! in!this!transaction!the!difference!between!prices.!So,! if! the!PLD!of!
the!submarket!where!the!energy!comes!from!is!higher!than!the!PLD!of!the!submarket!where!
the!hydro!having!the!deficit!is!located,!this!hydro!will!have!to!pay!also!the!difference!between!






through! a! selfSdispatch! procedure! nor! can! generators! influence! the! dispatch! through! their!
bids.!Ultimately,!this!shortSterm!market!is!not!an!environment!where!market!participants!can!

































In! the! scope! of! the! Brazilian! electricity!market,! it! is! important! to! clarify! the!meaning! of! the!
“verified!energy”!and!the!“contracted!energy”.!
As!explained! in!section!3.2.4,!through!the!MRE! it!can!be!added!to!the!“own!production”!“an!
extra!energy”.!Thus,! the!verified!energy! is! the!sum!of! the!own!production!and! total!amount!
resulting!from!the!MRE!(equation!3.2).!!"#$%$"&!!"!#$%! = !"#!!"#$%&'(#) + !"!#$%!!""#$!%&'!!"#$!!ℎ!! "# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(3.2)!
Moreover,! it!can!be!noted!(as! it!was!discussed!in!Section!3.2.3)!that!the!“own!production”!is!
strongly!influenced!by!the!ISO!dispatch,!since!the!scheduled!production!comes!from!the!ONS!
centralized! dispatch.! The! small! difference! between! the! own! production! and! the! scheduled!
production! is!usually!related!to!the!dynamic!of!the!real!time!operation!of!the!power!system.!!
Accordingly:!!"#!!"#$%&'#(! ≈ !"ℎ!"#$!!!"#$%&'(#)!!"!!ℎ!!!"# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(3.3)!
On! the! other! hand! (left! part! of! the! Figure! 3.15),! the! contracted! energy! is! the!monthly! and!
hourly! amount! defined! in! the! seasonalization! and! modulation! process! (analyzed! in! Section!
3.2.2).!Thus:!!"#$%&'$()!!"!#$% = !"#$%&!!"#$%&!$!!!"#ℎ!"!!ℎ!!!"#!$%#&'(#)'$%!!"#! "#$%&'(") !!(3.4)!
Finally,! the! exposed! position! regarding! the! shortSterm! price! is! the! difference! between! the!
verified!energy!and!the!closed!contracts!as!given!by!(3.5).!!!"#$%&'!!"#$%$"&! = !"#$%$"&!!"!#$% − ! !"#$%&!$'(!!"!#$% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(3.5)!
In!order!to!put!all!these!elements!together,!let!us!now!consider!Figure!3.1634.!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


















The!MCP! is! the! last! step! of! a! series! of! events.! To! provide! an! overview! of! this! process,! the!
sequence!of!events!will!now!be!exemplified:!!
• After!signing!the!CCEAR!(an!ACR!contract)!and!when!the!power!plant!becomes!available!









basis! in! order! to! optimize! the! hydrothermal! system! and! to! use! efficiently! energy!
resources.!The!dispatch!and!the!PLD!are!!established!for!each!load!step!of!the!day;!
• The! MRE! takes! place:! if! the! own! production! of! one! hydro! is! less! than! its! physical!
guarantee!(which!is!calculated!to!represent,! in!the!long!term,!the!amount!of!electricity!
that! can!be!continuously!produced),! the!hydro!will! receive!energy! from!other! stations!
that! produced! more.! In! other! words,! the!MRE! will! be! allocate! energy! to! this! hydro!
station;!
• The!own!production! plus! the! energy! allocated! from! the!MRE! is! equal! to! the! “verified!
energy”.!The!“verified!energy”!is!then!compared!with!the!“contracted!energy”,!and!the!
resulting! exposition! is! settled! in! the! shortSterm!market! (MCP)! at! the! shortSterm! price!
(Price!for!Settlement!of!Differences!S%PLD).!This!settlement!is!performed!for!each!agent!
on! a! weekly! basis!considering! the! three! load! steps! of! the! day! of! the! week! (heavy,!
medium,!and!light).%
If! the! power! plant! has! less! verified! energy! than! the! contracted! energy,! this! exposition! is!
negative,!which!means!that!the!generator!has!to!buy!this!difference!in!the!shortSterm!market!
(MCP);!otherwise,!the!exposition!is!positive!and!the!generator!will!inexorably!have!to!sell!this!










































Figure! 3.18! synthesizes! relevant! points.!Once! all! consumption!has! to! be! exSante! contracted,!
and!contracts!have!to!be!physically!backed,!structurally!the!Brazilian!market!was!designed!to!















































































































































• Efficiency% in! the! use! of! the! energy! resources,! mainly! considering! the! dichotomy!
between!the!centralized!and!decentralized!dispatch;!!
• Security! of! supply! achieved! in! Brazil! through! the! longSterm! contracting! via! public!
auctions,!and!the!requirement!that!all!contracts!must!be!physically!backed;!and!





whether! such! coordination! can! be! sought! through! the! market! or! through! the! hierarchical!
approaches.! In! this! case,! the! approach! via! market! demands! to! design! a! model! where! the!
market!price!and!the!dispatch!comes!from!the!market!participants’!interactions,!as!it!happens!
in! daySahead!market!with! price! and! quantity! bids! are! offered! by! generators.! In! other! hand,!
hierarchical!approaches!mean!that!a!centralized!dispatch!takes!place,!as!it!happens!in!Brazil.!In!
this! case,! there! is!no!price!bid!by!hydros.! Instead!of! that,! it! is! computed! the!water! value!as!
shown!in!Section!3.2.3.!
So,!in!order!to!compare!the!Brazilian!case!with!a!similar!power!system!in!terms!of!large!hydro!
penetration,! it! is! worth! examining! the! New! Zealand! electricity! market.! Despite! the! total!
installed!capacity!in!New!Zealand!(10!GW)![MBIE,!2012]!is!quite!different!from!Brazil!(142!GW)!
[ANEEL,!2015],!both!power!systems!are!similar!in!terms!of!the!share!and!importance!of!hydro!
generation.! New! Zealand! has! around! 60%! of! the! produced! electricity! from! hydropower!
plants35![New!Zealand!System!Operator,!2014]!and!Brazil,!during!the!years!2012!and!2013,!also!
produced!around!60%!of!the!electricity!from!hydros![ONS,!2014d].!
The!New! Zealand! electricity! sector! also!went! through! a! liberalization! reform!during! the! 80s!




all! generated! and! consumed! electricity! is! traded,! and! where! trading! is! developed! by! bids!
(supply! and! demand)! for! 48! half! hour! periods! (the! trading! periods)! over! 224! pricing! nodes!
[Philpott!et.!al.,!2010].!
Nevertheless,! some! authors! suggest! that! running! certain! electricity! sectors! as! a! centrally!









supply! [Evans! &!Meade,! 2005].! On! the! heels! of! this! centralized! approach,! [Philpott! et.! al.,!
2010]!describe!an!empirical!study!on!the!extent!of!productive!inefficiency!of!the!New!Zealand!
wholesale! electricity! market.! In! this! study,! the! authors! attempt! to! quantify! production!
efficiency! losses! by! comparing! market! outcomes! with! a! counterfactual! centrally! planned!
operation.!
These! authors! also! agree! that,! unlike! markets! consisting! solely! of! thermal! power! plants,!
markets! with! hydros! have! an! interStemporal! nature! arising! from! the! fact! that! the! energy!
(water)!can!be!stored!for!later!delivery.!This!feature!complicates!the!decision!making!process!
of! hydros! as! the! computation! of! the! marginal! cost! of! releasing! water! must! involve! some!
modeling!of!the!opportunity!cost!and!of!the!possible!shortage!costs.!
Nowadays,! by! default,! each! generating! station! in! New! Zealand! is! treated! by! the! market!
operator! as! a! separate! entity! to! be! dispatched! according! to! its! energy! offer.! However,! the!
inefficiency! in! the! New! Zealand! wholesale! market! design! is! recognized! by! including! an!
instrument!called!block!dispatch.!Under! the!block!dispatch!mechanism,!after!communicating!
the!offers!and!before!conducting!the!dispatch,!generators!can!rearrange!the!dispatch!amongst!
their! stations!on!the!same!riverSchain,!as! long!the!total!energy!delivered! is! the!same!as! that!





Although! block! dispatch! affords! some! degree! of! flexibility,! according! to! these! authors! it! is!
essentially! an! instantaneous! process,! and! the! interStemporal! features! of! the! river! chain!
operations! are! not! represented! in! the! singleSperiod! market! clearing! mechanism.! This! issue!
corresponds!to!a!new!source!of! inefficiency.!Having!this! issue!in!mind,![Philpott!et.!al.,!2010]!
established! a! counterfactual! model! that! considers! a! power! system! with! significant! hydro!
generation! and! which! is! centrally! planned.! This! counterfactual! model! was! developed!
considering!a!recent!study!based!on!the!Nord!Pool!system!conducted!by![Kauppi!&!Liski,!2008]!
and! on! the! stochastic! dynamic! programming! technique! of! [Pereira! &! Pinto,! 1991].! So,! this!
model! computes! a! generation! policy! that! takes! in! account! the! future! inflow! uncertainty,! as!
well!as!several!reservoirs!and!constraints!associated!to!the!New!Zealand!transmission!system.!
At! that! time,! three! experiments! were! done.! The! first! one! (daily! model)! associates! a! daily!
dispatch! under! the! market! model! with! a! dispatch! under! a! centralized! approach.! Then,! the!
second! and! the! third! experiments! solve! the! problem! over! one! week! and! one! year,!
respectively.!As!a!result,!by!comparing!the!counterfactual!proposal!that!supposes!that!the!New!
Zealand!electricity!system! is!centrally!controlled!with!the!actual!market!based!dispatch,! they!










$1,580,918! for! the! market! model.! This! represents! an! inefficiency! estimate! of! (NZ)! $!
33,645,!or!about!2.1%.!The! inefficiency!estimate!does!not!change!significantly! if! it!was!
computed!for!other!days!in!this!week.!The!inefficiency!values!range!from!1.9%!to!2.9%!
with!an!average!of!2.3%.!
• Weekly! model:! The! central! plan! approach! shows! that! some! flexibility! in! transferring!
water!between!days! can!be!exploited.!The!overall! savings! in! the!observed!week! (June!
18SJune!24,!2005)!is!(NZ)!$!729,433,!which!corresponds!to!6.8%!of!market!fuel!cost.!To!






There! is! an! extra! 386! GWh! of! water! stored! by! the! market! at! the! end! of! 2007! as!
compared!with! the! central! plan.! The! yearly! centrallySplanned!policy! incurs! in! less! fuel!
costs!than!the!market.!For!2005,!2006!and!2007,!the!saved!fuel!costs!are,!respectively,!
16.0%,!13.4%,!and!14.6%.!









with! their! own! constraints! over! the! day.! Thus,! the! authors! advocate! that! some! of! the!
inefficiency! could! arise! as! an! artifact! of! the! halfShour!market! design,! rather! than! reflecting!
strategic! offering! behavior.! So,! they! concluded! that! some! savings! of! the! central! plan! are!


















Therefore,! the! same! concerns! already! mentioned! in! Section! 2.3.2! should! be! in! mind.!
Considering! the! shortSterm! market:! ! Are! there! in! the! market! design! enough! incentives! to!
provide!adequate!investment?!Will!the!response!of!generators!regarding!the!shortSterm!prices!
come! in! the! form! of! new! installed! capacity?! Should! a! capacity!mechanism! be! added! to! the!
market!design?!
As! explained! earlier,! the! Brazilian! shortSterm! price,! PLD,! is! calculated! for! four! submarkets!
(South,!Southeast/Midwest,!Northeast!and!North)!and!it!is!set!on!a!weekly!basis!for!three!load!
steps! (heavy,!medium!and! light).!Moreover,! the!PLD!has!maximum!and!minimum! limits! that!





The! value! of! the! PLD! displayed! in! this! figure! results! from! a! weighted! sum! of! the! values!
obtained! for! the! four! submarkets!and! for! the! three! load! steps.! Furthermore,! this! figure!also!



















































































































































be! dispatched,! and! a! proportional! amount! of! water! is! saved! in! the! reservoir.! As! it! can! be!
observed!from!Figure!3.19,!during!most!of!the!time!the!demand!is!supplied!primarily!by!hydro.!
Nowadays! the! hydroelectricity! represents! around! 60%! of! the! total! installed! capacity,!
nevertheless,!historically!more!than!85%!of!the!electricity!produced!in!Brazil!comes!from!hydro!
generation.! Taking! into! account! this! amount! of! hydros,! the! PLD+ calculation! captures! the!
preference!for!use!water!to!supply!the!demand!rather!than!thermoelectric!stations,!and!this!
allocates! the! PLD! at! low! levels! for! long! periods.! In! a! scenario! where! all! hydros! are! trading!




generators! that! offered! successfully! bid! in! the! public! auctions! during! 2004S2012! in! order! to!
sign! a! PPA.! These! are! auctions! of! the! quantity! type! auctions! which! means! that! these!
generators! will! not! receive! any! availability! payment.! Thus,! the! price! bid! value! should! be!
enough!to!recover!both!the!FC!(basically,!costs!concerning!civil!works!and!electromechanical!
equipment,! debt!burdens! and! return! on!own! capital)! and! VC! (e.g.! operational! and!
maintenance! cost,! transmission! system! access! cost,! charges! and! taxes)! over! the! contract!
period!during!which!the!power!plant!will!be!operating.!
The!statement!that!110.29!R$/MWh,!on!average,!recovers!the!total!cost!of!the!project!during!
the!period!where!generator!has! the!concession! to!produce!electricity! is!corroborated!by! the!
analysis!of!the!price!cap!defined!for!the!public!auctions.!This!analysis!was!accomplished!by!the!
Brazilian!Federal!Court!of!Auditors!(TCU)!and!it!considers!all!elements!necessary!to!compute!a!
fair! price! cap! (e.g.! analysis! of! the! consistency! of! the! investment! costs,! and! analysis! of! the!
project! economic! viability).! The! competition! in! the! public! auctions! takes! place! after! the!
analysis!of!the!price!cap.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37! Recently,! the! Brazilian! Government! gave! a! referral! to! the! issue! of! the! renewal! of! the! electricity! services!
concessions! through! the!Provisional!Measure!579/2012,! converted! into! the! Law!12.783/2013.!This!norm!enables!
the!extension!of!the!concession!contracts!for!a!period!up!to!30!years,!provided!that,!among!other!conditions,!the!
generator!accepts!a!new!remuneration!of!assets! fully!amortized!compatible!with!their!current!Variable!Cost!(VC).!









Through! the! Court's!decision! regarding! the! auction! that! took! place! in! 2011! for! the! UHEs!
Estreito,! Castelhano,! Cachoeira,! Ribeiro! Gonçalves,! São! Manoel,! Sinop,! São! Roque! and!
Cachoeira!Caldeirão![TCU!Judgment!3005/2011!–!Plenary],! it!can!be!confirmed!that!the!price!
caps!were!calculated!considering!that!the!third!party!capital!should!finance!about!70%!of!these!
projects,! and! the! loan! should! be! repayable! over! 16! years.! Regarding! the! UHE! Jirau,! hydro!
presented! in! the! structuring! project! auctions! category! that! occurred! in! 2008,! 90%! of! the!
project! was! funded! by! third! party!capital,! and! price! cap! calculation! considered! that! this!
funding! should! be! amortized! over! twenty! years! [TCU! Judgment! 602/2008! –! Plenary].!
Consequently,! it! is! expected! that! the! total! fixed! cost! and! all! annual! variable! costs! are!
recovered!during!the!entire!concession!period!of!hydro!power!plants!operation!that!typically!
corresponds!to!30!years39.!
In! short,! this! analysis! indicated! that! 110!R$/MWh! is! enough! to! recover! both! the! FC! and!VC!
during! 30! years! of! hydro! operation.! On! the! other! hand,! the! question! is! whether! PLD,! on!
average!and!over!30!years,!would!be!above!110.29!R$/MWh.!On!average!because!there!will!be!
periods!with! low!PLD! that!will!not!cover! the!FC! (and!sometimes!even!the!VC),!but! there!can!
also!be!periods!when!high+PLD!values!that!will!provide!the!necessary!additional!rent!to!pay!FC.!
The! Brazilian! shortSterm!market! has! been! in! existence! for! about! fifteen! years.! For! the! time!
being,! the! PLD! has! an! average! value! equal! to! 109! R$/MWh.! Therefore,! it! is! really! close! to!
110.29!R$/MWh!that!corresponds! to! the!average!hydro!price!bid.!Nevertheless,! it! should!be!
noted! that,! since! the! beginning! of! the! PLD! historical! data,! Brazil! endured! two! large! energy!
crises!(in!2001S2002!and!in!2013S2014)!during!which!the!PLD!remained!in!extreme!levels!for!a!
long! time,! reaching! its! established! regulatory! maximum! limit! during! several! consecutive!
accounting!periods.!













to!162.4!R$/MW)!will!not!provide!enough! incentives!to! induce!adequate! investment!to!build!















3.2.3)! or! via! the! dispatch! out! of! the!merit! order! authorized! by! the! CMSE,! as!mentioned! in!
article!2º!of!the!CNPE!Resolution!3/2013:!
“Upon! a! decision! of! the! Monitoring! Committee! of! the! Electricity! Sector! (CMSE),!
extraordinarily!and!aiming!at!ensuring!the!security!of!supply!and!in!an!additional!way!
to! what! was! indicated! by! the! computational! programs,! the! ONS! is! authorized! to!
dispatch! energy! resources! or! change! the! direction! of! the! electricity! flow! between!
submarkets”.!
As!discussed! in! Section!3.1.4,! a! centralized! feature! regarding! the!energy! supply! adequacy! in!
Brazil!was!strongly!embedded!within!the!powers!of!the!institutions!that!are!responsible!for!the!
governance!of!the!electricity!sector.!Within!this!context,!once!supported!by!a!study!from!the!





In! Section! 2.3.1! it! was! discussed! the! market! design! completeness,! and! a! special! focus! was!
given! to! answer! the! following! question:! How! can! the! dispatch! schedule! and! commercial!
commitments!be!conciliated?!The!analysis!regarding!the!incompleteness!of!the!market!design!
relies! on! the! imperfect! coordination! between! the! markets! that! emerged! with! the!
liberalization:! forward,! future,! options,! daySahead,! intraday! and! balancing! markets.! This!
sequence!of!markets! is! an!alternative!way! to! the!vertical! integrated! structure.! In! this! sense,!


































contracts)! and! of! the! physical! guarantee! (ability! to! delivery! energy! in! the! longSterm).! So,!
regarding! the! temporal! flexibility,! December! corresponds! to! the! unique! “window”! in! which!
hydros!can!allocate!their!physical!guarantee!to!uphold!their!contracts.!In!the!shortSterm,!there!
is! no! way! to! adjust! the! amounts! previously! defined.! Thus,! considering! the! market!
completeness!analysis,!there!is!a!lack!of!“trading!opportunities”.!
Moreover,! the! dispatch! is! centralized! and! it! is! weekly! ahead! defined! by! the! ISO.! Strictly!
speaking,! as! discussed! in! Section! 3.2.3,! there! is! no! selfSdispatch! and! generators! are! not!
allowed!to!influence!the!dispatch!schedule!through!bids!like!it!happens!in!a!daySahead!market.!
Besides,! the! dispatch! is! centralized! because! there! is! an! embryonic! need! to! promote! the!
optimization! of! the! hydrothermal! system! and! to! ensure! the! efficient! use! of! the! energy!
resources,!especially!concerning!the!cascades!of!hydros.!So,!generators!are!not!that!ones!who!
decide! their!generation! levels.!They!operate! their!power!plants! just! following! the!amount!of!
production!set!by!the!ISO.!For!this!reason,!the!MRE!was!implemented:+a!financial!mechanism!
designed!to!promote!the!sharing!of!risks!associated!with!the!centralized!dispatch.!
Notwithstanding,! the!MRE! rules! are! implemented! in! the! settlement!process!and!are!applied!




















Then,! considering! the! rules!of!MRE! in! force!at! that! time,! this! strategy!generated! income! for!
these! generators,! but! a! loss! of! almost! R$! 600!million! for! Eletrobras.! Eletrobras! is! the! stateS
owned!that!administers! Itaipú!hydro41!and!the!hydros!of!PROINFA42,!and!these!power!plants!
usually!had! their! seasonalization!performed! following!a! flat!profile.!Moreover,! this! company!
holds! many! hydros! that! accepted! the! 2012! renewal! of! concessions! and,! according! to! the!
ANEEL!Normative!Resolution!514/2012,! article! 15,! §!1º,! their! seasonalizations! regarding! the!
contracted!energy!must!be!automatically!performed!following!the!declared!Disco!load!profile.!
Using!the!value!of!seasonalized!physical!guarantee!to!mark!the!exchange!of!energy!between!






























Hydro!B! 18! 40! 44.29! 40! 32.63!
Hydro!C! 64! 20! 22.14! 20! 16.32!
Hydro!D! 14! 30! 33.21! 30! 24.47!





given! by!multiplying! its! own!production! by! the! adjustment! factor.! This! factor,! also! know!by!
Generating!Scaling!Factor!(GSF),! is! then!computed!by!the!ratio!between!the!total!production!
and!total!seasonalized!physical!guarantee!of!the!hydros!into!the!MRE+for!this!period!(equation!
3.6).!If!the!GSF!is!less!than!1,!the!hydros!are!generating!less!than!their!physical!guarantee.!!"#! = !"#!!"!#$!!"#$%&'(#) ÷ ! !"#!!"!#$!!ℎ!"#$%&!!"#$#%&'' !% (3.6)!












In! sequence,! the! Financial! Settlement! (FS)! that! takes! place! into! the! MCP! was! computed!
according!to!equation!3.8.!!"! = !"#!!"#$%&'(#) − !"#$%$"&!!"!#$% ×!"# +!!!!!!!!!!+! !"#$%$"&!!"!#$% − !"#$%&'$()!!"!#$% ×!"#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(3.8)!
As! it! can! be! realized,! if! Hydro! A! adopts! the! strategy! of! increasing! the! seasonalized! physical!
guarantee! from!50,000! to! 100,000!MWh,! keeping! everything! else! constant,! after! processing!
the!MRE!81,580!MWh!will!be!allocated!to!Hydro!A!instead!of!55,360!MWh,!while!for!all!others!
hydros! the! amount! of! the! verified! energy!will! decrease.! If! in! this! period! Hydro! A! has!more!
verified!energy!than!contracted!energy!(situation!characterized!in!Figure!3.17),!this!difference!
will! be! sold! in! the!MCP! at! the! PLD! price.! If! the! PLD! is! high,! the! profit! can! be! remarkable.!
However,! this! strategy!affects! (decrease)! the! verified!energy! that!will! be!allocated! to!others!
hydros! participating! in! the! MRE,! which! can! originate! negative! exposed! positions! (as!




cancel! the! seasonalization! related! to! January! and! February.! The! whole! process! caused! a!
temporary! shutdown!of! the! shortSterm!market! (encompassing!around!R$!6!billion!or!U$!2.5!






the! seasonalized! physical! guarantee! of! all! MRE’s! participants! (528! power! plants)! [ANEEL!
Technical!Note!054/2013SSRGSSEM/ANEEL].!This!data!was!provided!by!CCEE!and!covered!the!
period!from!September!2000!until!December!2012.!The!purpose!was!to!assess!alternatives!in!
order! to! “protect”!hydros! that! cannot!accomplish! the! seasonalization! from! the!effect!of! the!
seasonalization!of!physical!guarantee!performed!by!agents!who!could!use!this!mechanism.!
Two!scenarios!were!employed!in!this!analysis:!one!with!seasonalizations!indeed!performed!by!
agents,! also! called! “occurred”! seasonalizations;! and! other! to! simulate! an! “extreme”!
seasonalization,!i.e.,!for!those!agents!that!can!do!it,!the!seasonalization!of!approximately!60%!
of!the!physical!guarantee!was!shaped!following!the!profile!of!the!average!PLD.!In!the!extreme!
seasonalization! scenario! with! the!MRE’s! rules! as! usual! it! is! possible! to! observe! that,! when!
hydros! perform! the! extreme! seasonalization,! they! benefit! from! the! fact! that! other! agents!
cannot! implement! seasonalization.! In! this! case,! a! transfer! of! large! financial! amounts! clearly!







In! the! end,! the! solution! adopted! is! detailed! in! the! ANEEL! Normative! Resolution! 584/2013,!
which!establishes!the!terms!and!the!conditions!for!seasonalization!of!the!physical!guarantee.!
This! norm! gives! the! possibility! to! separately! seasonalize! the! physical! guarantee! for! physical!
coverage! contracts! purposes! from! the! physical! guarantee! for! MRE! energy! allocation!
purposes43.!Regarding!the!MRE!purposes,! for! the!hydro!stations! that!are!allowed!to!perform!
the!seasonalization!of!their!physical!guarantee,! it!was+preserved!the!flexibility!to!define!their!
monthly!allocation,!while!for!those!that!do!not!have!such!flexibility!or!want!to!adopt!a!more!
conservative! strategy,! the! seasonalization! of! the! physical! guarantee! is! automatically!
performed!following!the!seasonalization!profile!of!the!other!agents!participating!in!the!MRE.!!
On! balance,! for! those! hydros! that! can! perform! the! seasonalization! process! of! the! physical!
guarantee,!there!is!still!a!single!“window”!to!set!the!(monthly)!amount!of!physical!guarantee!
that! will! influence! the! verified! energy,! which! is! employed! to! confront! the! amount! of! the!
contracted! energy.! Furthermore,! the! “shield”! currently! implemented! in! the!MRE! for! some!
hydros! does! not! eliminate! the! hydrological! risk! of! all! MRE’s! hydros! becoming! negatively!
exposed! in!MCP.! This! issue! brings! us! to! the! second! situation! that! recently! occurred! in! the!




PLD! is! high,! there! are!more! thermal! stations! that! are! dispatched! and! less! hydro! dispatched!
ones.! Thermal! power! plants! are! typically! contracted! in! the! “availability! type! auctions”! (as!
described! in! Section! 3.2.1),! and! thus! they! receive! an! availability! payment! and! an! additional!
remuneration! for! each! MWh! effective! produced.! Nevertheless,! hydro! power! plants! are!
normally!contracted! in!the!“quantity!type!auctions”!(as!defined! in!Section!3.2.1),!so!they!are!
committed! to! deliver! a! certain! amount! of! electricity! (MWh)! at! a! preSdefined! price.! The!








to!cover! the!monthly!amount!of! the!contracted!energy,!a! large!decrease! in! the!seasonalized!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43! The! seasonalization! of! the! physical! guarantee! for! physical! coverage! contracts! (PG_COVERAGE)! and! the!
seasonalization! of! the! physical! guarantee! for! MRE! energy! allocation! (PG_MRE)! have! different! goals! and!
applications.! The! first! one!was! implemented! to! check! (and!apply!penalty)! if! there! is! any!amount!of! contract!not!
supported!by!a!physical! guarantee! (the! currently!Brazilian!market!was!planned! to!push! the!equilibrium!between!
contracts! and! physical! guarantees),! and! this! is! done! by! calculating! the! difference! between! “resources”! (physical!
guarantee! and! purchase! contracts)! and! “requirements”! (sales! contracts)! for! each! agent! considering! 12! months!






physical! guarantee! of! all! hydros! into! the! MRE! (there! are! 528! power! plants)! originates! a!
widespread!negative!exposed!position!for!these!hydros.!!

































Hydro!B! 12! 40! 22.86! 40! S12,114,434!
Hydro!C! 7! 20! 11.43! 20! S6,046,677!
Hydro!D! 24! 30! 17.14! 30! S8,927,726!







































periods!of!electricity!price!spikes:! from!2001!until! the!beginning!of!2002;! in!the!beginning!of!
2008;!and!from!2012!to!2014!(see!Figure!3.19).!Recently,!the!situation!discussed!above!(large!
thermal! dispatch,!widespread!water! shortage! across! the! country,! hydros!with! their! physical!
guarantee! extensively! committed! though! contracts,! and! skySrocketing! shortSterm! prices)! is!




in! the! Mechanism! for! Reallocation! of! Energy! (MRE).! Consultants! estimate! that! the!




signed! the! longSterm! contracts,! and! that! the! dispatch! out! of!merit! order! carried! out! by! the!
CMSE! (explained! in! the!end!of!Section!3.3.2)!causes!market!distortions.!At! the!end,! this!arm!
wrestling! may! indicate! either! a! cyclical! or! even! structural! imbalance! in! the! current! market!
design.!Within! this! conjuncture! the!question! to!be!answered! is! as! follows:! Is! there!a!way! to!
improve!the!conciliation!between!the!physical!operation!and!the!exSante!contracts?!
If!each!hydro!decides!its!own!production,!their!reservoirs!would!be!managed!on!their!own.!In!
the!Brazilian!case,! the!power!system!dispatch! is!done! in!a!centralized!way!so! that! the!entity!
that!decides!the!production!levels!is!a!third!party!that!doesn´t!assume!this!“hydrological!risk".!
This!risk!is!assumed!by!the!hydros44!and,!as!stated!in!the!previously,!the!MRE!doesn´t!cover!it.!
Nonetheless,! as! point! out! by! [IEA,! 2005],! the! framework! of! incentives! should! be! structured!
such! that! risks! are! allocated! to! the! entities! that! take! the! decisions! and! that! hold! the!
responsibility!for!taking!them!into!account.
Again,! it! seems! that! it! is! missing! in! this! market! design! some! flexibility! to! enable! hydros! to!






This! chapter! details! the! main! features! of! Brazilian! electricity! market.! Then,! focusing! on! a!
hydrothermal!power!system!with!a!large!share!of!hydros,!three!concerns!regarding!this!market!
















the! ACR,! and! free! consumers! in! the! ACL,! need! to! contract! 100%! of! their! expected!
demand,!otherwise!penalties!will!be!imposed!to!them;!
ii) the! EPE! (the! stateSowned! company! created! to! support! the! MME! in! the! energy!







run! the!national!public! auctions! in!order! to!buy! the!electricity!needed! to! supply! the!
captive!consumers;!
vi) generators! that! were! successful! in! these! auctions! sign! PPAs! with! Discos! that!
demanded!electricity! for! the!MME!as! a! condition! to! receive! the! concession!grant! to!
build!and!explore!the!generation!activity;!
vii) in! the! end! of! each! year,! all! contracts! and! physical! guarantees! must! go! though! the!
seasonalization!process;!
viii) in!each!week!a!software!package!is!run!in!order!to!centrally!dispatch!the!system.!This!
is! done! by! the! ONS! (the! system! operator),! that! determines! the! dispatch! of! the!
generators! without! considering! their! contracted! energy.! The! shortSterm! price! (PLD)!
comes!also!as!a!result!of!these!simulations;!
ix) generators! follow! the! dispatch! mentioned! in! step! viii),! and! real! productions! are!
measured!by!CCEE;!
x) The!MRE!is!run!to!share!among!the!hydro!participants!the!risk!of!not!being!dispatched;!
xi) CCEE! has! in! its! records! all! the! seasonalized! contracts! and! physical! guarantees.!




The! market! adequacy! is! provided! by! a! mix! of! capacity! mechanisms! (for! both! contracting!























do! not!make! any! shortSterm! declaration! of! intention,! and! the! PLD! is! not! the! result!
from! the! interaction! between!market! participants.! Instead,! the!PLD! comes! from! the!
application!of!a!chain!of!software;!and!
• the! codes! of! this! chain! of! software! (NEWAVE! and! DECOMP)! are! under! intellectual!




and! price! bids! in! the! shortSterm,! which! would! be! used! to! set! their! market! positions! and,!
consequently,! substitute! the! seasonalization! and! the!MRE.! As! a! result,! the! shortSterm! price!









































and! decentralized! marketSbased! economy,! it! aims! at! increasing! the! degree! of! flexibility! to!
enable! generators! to! uphold! their! contracts! while! ensuring! the! efficient! use! of! the! energy!
resources!and!together!with!the!security!supply!of!the!country.!
Then,!Section!4.3!addresses!the!modeling!alternatives!to!understand!the!generators’!behavior,!






is! facing!a!power!system!with!a!high!share!of!hydropower!plants! the!decision!making!of! the!
market!participants!becomes!more!complex!mainly!because!of!the!following!issues:!
• Temporal!coupling:!It!means!that!the!present!decisions!will!affect!future!decisions!since!
the!use!of! the!water! from! the!hydro! reservoirs!depends!on! the!availability!of! affluent!
natural! energy! inflows! (i.e.! it! depends! on! the! amount! of! rain! that! will! fall! into! the!
watershed!and!that!will!flow!through!the!river!where!the!hydro!is!located)%45;!and!
• Space!coupling:!Within!the!same!cascade,!the!decision!for!electrical!energy!generation!
(i.e.! to! release! the! water! stored! into! the! reservoir,! through! the! turbines)! by! the!
upstream!hydropower!plant!affects!the!decision!of!the!downstream!hydropower!plants!
because!it! influences!the!short!run!availability!of!the!water!and!the!productivity!of!the!




fuel! is! previously! known! by! the! decision! maker.! Unlike! thermal,! it! is! more! demanding! for!
hydropower! plants! to! have! such! knowledge! especially! because! hydros! have! no! direct! costs,!














make! their!bids!based!on! the!water! value!of! its! reservoir.! This! complexity! can!be!addressed!
forecasting! the! affluent! natural! energy! inflows! and! using! stochastic! dynamic! programming.!
Section!3.2.3!showed!that!in!Brazil!this!issue!is!addressed!by!a!centralized!dispatch!carried!out!
by!the!ISO.!However,!in!a!decentralized!dispatch!scheme,!each!hydropower!plant!can!perform!
the! analysis! regarding! the! future! water! availability.! When! doing! so,! each! hydro! would! be!
responsible!for!the!forecast!of!the!water!that!will!fall!and!flow!until!reaching!its!reservoir.!!
Nevertheless,!the!space!coupling,!which!doesn’t!exist!for!thermal!power!plants,!is!problematic!
in! markets! where! different! companies! own! hydros! in! the! same! cascade.! As! observed! in!
Sections! 3.2.3! and! 3.3.1,! when! a! cascade! has! several! power! plants! operated! by! different!
owners! the! decentralized! dispatch! cannot! lead! to! the! global! optimal! solution! regarding! the!
efficient! use! of! the! resources.! In! other! words,! the! sum! of! the! total! individual! revenues!
obtained!by!each!company!may!not!coincide!with!the!optimal!global!revenue!associated!with!


















Considering! that! (i)! the! Brazilian! power! system! historic! operates! with! around! 80%! of!
hydropower! generation,! (ii)! different! private! and! public! companies! coexist! in! the! same!
cascade,!(iii)!the!dispatch!is!centralized!by!the!ISO,!and!(iv)!the!shortSterm!prices!are!formed!by!
a!minimum! cost! dispatch! approach,! the! design! of! a! suitable!market! structure! is! a! complex!
issue,! and! just! few! studies! have! raised! substantial! alternative! approaches! to! address! a!
liberalized!and!decentralized!Brazilian!electricity!shortSterm!market.!
For! hydrothermal! power! systems,! [Kelman,! 1999]! shows! that! the! downstream!hydro! power!
plants!capture!part!of!the!revenues!that!should!be!attributed!to!upstream!hydros.!This!author!
illustrates! this! concern! through! the! problem! of! the! coexistence,! in! a! same! cascade,! of! an!
upstream! “pure”! reservoir! (only! the! dam)! to! a! downstream! run! of! the! river! hydro.! The!
upstream!pure!reservoir!must!be!remunerated!for!its!investment!since!it!brings!the!benefit!of!
the! stream! inflow! regulation! for! the! downstream! hydros,! which! allows! increasing! the!
electricity!production!of!the!downstream!units!in!the!dry!season.!!
However,! the! usual! scheme! of! the! wholesale! electricity! market! only! pays! the! generated!
electricity.!Then,![Kelman,!1999]!proposes!the!creation!of!a!Wholesale!Water!Market!(WWM)!
to!adjust! it.!From!this!point!of!view,!a! reservoir! is!an!economic!agent!"buying"!water!during!
raining!periods!and! storing! it!until! the!arrival!of! the!dry! season.!The! turbine/generator! is!an!
economic!agent!“purchasing”!water!to!produce!electricity!to!be!sold!in!the!market.!
The! Revitalization! Committee! of! the! Power! Sector,! created! by! the! Brazilian! government! in!
200146! in!response!to!the!energy!crises!that!Brazil! faced! in!2001!and!2002!due!to!a! long!and!
tough! drought,! suggests! the! implementation! of! a! series! of! measures,! among! which! are!
[Revitalization! Committee! of! the! Power! Sector,! 2002b]:! assurance! of! the! supply! expansion,!
monitoring!of!the!supply!reliability,!strengthening!of!the!market,!prevention!of!the!exercise!of!
market! power,! and! enhancing! the! effectiveness! and! transparency! of! operation! of! the!
institutions.!!
Concerning! the! strengthening! of! the! market,! it! was! advocated! the! implementation! of! a!
dispatch!process!and!market!based!on!bids.!The!Committee!stated!that!the!determination!of!
the!production!of! each!plant! and! the! shortSterm!price! by! computational!models! (as! is! done!
nowadays)! is!not! ideal!for!assigning! individual!responsibilities!to!the!owners!of!the!hydros!to!
fulfill!their!contracts.!This!is!because!the!calculation!of!prices!that!existed!at!that!time!(and!it!
still! exists)! does! not! allow! companies! to! price! their! energy! portion! of! power! system.! In!
addition,!companies!could!understand!that!they!are!not!responsible!for!complying!with!their!












Besides!that,!another! issue!regarding!the!Brazilian!centralized!dispatch! is! related!to!the!nonS
diversification!of!the!system!operation!risks.!The!ISO!collects!and!manages!a!large!amount!of!
information! about! each! agent! as! well! as! other! parameters! of! equal! importance! (such! as!
hydrologic!and!demand!scenarios),!and!the!criteria!for!selecting!the!information,!modeling!of!
future! uncertainties! and! decision! making! are! necessarily! unified.! On! other! hand,! a! scheme!
based!on!offers!of!price/quantity!bids! incorporates! the!diversity!of! agents’! perceptions!with!
respect! to! future! uncertainties! of! supply,! demand,! fuel! prices! as! well! the! water! inflow!
conditions![Revitalization!Committee!of!the!Power!Sector,!2002b].!













that! the! physical! generation! of! each! individual! hydro! corresponds! to! energy! offered!
and!sold!by!the!hydropower;!
• The!connection!between!the!physical!and!the!commercial!operation!is!related!with!the!
following! requirement:! the! total! physical! production! of! hydropower! plants!must! be!
equal!to!the!sum!of!hydros!agents’!accepted!offers.!





Focused! on! improving! the! flexibility! to! enable! market! participants! to! comply! with! their!
contracts,!while! still! ensuring! the! efficient! use! of! the! energy! resources! and!maintaining! the!
current! security! of! supply! level,! and! partially! considering! the! proposal! of! the! Revitalization!
Committee!of!the!Electricity!Sector!(2002),!a!new!market!design!was!developed!to!be!applied!








an!agent! that!has!a! virtual! reservoir! representing!how!much!energy! is! virtually! stored! in!his!
hydro!plant.!Hereafter,!for!each!accounting!period,!each!account!is!fed!by!the!fraction!of!the!
total! Natural! Affluent! Energy! (NAE)! that! flowed! to! the! hydro! cascade! proportionally! to! the!
hydro’s!physical!guarantee.!Then,!the!following!sequence!of!events!is!adopted:!
1º The! system! operator! continues! his! work! as! it! is! currently! done! (running! NEWAVE,!
DECOMP!as!well!as!other!software,!procedures!and!schemes),!and!defines!the!amount!
of! generation! for!each!power!plant.! This!means! that! it!maintains! its! responsibility! in!






this! market,! hydros! have! the! opportunity! to! withstand! their! bilateral! contracts!
whereas! they!are! trying! to!have!successful!bids.!The!result!of! this!market! is!a!virtual!
dispatch!with! financial! settlement!purposes.! To!do! that,! hydro! agents! can!offer! bids!
considering! a! price! between! zero! and! a! ceiling! price! (e.g.! the! cost! of! the! cheaper!
thermal!power!plant!dispatched! in! this!period)!and!the! limit!quantity!corresponds!to!
the!energy!available!in!his!account;!
4º The! final! shortSterm! price! is! calculated! as! a!weighted! average! considering! the!most!
expensive! successful! hydro! price! bid! and! the! variable! cost! of! the! last! nonShydro!
resource!dispatched!by!the!ISO.!
Unlike! the!proposal! of! the!Revitalization!Committee,! in! this! case! the! ISO!defines! in! the! first!
place! the! amount! of! generation! of! each! power! plant,! through! the! computational! models!
package! and! with! the! goal! of! optimizing! the! power! system! and! addressing! the! security! of!
supply.!Then,!considering!the!“remaining!demand”,!hydros!participate!in!a!shortSterm!market!
aiming!to!be!successful!through!their!offers!in!order!to!endure!their!contracts.!
Through! VRM,! the! ISO! will! freely! operate! the! physical! system! and! hydro! agents! would! be!
responsible! for!deciding,! in! commercial! terms,!how!much! they!want! to!withdraw! from! their!
virtual! reservoirs! to!meet! their! contracts.! To! do! that,! their! bids! have! to! be! accepted! in! an!
auction! that!will! be! performed! as! a! daySahead!market.! In! doing! so,! each! generator! has! the!
opportunity! to!manage! its! contracts!more!efficiently,!without!affecting! the! real!operation!of!
the!physical!system.!
As! can! be! observed! in! Figure! 4.2,! in! the! VRM! two! worlds! would! coexist:! the! real! one,!
associated!with! the! power! system! considering! physical! effects,! and!where! the! ISO! runs! the!
dispatch!in!a!centralized!way;!and!the!virtual!one,!related!to!the!settlement!system!and!with!
commercial!effects,!and!where!hydro!agents!participate! in!a!shortSterm!market.!Both!worlds!

















By! doing! so,! the! MRE! and! the! seasonalization! process! of! the! physical! guarantee! (two!
mechanisms!of!the!current!Brazilian!market)!will!be!replaced!by!the!virtual!hydro!shortSterm!
market.! Thus,! the! settlement! process!will! occur! considering,! for! each!hydro,! the! “successful!
quantity! bid”! (equation! 4.1)! instead! of! the! “own! production! defined! by! the! ISO”! plus! the!
“allocated!energy!from!the!MRE”!(equation!3.2).!Thus,!the!“verified!energy”!is!now!given!by:!!"#$%$"&!!"!#$%! = !"##$!!%"&!!"#$%&%'!!"!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.1)!
Nevertheless,! the! “contracted! energy”! and! the! “exposed! position”! remain! unchanged!
(equation!4.2!is!equal!to!equation!3.4,!and!equation!4.3!is!equal!to!equation!3.5):!!!"#$%&'$()!!"!#$% = !"#$%&!!"#$%&!$'!!"#ℎ!!!ℎ!!!"#!$%#&'(#)'$%!!"#! "#$%&'(") !!(4.2)!!"#$%&'!!"#$%$"&! = !"#$%$"&!!"!#$% − ! !"#$%&!$'(!!"!#$% !!!!!!!! ! ! !!!!!!(4.3)!
At!the!end!of!this!process,!the!prices!no!longer!result!primarily!from!a!chain!of!computational!
models!that!may!eventually!present!problems!related!with! inconsistencies!and!transparency,!
but! they! are! obtained! through! the! combination! of! thermal! costs! originated! from! the! ISO!
dispatch!and!the!shortSterm!market!price!arising!from!the!liberalized!hydro!shortSterm!market.!
A!mix!of!centralized!dispatch!and!market!based!on!bids!can,!therefore,!increase!the!confidence!
of! market! participants! and! improve! the! transparency! and! regulatory! stability! of! the! power!
sector.!

































































Time% t0:! ! Both! systems! (physical!
and!commercial)!start!equal!
Time%t1:% ISO!deposits!a! fraction!of! the! total!





































Finally,! this!market! design!maintains! the! same! levels! of! the! previously!mentioned! efficiency!
and!security,!while! it! increases! the! level!of! flexibility!of! the!agents’!commercial!aspects.!This!
flexibility! can! be! achieved! by! replacing! the! MRE! and! the! seasonalization! of! the! physical!
guarantee!by! the! proposed!Virtual! Reservoir!Model.! As! a! consequence,! the!management! of!
(virtual)!reservoirs!is!under!the!responsibility!of!each!hydro,!which!could!(virtually)!save!water!
according! to! their! own! risk! perception.! On! the! other! hand,! the! operation! of! the! physical!




















































However,! if! it! is! intended! to! operate! the! hydro! shortSterm!market! as! a! daySahead!market,!
every! day! the! ISO! must! measure! the! amount! of! the! energy! inflow! that! flowed! within! the!
cascade!during!the!previous!day!and!to!deposit!the!corresponding!amount!in!each!hydro!ERA.!
Then,! dayStoSday! the! ISO! dispatches! the! system! and! computes! the! remaining! demand.!
Subsequently,! hydros! daily! communicate! bids! including! 24! pairs! of! quantity! and! price! (each!
pair! for!one!hour!of! the!next!day)! in!order! to!withstand! their! contracts!and! set! the! clearing!
price.!Finally,!the!settlement!process,!which!considers!the!contracted!energy!and!the!accepted!
quantity!bids,!must!be!performed!in!the!same!basis.!
As! it! can! be! noted,! the! complexity! of! the! daySahead!market! is! higher! than! the!weekSahead!
market,! but! the! shortSterm!prices! obtained! from! the!daily!market!will! represent! the! system!
conditions! more! accurately.! Moreover,! it! can! further! improve! the! competitiveness! and!
completeness! of! the!market,! and! facilitate! the!materialization! of! reference! prices! that! send!
more! relevant! price! signals! to! the! participants.! So,! the! daySahead! market! of! the! virtual!
reservoir!model!could!be!timely!implemented!as!a!second!stage!of!the!reform.!
4.2.2.2+Amount+deposited+in+the+ERA+
It!was!stated!that! the!amount! that!must!be!deposited! in!each!ERA!by! the! ISO!should!be!the!
fraction! of! the! total! Natural! Affluent! Energy! (NAE)47! that! flowed! within! the! cascade!
proportional! to! the!hydro’s!physical!guarantee.!This!calculation! is! shown! in!equation!4.4! (“i”!
represents!the!hydro!index!and!“t”!is!the!trading!period!index).!!!"#!" = !"#!!×!!"!!"!!!=1 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.4)!
This!designation!was!chosen!because,!considering!the!cascade!operating!as!a!unique!reservoir!
shared!by!several!owners,!this!value!gives!to!each!owner!a!fair!fraction!of!the!inflow.!It!is!also!
important! to! emphasize! that,! according! to! the! aforementioned! definition,! the! downstream!
hydros!are!not!influenced!by!the!decision!of!the!upstream!hydros.!If,!for!instance,!the!amount!
deposited!in!the!ERA!is!the!exactly!amount!of!water!that!reaches!the!hydro’s!reservoir!(i.e.!the!
affluent! energy! of! the! hydro),! this! deposit! would! be! influenced! by! the! quantity! of! water!




















virtual! reservoir! model.! Both! spillages! are! related! to! the! physical! capacity! of! the!
reservoir.! However,! while! physical! spillage! is! related! to! the! current! real! level! of! the!
reservoir,!the!virtual!one!is!connected!with!the!level!of!ERA.!The!consideration!of!virtual!
spillages! into! the! rules! of! this! market! design! can! contribute! to! curb! speculation! in!
(virtual)! water! management! since! there! will! be! no! reservoirs! with! infinite! storage!
capacity.! For! instance,! hydros! can! save! water! in! order! to! offer! energy! when! the!
resources! are! scarce! and! thus! prices! go! up.! Nevertheless,! even! hydros! that! are! not!
committed!with! bilateral! contracts! (and! therefore! are! totally! flexible! to!manage! their!
virtual! reservoir! just! considering! the! shortSterm! market)! can! save! water! and! until! a!
certain!point,!which!is!exactly!the!reservoir’s!level!that!starts!originating!the!spillages.!
• Minimum!outflow!of! the!hydro:! Some!hydros!have! to! constantly!maintain!a!minimum!
outflow! from! the! reservoir! since! they! can! have! restrictions! in! the! downstream!of! the!
river!regarding!the!need!for!water!(e.g.!to!keep!the!aquatic!fauna!and!flora!of!the!river,!
as!well!as!to!support!human!activities!such!as!irrigation,!transportation,!recreation!and!




• Losses! of! the! power! system:! Sharing! rules! of! physical! losses! of! the! power! system,!
notably! regarding! electrical! losses! in! the! transmission! and! distribution! networks,! can!
also! be! applied! to! hydro’s! offer.! Obviously,! it! will! depend! on! how! it! is! designed! the!
sharing!costs!between!generation,!transmission,!distribution!companies!and!consumers.!
4.2.2.4+Sources+of+bid+constraints++





storage!capability.! In!other!words,! they!don’t!have!reservoir!or! their! reservoirs!cannot!












“unavailability! factor! due! to! forced! maintenance”! and! “unavailability! factor! due! to!
scheduled! maintenance”.! Both! of! them! represent! interventions! of! maintenance! or!
repair!teams,!however!the!former!is!related!to!unexpected!outages!that!can!happen!in!
the! power! plant,! and! the! latter! with! expected! outages! planned! by! the! staff! of! the!
company.! The! consideration!of! both!unavailability! factors! into! the! rules! of! the!Virtual!
Reservoir!Model! (VRM)!makes! sense! because! it! stimulates! the! (real)! unavailability! to!
remain!as!low!as!possible,!namely!by!doing!an!adequate!maintenance.!For!example,!if!a!
power!plant!has!two!generation!units,!each!one!with!50!MW!of! installed!capacity,!and!




Only! hydros48! will! operate! into! the! VRM.! However,! other! generation! sources! contribute! to!
supply! the! total! demand.! This! section! addresses! the! conciliation! of! the!VRM!with! the! other!
sources! of! generation.! This! conciliation! is! done! considering! that! the! implementation! of! the!
hydro!shortSterm!market!(i.e.!the!VRM)!is!the!main!change!in!the!Brazilian!market!design:!the!
current! centralized!dispatch! scheme!and! the!existing! regulatory! framework! applied! to!other!
generation!sources!are!kept!same.!
In!Brazil,!thermal!power!plants!sign!availability!type!contracts,!which!means!that!they!receive!a!
fixed! revenue! whether! dispatched! or! not,! and! when! dispatched! they! receive! a! variable!
revenue! according! to! their! production,!mainly! to! cover! the! cost! of! the! fuel.! This! is! because!
their! fixed! and! variable! costs! are! previously! known! by! the! ISO.! The! ISO! beforehand! knows!
these!costs!once!they!are!components!of!their!bids!in!the!longSterm!public!auctions!(described!
in!Section!3.2.1).!Even!though!the!thermal!power!plants!don’t!really!participate!in!a!shortSterm!
market,! the!market! knows! their! average! variable! costs.! Thus,! the!hydros! supply! curve! (built!
through! their! bids! in! the! shortSterm! market)! can! be! conceptually! extended! in! order! to!
incorporate!other!bids,!such!as!the!bids!(average!variable!costs)!made!by!thermal!power!plants!
in! public! auctions.! The! resultant! curve!will! be! here! called! by! the! “global! supply! curve”,! and!












Regarding!wind! farms!and! solar!PV,!both! technologies! intrinsically!have!an!Average!Variable!
Cost!(AVC)!equal!to!zero!since!they!use!energy!provided!by!the!wind!and!sun,!respectively,!to!
produce! electricity.! Moreover,! their! marginal! cost! is! equal! to! zero! and,! unlike! hydropower!












Figure! 4.5! can! then! be! decomposed! in! two! supply! curves.! As! explained! in! the! beginning! of!
Section!4.2,!in!VRM!the!ISO!defines!in!the!first!place!the!physical!amount!of!generation!of!each!
power! plant.! So,! through! this! dispatch! it! is! known! the! total! demand! to! be! supplied! by! all!
hydros!(Qh)!and!nonShydros!(Qnh).!The!sum!of!Qh!and!Qnh!is!equal!to!the!total!demand!of!the!
system!(Qtotal).!Figure!4.6!illustrates!these!two!supply!curves:!the!graphic!on!the!left!represents!





























































the! hydros! can! be! seen! as! an! opportunity! cost! linked! with! the! variable! cost! of! the! last!
dispatched! resource.! In! other! words,! the! ceiling! price! or! the! maximum! regulatory! price!
(p_uplim)!is!equal!to!PLDnh.!!
In! the!example!of!Figure!4.6,!Hydro!4!had! the! last! successful!bid,!which! in! fact!was!partially!
successful.!Hydro!5!was!the!only!one!to!offer!a!price!bid!(p_h5)!equal!to!the!maximum!allowed!
price.!Here!the!p_uplim!is!equal!to!the!variable!cost!of!the!gas!thermal!power!plant!dispatched!
by! the! ISO! (p_gas).! Regarding! Hydro! 5,! this! situation!may! occur! because! in! this! framework!
hydros! can! bid! according! to! their! risk! perception! and! considering! their! bilateral! contracts.!
Supposing! that! Hydro! 5! is! expecting! a!water! scarcity! for! the! next! periods,! his! evaluation! of!
water! savings! is! different! from! the! others.! Another! assumption! is! that! Hydro! 5! is! the! only!
hydro!that!is!not!fully!bilateral!contracted.!Consequently,!price!bids!from!Hydros!4,!3,!2!and!1!
tend!to!be! lower! than!price!bids! from!Hydro!5!because!the! formers!want! to!avoid!having! to!
buy!electricity!to!deliver!their!commercial!commitments!if!their!bids!are!unsuccessful.!
4.2.2.6+Final+short&term+market+price+
The! final! shortSterm!price! (PLDfinal)! is! calculated!as! a!weighted!average! considering! the!most!
expensive! successful! hydro! price! bid! (the! marginal! hydro! resource! to! supply! Qh)! and! the!
variable! cost! of! the! last! nonShydro! resource! dispatched! by! the! ISO! (the!marginal! nonShydro!
resource!to!feed!Qnh).!So,!taking!Figure!4.5!as!an!example,!the!final!shortSterm!market!price!is!
determined!by!equation!4.5:!PLD!"#$% =! !_!"×!! ! !_!"#×!!!!!"!#$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.5)!





As! it! can! be! observed,! the! final! shortSterm! market! price! is! a! combination! of! the! visions!
(perspectives,! strategies! and! risk! perceptions)! from! both! the! ISO! and! hydros,! i.e.,! the! final!
price!reflects!both!the!centralized!dispatch!and!the!market!based!on!bids.!!
Besides,! the! hydros’! freedom! to! influence! the! final! price! is! limited! by! the! value! of! the!
maximum! regulatory! price! bid! (PLDreg_uplim).! To! illustrate! this! issue! in! this! research,! two!
scenarios!are! considered! in! the! simulations!of! the!next! chapter:! (i)! the!market!has!high!and!













the!evaluation!of! the! ISO’s!performance! (Figures!4.3!and!4.4)!has! to!be!performed!after! the!
elimination! of! variables! that! can! bias! the! results,! such! as! the! amount! of! water! physically!
withdrawn! from! the! reservoir! for! flood! control! purpose.! Since! “flood! control”! is! one! of! the!
ISO’s!concerns!and!obligations,!which!is!not!taken!into!account!in!the!agent’s!decision!process,!
it!has!to!be!excluded!in!order!to!avoid!distortions!in!this!comparison.!This!comparison!should!





wholesale! electricity! market,! it! is! necessary! to! understand! the! behavior! of! the! generation!
companies,!especially!regarding!their!bidding!strategies.!Thereby,!numerous!publications!were!






The! single! generation! company!optimization!models! include! a! large!number!of! formulations!
that! use! a! wide! range! of! mathematical! programming! methods! such! as! Mixed! Integer!











Game! theory! models,! also! called! equilibrium! models,! optimize! the! bidding! strategies! by!
investigating! interactions! between! the! players! and! analyzing! economic! equilibrium! of! the!
system.!Typically,!in!a!game,!each!player!chooses!the!strategy!from!his!own!strategy!set,!then!
a! payoff! will! be! assigned! to! each! player! by! the! payoff! function,! and! the! solution! can! be!
reached! via!Nash! equilibrium.!Nash! equilibrium! is! the! strategy! combination! of! all! players! in!
which!no!player!can!increase!his!payoff!by!changing!his!own!strategy!alone.!
Different!competition!rules!can!also!be!adopted!in!game!theory!models:!Bertrand!competition!
(generation! companies! compete!with! one! another! by! using! prices! as! the! strategic! variables!
and! ignore! their! capacity! constraints);! Cournot! competition! (generation! companies! compete!
by!using!quantities!as!strategy!choices,!under!the!assumption!of!having!homogenous!products,!
and!the!market!clearing!price!is!determined!by!the!intersection!of!the!aggregated!supply!and!
market! demand! curves);! Supply! Function! Equilibrium! –! SFE! (in! such! market,! considering!
uncertain!demands,!participants!prefer!to!set!supply!functions!rather!than!competing!in!prices!
or! quantities);! and! some! other! newly! proposed! competition! rules! (e.g.!multiSperiod! bidding!
markets! under! the! assumptions! of! priceSsensitive! demands,! and! hourly! bidding! strategy!
according!to!degrees!of!risk!aversion).!
In! the! agentSbased! models! (ABM),! market! participants! are! represented! as! agents! with!
different! bidding! preferences! and! strategies,! and! they! are! enabled! to! use! their! past!
experiences!to!improve!their!behaviors.!Each!agent!can!also!be!adaptive,!which!means!that!it!
can!develop!its!optimal!bidding!strategy!by!learning!from!his!past!experiences!obtained!from!
the! direct! interaction! with! the! environment.! This! brings! a! new! type! of! numerical! analysis!
theory,! which! is! categorized! in! terms! of! different! learning! algorithms! such! as,! for! example,!










developed! recently! for! strategic! bidding! analysis,! as! the! hybrid! approach! that! combines!
multiple! modeling! methods! like! Lagrangian! relaxation! and! genetic! algorithms! in! order! to!
generate!a!proper!unit!commitment!scheduling!and!to!derive!the!optimal!supply!curves![Yamin!






















Modeling! the! electricity! market! as! a! game! and! mathematically! capturing! the! players’!
behavior! in! the! game! where! one! players! success! in! making! choices! depends! on! the!
others!choices:!
• Usually!mathematically! wellSdefined,! involving! a! set! of! game! players,! a! set! of! bidding!
strategies,! and! a! specification! of! payoffs! for! each! possible! combination! of! bidding!
strategies;!
• Analyzing! the! economic! equilibrium! of! the! market! by! focusing! on! the! players!
interactions;!




• Also,! it! is! limited! by! the! requirement! of! common! knowledge! on! all! generation!
companies’!real!generation!costs.!
AgentSbased!
Modeling! the! complex! electricity! market! as! collections! of! ruleSbased! agents! interacting!





• No! centralized! control! or! planning! is! required! although! random! elements! often! exist!
either!among!agents!or!in!the!system;!












relevant! information! about! the! other! players’! characteristics! and! behavior,! and! they! also!











To! simulate! the! behavior! of! the! hydropower! plants! in! the! shortSterm!market! based! on! the!
VRM,!an!ABM!was!developed!using!QSLearning.!As!previously!discussed,!among!the!modeling!
alternatives! for! strategy! bidding! analysis,! ABM! is! highlighted! because! it! provides! an!
environment! where! agents! can! mimic! the! human! behavior! to! dynamically! and! intelligently!
interact!with!each!other.!As!pointed!out!by![Weidlich,!2008],!the!concept!of!(computational!or!
software)!“agents”!stems!from!the!fields!of!Artificial!Intelligence!(AI)!and!MultiSAgent!System!
(MAS).! In! the! developed! model! these! agents! learn! how! to! act! optimally! using! the!
reinforcement!QSlearning!algorithm.!
A! reinforcement! learning! inspired! on! psychological! theory! is! an! active! area! of! the! artificial!
intelligence! [Kaelbling! et.! at.,! 1996].! Through! trial! and! error! search,! reinforcement! learning!
techniques!allow! the!agent! to!map!each! situation! into!action! [Sutton!&!Barto,!1998]!and,! in!
doing! so,! it! learns! the! policy! of!what! to! do! by! finding! the! optimal! output! for! each! possible!
input.! The!QSlearning! algorithm!was! initially! proposed! by! [Watkins!&!Dayan,! 1992]! and! it! is!
nowadays! one! of! the!most! adopted! reinforcement!machine! learning! techniques.! QSlearning!








provides! the! expected! utility! of! taking! a! given! action! in! a! given! state.! The! function! used! to!
update!the!QSlearning!matrix!is!given!by!(4.7).!! !!,!! ← ! !!,!! + !!. {!! !!,!! + !!.!"#!! !!!!,!! − ! !!,!! }!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.7)!






















First,! it! is! initialized! the!QSlearning!matrix,!which! operate! as! the! agent’s! brain! emulating! its!





agents! to!acquire! knowledge! from!past! actions!and!properly!decide! for!upcoming!actions,! it!







&! Anderson,! 2006]! tested! a! simulator! with! ABM! and! QSlearning! for! evaluating! different!
congestion!management!methods!of! transmission!networks! in! liberalized!electricity!markets.!






game! theory! approach! requires! a! lot! of! information! to! be! able! to! identify! the! best! bidding!
strategy,! the! proposed! method! using! QSlearning! enables! participants! to! find! the! optimal!
strategy!using!only!those!few!items!of! information!available!to!all!participants! in!real!market!
places.!
[Krause! et.! al.,! 2006]! also! worked! to! distinguish! an! ABM! and! an! analysis! based! on! Nash!
equilibrium.! These! authors! compared! these! two! approaches! considering! a! networkS
constrained! pool! market.! Assuming! an! oligopoly! market! with! three! generators! and! three!












that! agents! are! able! to! capture! the! dynamic! interaction! between! strategic! bidding! market!
participants.! Results! show! that! major! generation! owners! who! interact! with! each! other! in!
similar!scenarios!easily!learn!to!implicitly!collude.!
Focusing! on! capacity! withholding! and! the! emergence! of! tacit! collusion! among! the! market!
participants,! [Tellidou! &! Bakirtzis,! 2007]! performed! a! study! on! the! spot! electricity! market!
running! a! modified! version! of! typical! QSlearning.! The! energy! market! is! formulated! as! a!
repeated!game,!where!each!stage!of!the!game!corresponds!to!an!hourly!energy!auction!that!is!
cleared! using! the! locational!marginal! prices.! Furthermore,! in! all! stage! game! repetitions! the!
nodal!load!demand!and!the!transmission!system!conditions!remain!the!same.!Test!results!on!a!
twoSnode! power! system! with! two! and! eight! competing! generatorSagents! demonstrate! the!
development!of!tacit!collusion!among!generators!even!under!competitive!conditions.!
An! interesting!comparison!was!performed!by![Trinh!et.!al.,!2013].!These!authors!applied!two!
approaches! to!a!market! test! suite! that! is!based!on!a! fictional!European!wholesale!electricity!
market.! The! first! approach! is! a! laboratory! experiment! where! master! students! from! the!
engineering!department!of!the!KU!Leuven!represent!generators!in!this!market.!In!the!second!
one,! generators! are! represented! by! computational! agents! in! an! ABM!with! a! reinforcement!
learning!algorithm.!Quantitative!results!obtained!from!this!research!show!that!computational!
agents! achieved! higher! generators’! profits! than! students! in! the! given! market! simulation.!
However,!they!indicate!that!aspects!like!cognitive!issues,!expertise!and!motivation,!as!well!as!
the! number! of! rounds,! sample! size! and! freedom! of! choice! can! affect! the! outputs! of! this!
comparison.!
As!a! result!of! the! research!conducted!by! [Guo!et!al.,!2004]!concerning! the!balance!between!
exploration! and! exploitation! of! the! reinforcement! learning! process,! a! QSLearning! algorithm!
with!a!Simulated!Annealing!(SA)!was!proposed.!In!this!framework,!exploration!means!to!gather!
more! information! by! experimenting! new! alternatives! and! discovering! new! possibilities,! and!
exploitation! refers! to! refine! the! old! certainties,! i.e.! to! take! the! best! decision! given! current!
information.! An! appropriate! algorithm!has! to! deal!with! this! tradeSoff! and! help! the! agent! to!
gather! enough! information! to! take! the! best! overall! decisions.! Given! that! the! SASQSlearning!
algorithm! has! been! very! promising! by! improving! the! ability! of! the! agent! to! acquire! new!
knowledge! and! avoiding! a! decrease! of! performance,! it!was! adopted!by! [Bakirtzis!&! Tellidou!
2006],! [Tellidou!&!Bakirtzis,!2007],! [Wang,!2009]!and![Bach!&!Yao!2012]! in!their!modeling!of!
electricity!shortSterm!markets.!
The!SASQSlearning!algorithm!guides!the!agent!to!choose!the!action!that!seems!the!best!(apolicy).!












!!"#$%& = !"#!"#!! (!,!)! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!(4.8)!
(4) Generate!a!random!value!ε!∈!(0,!1);!




(7) Adopt! a! temperatureSdropping! rule! able! to! ensure! a! slow!decay!of! the! temperature!
factor! along! the! algorithm.! Usually! it! is! used! the! geometric! scaling! factor! rule! as!






into! account! the! level! of! the! (virtual)! reservoir,! the! amount! of! energy! committed! through!
bilateral! contracts,! and!month! of! the! year,! which! is! associated! with! the! water! inflows,! the!
hydro!shortSterm!market!ceiling!price!and!the!demand!to!be!supplied!by!hydros.!!




contracts! through! their! bids! in! the! shortSterm!market! to! address! the! risk! of! exposition,! and!
manage!their!reservoirs,!saving!and!using!water!throughout!the!year!in!an!appropriate!way,!in!
order!to!maximize!their!profit.!
Furthermore,! they! are! goalSoriented! learners! using! the!QSlearning! algorithm.! Thereby,! for! a!
giving!Markov! decision! process,! agents! continually! interact! with! their! environment,! receive!
feedback! (rewards! or! punishments)! from! it,! and! search! for! the! most! profitable! action!



































in! the! balance! account! equal! to! ERAadept! (i.e.! ERA! after! deposit).! Then! it! is! checked! the!
occurrence! of! spillage! (if! ERAadept! >! RC)! and! the! balance! account! ends! up! with! ERAaspillt!
(which!means!ERA!after!spillages).!At!this!stage,!the!QSlearning!algorithm!identifies!the!current!
state! st,! and!prepares! the! actions! at.! In! other!words,! it! is! chosen! the!most! adequate!pair! of!
quantity!bid!(qBID)!and!price!bid!(pBID)!according!the!learning!process!that!hydros!undergo.!




are! sorted! considering! the! pBIDs,! the! successful! bids! are! then! identified,! and! the! ERA! is!























































market! (PLDh),! and! the! final! shortSterm! market! price! (PLDfinal)! is! determined! as! previously!
indicated!by!equation!4.6.!With!these!outputs!the!rewards!of!the!QSlearning!are!processed!(as!





strategy! to! sustain! bilateral! contracts! and! avoid! or! minimize! the! exposed! positions! in! the!
shortSterm!market.!In!the!second!bid!(BID2)!agents!are!allowed!to!manage!their!reservoirs!in!
order! to!optimize! the! leftover! stored!energy.! That! is,! considering!water!management! in! the!
reservoir!throughout!the!year,!in!BID2!the!agent’s!focus!is!to!get!extra!profit!in!the!shortSterm!
market! when! there! is! more! energy! in! the! reservoir! than! the! one! need! to! comply! with! the!
bilateral!exSante!contracts.!!
Thus,! the! algorithm! is! structured! focusing! on! both! the! hydros’! flexibility! to! comply! with!
bilateral! contracts! (through!BID1)! and! the!hydros’! flexibility! to!manage! their! leftover!energy!





Regarding!BID1,! the!state!space!of!QSlearning! is!divided! in!three:!state!s1,!when!the!amount!
available!into!the!ERA!is!larger!than!the!exSante!contract!(qCEt);!state!s2,!when!ERA!balance!is!
equal!or!lower!than!qCEt;!and!state!s3,!if!qCEt!is!equal!to!zero.!
!Moreover,! it! is! possible! to! offer! twelve! different! bids! (actions),! each! one! formed! by! a! pair!
(qBID,!pBID).!The!action!space!is!formed!by!qBIDs!equal!to!zero,!100%!of!the!ERA,!or!100%!of!
the! qCEt,! depending! on! the! state.! The! pBID! can! be! 100%,! 75%,! 50%,! 25%! or! 0%! of! the!
maximum!allowed!bid!price!for!the!account!period!(PLDreg_uplimt).!








% ERA!>!qCE! s1$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ERA!≤!qCE! s2$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! qCE!=!0! s3$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! !! ! a1% a2% a3% a4% a5% a6% a7% a8% a9% a10% a11% a12%
pBID!!(%!of!PLDreg_uplimt)!=! 0%! 100%! 100%! 75%! 50%! 25%! 0%! 100%! 75%! 50%! 25%! 0%!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!qBID!=!!! 0! 100%.!ERA! 100%!.!qCE!









amount!committed! through!contracts! for! that!period! (qCEt),!as!shown! in!equation!4.11.!This!
reward!was!conceived!to!induce!the!agent!to!avoid!negative!exposures!regarding!his!bilateral!


















% January! s1$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! …! …$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! December! S12$ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! !! ! a1% a2% a3% a4% a5% a6% a7% …% a23% a24% a25% a26% a27%
pBID!!(%!of!PLDreg_uplimt)!=! 0%! 100%! 0%! 25%! 50%! 75%! 100%! …! 0%! 25%! 50%! 75%! 100%!





! ! ! ! Actions%
!
When! the! hydro! is! runSofStheSriver! type! (discussed! in! Section! 4.2.1.4),! the! company! always!
choose!the!action!a23! (qBID!equal! to!100%!of! the!ERAaBID1!and!pBID!equal! to!zero).!This! is!





For! hydros! with! reservoir,! their! reward! is! given! by! equation! 4.12.! As! detailed! below,! the!
equation!leads!the!agent!to!pursuit!the!optimal!management!of!the!reservoir!at!the!same!time!













obtained!after!solving!the!linear!programming!problem!shown!in!(4.13).!Max !! = !!"#$2′!!. !"#$_!"#$%!!"!!! + !!. !!"#$1′! +!"!!! !!.!"#$%&'2′!!!"!!!!!!!!!(4.13)!
where:!! = !!"#$_!"#$%!"# !. ! "#!!!"!!! !!!!!! ! ! ! ! ! !(4.14)!
PLDreg_uplimmax!!=!maximum!monthly!PLDreg_uplim!of!the!year! ! ! !(4.15)!! = !100!.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !(4.16)!
!
Subject!to:!!!"#$%&'1′! = ! − !!"#$1′!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!,!!for!t!=!1!! !! !(4.17)!
where:!!
D!=!ERAstart1!+!DEP1! ! ,!!!if!!ERAstart1!+!DEP1!!!<!!RC! ! !(4.18)!
D!=!RC! ! ! ! ,!!!if!!ERAstart1!+!DEP1!!>!!RC!! ! !(4.19)!
! !"#$%&'1′! = !"#$%&'2′!!! + !"#!! − !!"#$1′!!!!!,!!for!t!=!2!until!12!!!!! !(4.20)!!"#$%&'2′! = !"#$%&'1′! − !!"#$2!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!,!!for!t!=!1!until!12!!!!! !(4.21)!!"#$%&'2′! ≤ 0,25!.!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!!,!!for!t!=!12!!!!! ! !(4.22)!!"#$1′!! ≤ !"#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!,!!for!t!=!1!until!12!!!! !(4.23)!
!0! ≤ !"#$1′!!!, !"#$2′!!,!"#$%&'1′!!,!"#$%&'2′! !≤ !"!! ! ! !(4.24)!
!!!!!!!!!!!!
The!variables!of!the!problem!are!qBID1’t,!qBID2’t,!ERAaBID1’t!and!ERAaBID2’t,!and!all!of!them!




the! objective! function! encourages! high! values! of! qBID1’t,!while! the! equation! 4.23! limits! the!
maximum!values!of!qBID1’t.!Similarly,!the!value!B!pushes!the!reservoir!to!end!up!the!year!with!
a!level!equals!to!or!as!close!as!possible!to!its!target.!Here,!this!target!is!embodied!by!equation!
4.22,! i.e.! at! 25%! of! the! reservoir! capacity! (RC).! Afterward,! the! equation! “ΣqBID2’t! x!
PLDreg_uplimt”! presents! into! the! objective! function! represents! the! revenue! obtained! in! the!
VRM!when!the!company!sell!qBID2’t!at!the!ceiling!price!(PLDreg_uplimt).!
The!variable!D!is!included!in!the!linear!programming!just!to!limit!the!occurrence!of!values!(sum!
of!ERAstart!and!DEP)!above!RC! in!the!first!month.! If! this!occurs,! it!represents!an!unmanaged!








that! no! spillages! occur49.! At! the! end,! the! linear! programming! formulated! at! this! way! will!
safeguard!results!where!all!the!manageable!spillage!will!be!avoided.!!
Finally,! once! the! ERAaBID2’t! is! known,! it! is! possible! to! compute! the! goal! level! of! the! virtual!
reservoir! at! the! end!of! the! trading!period! (Reservoir_levelgoal_t).! This! calculation! is! shown!by!
equation!4.25.!Reservoir_level!"#$_! = !"#$%&'2!!!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.25)!
As!can!be!noted,!this!optimization!outputs!the!Reservoir!goal! level! in!each!period!t,!which! is!
the! input! data! to! compute! factorgoal_t.! The! factorgoal_t! works! according! a! target! band! system!
that!embodies!a!hyperbolic! function.!That! is,! if! the!difference!between!the!current! reservoir!
level! and! its! target! is! into! the! narrowest! band,! the! value! of! the! factorgoal_t! is! the! largest!
possible;! however,! the! value! of! the! factorgoal_t! reduces! and! tends! to! zero! as! this! difference!
increases.!!
In!the!algorithm!it!was!adopted!the!following!rule:!factorgoal_t!is!equal!to!1!if!the!current!level!of!












































































! 0%! ! 7%! ! 17%! ! 27%! 32%% 37%! ! 47%! ! 57%! ! 67%! ! 100%!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! % ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
factorgoal_
t!=! !
0.4! ! 0.7! ! 0.9! ! 1% ! 0.9! ! 0.7! ! 0.4! ! 0! !
!
Figure%4.9%–%Example%to%illustrate%the%choice%of%the%factorgoal_t%
Last! (but! still! regarding! equation! 4.13),! the! following! should! be! detailed.! There! are! periods!
(near!the!starting!period!of!low!water!flows)!when!it!is!better!to!save!water.!In!this!case,!it!is!
expected! to! use! low! qBID2suct,! which! results! in! high! ERAaBID2t.! Therefore,! agents! should!
value!the!ERAaBID2t!more!than!qBID2suct.!Nevertheless,!in!certain!occasions!(e.g.!when!there!
is!water! scarcity! and!prices! are! high)! the! best! action! is! to! offer! large! qBID2suct! (at! a! higher!
price),!decreasing!the!level!of!the!ERAaBID2t.!!
The!decision!whether!to!value!qBID2suct!more!than!ERAaBID2t!and!viceSversa!is!guided!by!the!
factorgoal_t.! If! the! agent! offers! a! large! qBID! when! it! should! be! low,! the! current! level! of! the!
reservoir!will!be!away!from!the!goal!level,!and!the!reward!will!penalize!the!agent!through!the!
factorgoal_t.!Even!if!there!is!a!successful!qBID2,!the!penalty!can!be!so!large!that!the!reward!will!
be! zero! (when! factorgoal_t! =! 0).! Finally,! the! PLDfinalt! in! equation! (4.13)!will! boost! the! learning!
agent,!reinforcing!the!periods!of!high!or!low!price!(i.e.!low!or!high!water!inflow).!
4.5.3%An%overview%of%the%update%process%of%ERA%balance%%
Within! one! trading! period! the! ERA! is! updated! several! times.! First,! due! the! occurrence! of!
inflows,!it!is!credited!in!each!hydro!account!its!corresponding!deposit,!and!the!ERA!ends!up!as!
ERAadept!(equation!4.26).!Then,!if!ERAadept!is!higher!than!the!RC,!the!ERA!undergoes!a!debt!
due! a! virtual! spillage! (VSt)! (equation! 4.22),! resulting! in! the! next! update! of! the! ERA!balance:!









energy!available! for!BID2! (equation!4.29).!The! last!account!update!occurs!considering!all! the!
two!successful!bids!of!the!hydro!(qBID1suct!and!qBID2suct,! if!applicable),!and!the!hydro!ends!
the!trading!period!with!ERAaBID2t,!which!is!equal!to!the!available!amount!of!energy!that!hydro!
will!have!in!the!beginning!of!the!next!trading!period,!i.e.!ERAstartt+1!(equation!4.30).!!"#$%&'1! = !"#$%&'((! − !"#$1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.29)!!"#$%&'2! = !"#$%&'((! − !"#$1!"#! − !!"#$2!"#! = !!"#$%&'%!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.30)!
4.6.Final.remarks.
In! order! to! overcome! the! concerns! discussed! in! Section! 3.3! (i.e.! efficiency! of! the! energy!
resource;!security!of!supply;!and!flexibility!to!endure!contracts),!a!new!market!design!based!on!
the! concept! of! virtual! reservoirs!was! proposed.! This!market! design! aims! at!maintaining! the!
current! levels!of!efficiency!and!security,!while! increasing! the! level!of! flexibility! regarding! the!
commercial!behavior!of!the!agents.!In!the!Brazilian!case,!this!flexibility!is!achieved!by!replacing!
the!MRE!and!the!seasonalization!processes!by!the!Virtual!Reservoir!Model!(VRM).!!
According! to! the! proposed! market! framework! two! worlds! operate! simultaneously:! one!
associated! with! the! power! system! considering! physical! effects;! and! another! related! to! the!
settlement!system.!The!management!of!(virtual)!reservoirs!is!under!the!responsibility!of!each!
hydro,!which!can! (virtually)! save!water!according! to! their!own!risk!perception,!but! the! (real)!
operation! of! the! physical! system! is! not! affected.! Thus,! the! efficiency! of! the! hydro! cascade!
operation!is!ensured!and!the!current!level!of!the!security!of!supply!is!maintained.!
Other!advantages!of!this!market!design!can!be!noted!as!follows.!First,!it!promotes!an!increased!
transparency! related!with! the! computational!models! used! by! the! ISO! to! run! the! centralized!
dispatch.! Given! that! the! codes! associated!with! this! software! package! are! under! intellectual!
property! rights,! inconsistencies! in! these! algorithms! have! a! huge! impact! within! the! entire!
sector.!A!market!design!that!combines!a!centralized!dispatch!and!a!market!based!on!bids!can!
increase! the! confidence! of! sector.! Second,! with! both! the! physical! and! virtual! dispatch!
operating! in! parallel,! it! is! possible! to! promote! an! analysis! of! the! ISO!performance!based!on!
comparisons!of!the!ISO’s!decisions!and!agents’!decisions.!
Section! 4.2.2.5! dealt! with! the! implementation! of! the! VRM! taking! into! consideration! the!
permanence!of!current!Brazilian!central!dispatch.!The!hydro!shortSterm!market!based!on!VRM!
fits!the!other!aspects!of!the!current!Brazilian!electricity!market!design,!notably!regarding!the!
present! regulatory! framework!applicable! to!other! resources! such!as! thermal,!wind!and!solar!
power!plants!(e.g.!longSterm!bilateral!contracts!with!clauses!regarding!fixed!and!variable!cost!












penetration!of!hydros!as! follows:! i)! “all”! sources!of!generation!participate! in!a!unique!shortS
term!market!based!on!bids;!ii)!by!doing!so,!it!is!the!market!(not!the!ISO)!that!decides!the!total!
generation!to!be!supplied!by!each!source,!including!hydros;!iii)!hydros’!bids!in!the!shortSterm!
market! can!operate!based!on! the!VRM! (i.e.! their!bids!are! virtual!ones!and!have! commercial!
replications,!as!presented!Section!4.2);! iv)! later,! considering! the! total! successful!bids! coming!






agents! to! offer! two! bids! in! each! trading! period,! and! each! bid! has! a! different! purpose.! BID1!
aims! at! allowing! the! hydro! to! comply! with! its! exSante! bilateral! contracts,! while! BID2! goes!
beyond! by! allowing! the! management! of! the! reservoir! concerning! the! maximization! of! the!
profit!regarding!the! leftover!energy!from!BID1.!These!two!features!are! incorporated! into!the!
algorithm! through! the! combination!of! a! goalSoriented! scheme,! built! through! the!mentioned!
linear!programming,!with!a!goalSoriented!learner!from!the!QSlearning.!
The! whole! process! of! agentSbased!modeling! contains! several! iterations! and! feedback! loops!
between! the! target! system! and! its! computational! implementation! [Weidlich,! 2008].! Indeed,!
the!algorithm!presented!in!Section!4.5!is!the!12th!version!of!ABM!developed!in!this!thesis,!i.e.!
several! alternatives! of! the! ABM! with! QSlearning! were! developed! before! this! final! one.!




agents.! Finally,! the! second! part! of! Chapter! 5! is! dedicated! to! simulate! the! Brazilian! hydros!







This! chapter! is! organized! in! two! parts.! The! first! one! (Section! 5.1)! focuses! on! testing! and!
validating!the!algorithm!described!in!Section!4.5.!This!algorithm!was!written!in!Matlab!bearing!
in!mind! the! analysis! of! the!market! participants’! behavior! using! the! Virtual! Reservoir!Model!
(VRM).!The!VRM!was!designed!as!an!Agent!Based!Model!(ABM)!where!agents!are!adaptive!and!
use! QSlearning! as! the! core! of! the! mentioned! algorithm.! The! second! part! (Section! 5.2)! is!
devoted! to! report! the! results! of! the! simulation! of! the! Brazilian! electricity!market! operating!
under!the!proposed!market!design.!
5.1.Validation.of.the.algorithm.
In! order! to! test! and! validate! the! algorithm,! a! Case! Study! was! constructed! with! four! hydro!
stations!that!are!characterized!in!Table!5.1.!The!hydros’!features!embody!the!diversity!needed!
to! perform! the! assessment.! In! this! example,! hydros! compete! to! supply! a! demand! Qh! that!
varies! along! one! year.! Since! in! Brazil! the! settlement! process! occurs! monthly,! the! current!
version!of!the!hydro!shortSterm!market!also!operates!on!a!monthly!basis.!
Table%5.1%–%Characteristics%of%the%hydros%(MWaverage)%%
Hydro% H1% H2% H3% H4%
Physical!guarantee!(PG)! 125! 100! 50! 225!
Reservoir!capacity!(RC)! 500! 400! 200! 900!





• Three! level!of!bilateral!contract!commitments:!qCE!equal! to!100%,!50%!and!0%!of! the!
physical!guarantee;!
• Two!types!of!seasonalization!of!the!bilateral!contracts:!FLAT,!where!the!annual!energy!







In! Table! 5.2! we! can! observe! the! monthly! demands! (Qtotal,! Qnh! and! Qh)! for! the! hydrological!
regimes.!The!high!water!flow!pattern!was!shaped!considering!that!the!annual!average!of!the!
NAEtotal! exceeds! 25%! of! the! sum! of! hydros’! physical! guarantees.! So,! the! indicator! GSF!
(Generating! Scaling! Factor)! computed! using! equation! 3.6! (Section! 3.3.3)! is! equal! to! 1.25.! In!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!







that! the! four! generators! together!produce!either!100%! (medium)!or!only! 75%! (low)!of! their!
physical! guarantees.! Besides! that,! as! typically! more! than! 85%! of! the! demand! in! Brazil! is!
supplied!by!hydro!generation,!the!variable!Qh!embodies!this!figure.!
Table%5.2%–%Demand%and%dispatch%data%throughout%the%year%(MWaverage%or%$/MWaverage)%%
+ Month% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
Qtotal! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500! 500!
PLDnh! 217! 117! 117! 57! 57! 57! 117! 117! 317! 417! 517! 617!
High!water!
flow!
Qnh! 167! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5!
Qh! 333! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495!
NAEtotal! 333! 666! 1,166! 1,833! 1,666! 833! 666! 167! 167! 0! 0! 0!
Medium!
water!flow!
Qnh! 250! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 250!
Qh! 250! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 250!
NAEtotal! 267! 533! 933! 1,466! 1,333! 667! 533! 133! 133! 0! 0! 0!
Low!water!
flow!
Qnh! 300! 100! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 5! 200! 300! 300! 300!
Qh! 200! 400! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 495! 300! 200! 200! 200!
NAEtotal! 200! 400! 700! 1,100! 1,000! 500! 400! 100! 100! 0! 0! 0!
 
The! next! sections! focus! on! BID1! (Section! 5.1.1)! and! BID2! (Section! 5.1.2).! Section! 5.1.3!
discusses!whether!the!algorithm!fulfills!its!intended!purpose.!
5.1.1%Concerning%BID1%
To! start!with,! the! simulations! consider! all! the! aforementioned!water! flows!patterns,!market!






















+ 100%! 1! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a3! a5! a6! S! S! S! S!
50%! 2! a12! a12! a12! a12! a6! a7! a6! a6! S! S! S! S!
0%! 3! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!
N
AE
+ 100%! 4! a12! a12! a12! a12! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!
50%! 5! a12! a12! a12! a12! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!








+ 100%! 7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a5! a4! a4! S! S! S! S!
50%! 8! a12! a12! a12! a12! a5! a3! a3! a3! S! S! S! S!
0%! 9! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!
N
AE
+ 100%! 10! a12! a12! a12! a12! a7! a7! a3! a3! a1! a1! a1! a1!
50%! 11! a12! a12! a12! a12! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!





T+ 100%! 13! a12! a12! a12! a12! a7! a7! a7! a7! S! S! S! S!
50%! 14! a12! a12! a12! a12! a4! a7! a4! a3! S! S! S! S!
0%! 15! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!
N
AE
+ 100%! 16! a12! a12! a12! a12! a7! a7! a7! a4! a1! a1! a1! a1!
50%! 17! a12! a12! a12! a12! S! S! S! S! a1! a1! a1! a1!





























with! balance! zero)! and! in! the! driest! months! (i.e.! those! with! lowest! NAEtotal).! When! this!
happens,! obviously! it! is! not! possible! to! endure! all! energy! committed! by! contracts! because!
there! is! not! enough! energy! available! to! do! so.!Nevertheless,! the! selected! action! adopts! the!














1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a3!
H2! a3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a3!
H3! a5! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a5!














Hydro% Month%1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H2! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!












When! in! state! s2! (ERA! ≤! qCE),! agents! try! to! compensate! the! lack! of! energy! to! uphold! their!
contracts!by!offering!as!much!as!possible!at!prices!often!close! to! the! lowest! levels.! So,! they!
choose!from!a3!to!a7,! instead!of!a2.!As!can!be!noticed,!a2!would!be!a!wrong!choice:!a!qBID!









the! bidding! strategy! of! high! water! flow! scenarios.! However,! some! changes! are! noticed.! In!
FLAT_seaso+ scenarios,! given! that! water! flows! are! more! reduced! compared! with! the!
corresponding! previous! scenarios,! the! best! actions! have! large! price! bids! more! often.! For!
instance,!by!comparing!the!occurrence!of!actions!in!scenario!no.!2!(a6!and!a7)!with!those!from!
scenario!no.!8! (a3!and!a5)! in!dry!months! (months!no.!10,!11!and!12),!we!can!notice! that!as!
inflows! begin! to! decrease! hydros! can! have! successful! bids! with! higher! pBID.! This! result! is!
expected!when!resources!become!scarce.!
Tables! 5.7,! 5.8! and! 5.9! present! the! best! actions! for! scenario! no.! 2,! no.! 8! and! no.! 10,!
respectively.!As!can!be!seen!in!Table!5.7!and!Table!5.8!(hatched!cells!in!end!of!the!year),!while!
in! scenario!no.!2! the!best!action! is!either!a7! (pBID!=!0)!or!a6! (pBID!=!25%.PLDreg_uplim),! in!
scenario! no.! 8! the! action! chosen! is! either! a5! (pBID! =! 50%.PLDreg_uplim)! or! a3! (pBID! =!
75%.PLDreg_uplim).!
Table%5.7%–%Best%actions%throughout%the%year%in%scenario%no.%2%
Hydro% Month%1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a6! a6!
H2! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a7!
H3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a6! a6! a6!
H4! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a6!
!
Table%5.8%–%Best%actions%throughout%the%year%in%scenario%no.%8%
Hydro% Month%1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a3! a3!
H2! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3! a3!
H3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a5! a5! a5! a5!
H4! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a3!
!
Focusing!on!NAE_seaso+scenarios,!by!analyzing!scenarios!no.!4!and!no.!10!in!Table!5.3!we!can!
conclude! that! state! s2! started! to!occur! in! scenario!no.! 10!because! these! are!medium!water!





Hydro% Month%1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a7! a7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H2! a7! a7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H3! a3! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!







The! incidence! of! state! s2! (ERA! ≤! qCE)! in! all!NAE_seaso+ scenarios! is! higher! when! the! worst!
hydrological!year!comes.!When!this!happens,!hydros!have!more!difficulty!to!fully!endure!their!
contracts.! Table! 5.10! presents! the! best! actions! through! the! year! for! scenario! no.! 16,! and! it!
shows!that!hydros!are! facing!state!s2! (i.e.! suffering!water!scarcity! to!comply!contracts)! for!a!
longer! period! than! in! the! previous! scenarios! (from!month! no.! 1! to!month! no.! 4).! This! fact!
becomes! more! evident! with! comparing! the! results! of! scenario! no.! 16! (Table! 5.10)! with! its!
peers!(NAE_seaso!and!qCE!=!100%)!from!the!other!weather!patterns!(Table!5.9!and!Table!5.4).!







1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
H1! a7! a7! a7! a7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H2! a7! a7! a7! a7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H3! a7! a7! a7! a7! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
H4! a4! a4! a4! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a12! a1! a1! a1!
!
When! there! is! water! scarcity! electricity! prices! strongly! rise,! which! means! that! a! negative!
exposed!position!is!a!very!relevant!issue:!losses!are!greater!when!one!has!to!fulfill!his!bilateral!
contract!by!buying!energy!at!prices!closer!to!the!ceiling!price.!So,!during!these!periods!hydros!
really! try! to! avoid! this.! In! a!market! based!on!bids! as! the!VRM,! this! can!be!done! offering! as!
much!as!possible!at!the!lowest!price,!i.e.!they!choose!a7!(qBID!=!100%.ERA;!pBID!=!0).!















of! ceiling! price! rules! are! used! (PLDnh! and! Fixed),! and! the! seasonalization! of! the! bilateral!
contracts!is!only!shaped!according!to!the!water!inflow!(NAE_seaso+mode).!
Giving!these!assumptions,!18!scenarios!were!tested!and!analyzed.!The!QSlearning!mechanism!






























h+ 100%! 1! a7! a19! a17! a22! a21! a23! a5! a10! a2! a7! a6! a9!
50%! 2! a11! a14! a23! a12! a6! a18! a20! a11! a7! a16! a11! a14!
0%! 3! a11! a13! a14! a15! a17! a13! a4! a3! a7! a24! a2! a4!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 4! a11! a2! a14! a5! a17! a15! a8! a21! a5! a12! a12! a4!
50%! 5! a9! a4! a8! a6! a11! a25! a26! a12! a7! a8! a8! a2!








h+ 100%! 7! a1! a6! a22! a11! a27! a2! a5! a8! a25! a9! a7! a22!
50%! 8! a5! a24! a10! a11! a11! a25! a20! a22! a3! a10! a7! a12!
0%! 9! a26! a7! a14! a16! a18! a8! a17! a20! a27! a13! a21! a2!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 10! a1! a9! a22! a16! a24! a10! a8! a6! a7! a13! a17! a26!
50%! 11! a23! a13! a5! a11! a21! a16! a8! a26! a17! a20! a4! a13!






+ 100%! 13! a1! a1! a1! a1! a2! a13! a10! a13! a10! a6! a12! a10!
50%! 14! a25! a9! a18! a7! a24! a8! a14! a4! a22! a7! a12! a12!
0%! 15! a10! a21! a25! a13! a15! a15! a19! a2! a25! a2! a2! a2!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 16! a1! a1! a1! a1! a25! a25! a4! a21! a14! a16! a17! a23!
50%! 17! a24! a21! a16! a16! a22! a17! a21! a17! a10! a7! a5! a25!





























h+ 100%! 1! 20! 80! 60! 80! 80! 100! 20! 40! 0! 20! 20! 40!
50%! 2! 40! 60! 100! 40! 20! 80! 80! 40! 20! 60! 40! 60!
0%! 3! 40! 40! 20! 20! 40! 80! 60! 20! 0! 60! 40! 60!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 4! 40! 0! 60! 20! 60! 60! 40! 80! 20! 40! 40! 20!
50%! 5! 40! 20! 40! 20! 40! 100! 100! 40! 20! 40! 40! 0!








h+ 100%! 7! 0! 20! 80! 40! 100! 0! 20! 40! 100! 40! 20! 80!
50%! 8! 20! 100! 40! 40! 40! 100! 80! 80! 20! 40! 20! 40!
0%! 9! 100! 20! 60! 60! 80! 40! 60! 80! 100! 60! 80! 0!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 10! 0! 40! 80! 60! 100! 40! 40! 20! 20! 60! 60! 100!
50%! 11! 100! 60! 20! 40! 80! 60! 40! 100! 60! 80! 20! 60!





h+ 100%! 13! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 60! 40! 60! 40! 20! 40! 40!
50%! 14! 100! 40! 80! 20! 100! 40! 60! 20! 80! 20! 40! 40!
0%! 15! 40! 80! 100! 60! 60! 60! 80! 0! 100! 0! 0! 0!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 16! 0! 0! 0! 0! 100! 100! 20! 80! 60! 60! 60! 100!
50%! 17! 100! 80! 60! 60! 80! 60! 80! 60! 40! 20! 20! 100!






















h+ 100%! 1! 100! 25! 100! 100! 75! 0! 50! 50! 100! 100! 75! 25!
50%! 2! 75! 25! 0! 100! 75! 0! 50! 75! 100! 75! 75! 25!
0%! 3! 25! 0! 75! 50! 75! 50! 100! 100! 100! 75! 75! 100!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 4! 75! 100! 25! 50! 100! 50! 0! 75! 50! 100! 100! 25!
50%! 5! 25! 25! 0! 75! 75! 50! 75! 100! 100! 0! 0! 100!








h+ 100%! 7! 0! 75! 100! 75! 100! 100! 50! 0! 50! 25! 100! 100!
50%! 8! 50! 25! 50! 75! 75! 50! 50! 100! 0! 50! 100! 100!
0%! 9! 75! 100! 25! 75! 0! 0! 100! 50! 100! 0! 75! 100!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 10! 0! 25! 100! 75! 25! 50! 0! 75! 100! 0! 100! 75!
50%! 11! 0! 0! 50! 75! 75! 75! 0! 75! 100! 50! 25! 0!





h+ 100%! 13! 0! 0! 0! 0! 100! 0! 50! 0! 50! 75! 100! 50!
50%! 14! 50! 25! 0! 100! 25! 0! 25! 25! 100! 100! 100! 100!
0%! 15! 50! 75! 50! 0! 50! 50! 25! 100! 50! 100! 100! 100!
Fi
xe
d+ 100%! 16! 0! 0! 0! 0! 50! 50! 25! 75! 25! 75! 100! 0!
50%! 17! 25! 75! 75! 75! 100! 100! 75! 100! 50! 100! 50! 50!
0%! 18! 0! 75! 75! 50! 75! 0! 75! 100! 75! 100! 75! 100!
!
As!it!can!be!observed,!in!the!case!of!BID2!the!interpretation!of!the!optimal!bidding!strategy!is!










































1! 1! 1! 0,4!
0,4!
!
0! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 0,7! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 155%
Medium+ 7! 1! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 0,9! 0,9! 1! 165%






4! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 0,4! 0,7! 1! 0,9! 0,9! 310%
Medium+ 10! 1! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,4! 0,9! 1! 310%







2! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,4! 0,7! 1! 1! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 0,7! 163%
Medium+ 8! 1! 0,9! 1! 0,4! 0,9! 1! 0,9! 0! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 181%






5! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 1! 1! 1! 0,9! 0,9! 1! 379%
Medium+ 11! 1! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0,9! 0,7! 0,9! 0,7! 0,4! 0! 0,4! 0,7! 431%







3! 0,9! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0! 0,7! 0,7! 0,4! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 176%
Medium+ 9! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0,7! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 184%






6! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0,9! 0,9! 0,7! 0,4! 0,4! 0,4! 0,9! 516%
Medium+ 12! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 0! 0! 0,4! 0,9! 0,9! 0,4! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 586%
Low+ 18! 1! 1! 1! 0! 0,9! 0,9! 0,9! 0,9! 0,9! 0,9! 1! 0,9! 638%
!
Table! 5.14! doesn’t! present! the! scenarios! in! an! ascendant! order! (unlike! Table! 5.11).! This! is!
because!in!this!way!it!is!easier!to!note!that!the!level!of!contract!(qCE!equal!to!100%,!50%!and!




In! groups! 1! and! 2! (qCE! equal! to! 100%),! for! the!Medium! and! Low! scenarios! and! around! the!
second! and! third! trimester! of! the! year,! the! hydro! doesn’t! come! close! to! achieve! its! target!
(factorgoal_t!equal!to!0).!In!groups!3!and!4!(qCE!equal!to!50%),!the!hydro!has!been!close!to!his!
target!almost!all!the!time!(factorgoal_t!equal!to!0!just!in!a!few!months).!In!groups!5!and!6!(qCE!









of! the!annual!PLDaverage.!As! it! can!be!observed,! the!price! increases! from!the!High! to! the!Low!



































1! 1! 1! 0,4!
0,4!
!
0! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 0,7! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 155%
Medium+ 7! 1! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 0,9! 0,9! 1! 165%






2! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,4! 0,7! 1! 1! 1! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 0,7! 163%
Medium+ 8! 1! 0,9! 1! 0,4! 0,9! 1! 0,9! 0! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 181%






3! 0,9! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0! 0,7! 0,7! 0,4! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 176%
Medium+ 9! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0,7! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,7! 184%







4! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 0,4! 0,7! 1! 0,9! 0,9! 310%
Medium+ 10! 1! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0,4! 0,9! 1! 310%






5! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 0,7! 1! 1! 1! 0,9! 0,9! 1! 379%
Medium+ 11! 1! 1! 0,9! 0,4! 0,9! 0,7! 0,9! 0,7! 0,4! 0! 0,4! 0,7! 431%






6! 1! 0,7! 0! 0! 0! 0,9! 0,9! 0,7! 0,4! 0,4! 0,4! 0,9! 516%
Medium+ 12! 1! 0,7! 0,7! 0! 0! 0,4! 0,9! 0,9! 0,4! 0,4! 0,4! 0,7! 586%





levels! considers! the! monthly! deposit! (DEPt),! which! reflects! the! weather! condition.! When!
solving! this! problem,! agents! are! free! to!define! their! qBID1’t! (or!qBID1_goalt)! and!qBID2’t! (or!
qBID2_goalt).! The! value! of! qBID1_goalt! is! defined! to! be! as! close! as! possible! to! qCEt,! and!
qBID2_goalt! is! formulated! to! optimize! the! leftover! energy.! This! is! done! because,! in! the!
objective!function,!qBID1_goalt!has!a!greater!weight!(value!of!A,!given!by!equation!4.14)!than!











reservoir! capacity! (RC).!Bearing! in!mind! that!competition! is!not!considered,! the!optimization!
(dashed!green!line)!guides!the!agent!to:%
• keep!the!reservoir!at! low!levels! in!the!initial!months!until!month!3,! in!scenario!no.!1,!
and!month!4,!in!scenario!no.!3;!!
• sharply! increase! the! level! of! the! reservoir! until! the!middle! of! the! year,! reaching! its!
maximum!level!in!month!7,!in!scenario!no.!1,!and!month!9,!in!scenario!no.!3;!and!
• in!month!12decrease!the!reservoir!level!until!it!reaches!its!target!of!25%.!Nevertheless,!
in! scenario! no.! 1! it! happens! gradually! over! the! last! semester! of! the! year,! and! in!
scenario!no.!3!it!radically!occurs!with!only!one!bid!in!the!last!month!of!the!year.!
In!scenario!no.!1,!regarding!the!reservoir! level,!the!shape!of!the!actual!curve!is!similar!to!the!
shape!of! the! target!one.!Nevertheless,! some!difference!can!be!noticed.! In! the! first! semester!
(period!with! the!highest!water! inflow,!as!can!be!seen! in! the!DEP!curve)! there!are! successful!
qBID1! (qBID1suc_atual)! lower! than! the! need! to! sustain! contracts! (qCE).! However,! this!






































































agents! operate! over! the! same! goalSoriented! scheme,!which! causes! a! generalized! overbid! in!
certain!periods.!So:!
• In! the! beginning! of! the! learning! process! all! hydros! tend! to! offer! high! amounts! in! the!
initial!months!of! the!year.!By! realizing! the! signal! sent!by! the! factorgoal_t! (they!perceive!
this! through! the! reward! calculated! by! equation! 4.12),! in! the! first! rounds! of! the!
interaction! hydros! aim! to! get! rid! of! the! water;! so! competition! grows.! Once! there! is!







































































% % % % % %
%
qBID1suc% % qBID2suc% Reservoir%
%Month% ERAstart% DEP% ERAadep% VS% ERAaspill% Qh% qBID1% goal% actual% qBID2% goal% actual% goal% actual% factorgoal%
1! 0! 150! 150! 0! 150! 333! 120! 120! 120! 6! 10! 6! 2%! 3%! 1!
2! 24! 300! 324! 0! 324! 495! 240! 240! 223! 0! 29! 0! 6%! 11%! 1!
3! 101! 525% 626% 0! 626! 495! 420! 420! 223! 123! 13! 0! 16%% 45%% 0,4%
4! 403! 825% 1228% 328% 900% 495! 660! 660! 223! 192! 8! 0! 33%% 75%% 0%
5! 677! 750% 1427% 527% 900% 495! 600! 600! 223! 180! 17! 0! 48%% 75%% 0,4%
6! 677! 375% 1052% 152% 900% 495! 300! 300! 223! 600! 23! 0! 54%! 75%! 0,7!
7! 677! 300! 977! 77! 900! 495! 240! 240! 223! 264! 34! 0! 57%! 75%! 0,7!
8! 677! 75! 752! 0! 752! 495! 60! 60! 60! 692! 44! 148! 53%! 60%! 0,7!
9! 544! 75! 619! 0! 619! 495! 60! 60! 60! 559! 63! 170! 48%! 43%! 1!
10! 389! 0! 389! 0! 389! 495! 0! 0! 0! 78! 73! 78! 40%! 35%! 1!
11! 311! 0! 311! 0! 311! 495! 0! 0! 0! 124! 76! 124! 31%! 21%! 0,7!




BID1!(qBID1)!coincides!with! its! target! (qBIDsuc!–!goal).!Nevertheless,!as!highlighted!by!
the! cells! shaded! in! light! gray,! in! certain! periods! these! values! are! different! from! the!
successful! quantity! bid! (qBID1suc! –! actual).! This! is! mainly! because,! due! the!
seasonalization!process!of!the!hydros’!contracts!(type!NAE,!which!means!that!the!annual!
energy! is!monthly! distributed! according! to! the! NAE! profile),! there! are!months!where!
there!is!more!contracted!energy!than!total!demand!(Qh).!For!example,!in!month!4,!Qh!is!












• BID2:!As!earlier!discussed,! regarding!BID2!hydros! try! to!decrease! their! reservoir! in! the!
beginning! of! the! year! by! offering! substantial! qBID2s.! By! doing! so,! they! are! striving! to!
avoid!the!virtual!spillages!of!the!months!4,!5!and!6.!However,!there!are!more!offers!than!






certain! months,! limitation! coming! from! the! reservoir! capacity,! periods! where!
competitors! try! to! sell! a! large! amount! of! energy! for! a! relatively! small! demand),! the!
monthly!reservoir!levels!is!only!away!from!its!target!in!months!3,!4!and!5!(cells!shaded!in!
dark! gray!with! text! in! bold).! During! the! rest! of! the! year! it! is! possible! to! remain! quite!
close!to!the!target.!
In! addition,! it! should! also! be! mentioned! that,! when! there! are! more! than! one! successful!
quantity! bid! (qBIDsuc)! related! with! a! price! bid! (pBIDsuc)! equal! to! the! clearing! price,! the!
algorithm!includes!a!rule!to!proportionally!decrease!each!of!these!qBIDsuc!until!all!demand!is!
covered.!And!during!this!process,!in!case!of!having!both!BID1!and!BID2!with!pBIDsuc!equal!to!
the! clearing! price,! this! procedure! is! applied! only! on! BID2.! This! was! designed! to! give! BID1!
priority! over! BID2,! and! thus! to! avoid! partially! unsuccessful! BID1s,! which! would! bring! on!
involuntary!exposed!positions.!
To! sum!up,!we!observe! that,!while! the! target! coming! from!the! linear!programming!problem!
suggests!the!agent!reaches!the!reservoir!level!target!at!the!end!of!each!month,!the!QSlearning!








In! economic! terms,! indeed! we! should! expect! an! increase! of! the! product! price! when! the!
availability!of! the! resource!needed! to!produce! it! (water! inflow)!decreases! (item! i).! So,!when!
moving! from!a! good!hydrological! year! to! a!medium!or! a! bad!one,! the! electricity! shortSterm!
price!level!should!rise.!The!second!observation!(item!ii)!corroborates!the!previous!observation!






Lastly,! as! pointed! out! by! [Rangel,! 2008],! market! power! in! hydro! markets! arises! from! the!
strategic! water! management! of! reservoirs,! which! means! that! the! reallocation! of! a! given!
amount!of!energy!across!periods!can!lead!to!an!increase!in!prices.!In!the!absence!of!longSterm!
contracts,!this!author!states!that!the!interStemporal!strategic!water!management!could!lead!to!
an! increase! in!prices!of!about!20%.!However,! if!generators!are! fully!contracted!the! incentive!
for!strategic!behavior!disappears.!This!price!trend!is!observed!in!item!iii).!Moving!from!a!higher!
level! (100%!and!50%)! of! bilateral! contracts! to! a! lower! one! (50%!and!0%)! originates! a! sharp!




While! Figure! 5.5! illustrates! the! scenario! with! the! lowest! PLDhaverage! (scenario! no.! 1! has! the!
highest!water! flow,!a!“tight”!ceiling!price! rule!PLDnh,!and!hydros!are!100%!committed!by!exS
ante! contracts),! Figure! 5.6! shows! the! results! obtained! for! the! scenario! with! the! highest!














































5.6! (scenario! no.! 18)! with! Figure! 5.7! (scenario! no.! 16),! which! is! presented! below.! The! only!
difference!between!these!two!scenarios!is!the!level!of!exSante!contract!imposed!to!all!hydros:!
while!in!scenario!no.!18!qCE!is!equal!to!0%;!in!scenario!no.!16!qCE!is!equal!100%.!Nevertheless,!






















of! the!matrix! of! the! previous! one! is! lower! than! the! 0,5%! (for! BID1)! or! 5%! (for! BID2)! of! the!



























At! the! end,! the! α! and! γ! values! used! in! these! simulations! seem! to! appropriately! serve! the!
purpose! of! testing! the! capability! of! hydro! agents! learning! how! to! manage! the! bilateral!
contracts!and! the! leftover!energy.!The! learning! rate!α! is!equal! to!0.9! in!both!BID1!and!BID2!
because!new! information!coming! from!each!new! iteration!can!strongly! influence! (and!at! the!







a! centralized! dispatch! driven! by! computational! software! that! include! dynamic! and! linear!
programming!tools,!while!the!proposed!market!design!(i.e.!the!hydro!shortSterm!market!based!
on! VRM)! operates! under! a! decentralized! dispatch! scheme! driven! by!market! based! bids.! So,!
once!VRM! is!a!new!market!design!never! implemented!before,! the! results!of! the! simulations!
provided!by!the!VRM!cannot!be!validated!against!market!results!observed!in!the!Brazilian!real!
electricity! market.! On! the! other! hand,! the! analysis! of! the! representativeness! of! this! model!
concerning!the!real!world!is!done!based!on!qualitative!observations.!Thus,!the!results!coming!
from! the! aforementioned! simulations! are! examined!under! the!perspective!of! the! real!world!
market!forces.!
By! examining! the! basis! of! the! criteria! that! should! be! fulfilled! by! an! adequate! learning!
algorithm,! [Weidlich,! 2008]! directs! the! discussion! towards! the! collective! and! individual!
rationality!of!the!agents! in!the!framework!of!electricity!markets.!Afterwards,!she!suggest!the!
following!questions!to!address!the!mentioned!capabilities:!
Question!1. Collective! rationality:! Do! agents! succeed! to! coordinate! on! bidding! sufficient!
quantities!to!satisfy!total!demand?%
Question!2. Individual!rationality:!Do!agents!recognize!their!strategic!advantages?%
Regarding!Question!1,! it! should!be!noted!that! this!assessment! is!not!an! issue!to!be! imposed!
over!the!proposed!market!design.!The!usefulness!of!the!VRM!is!to!disconnect!the!(virtual)!bids!
in! the! shortSterm! market! from! the! physical! quantities! coming! from! the! ISO! dispatch.! As!













i) Endure! bilateral! contracts;! otherwise! they! will! be! negatively! exposed,! which! means!







They! are! totally! free! to! save! water! and! manage! their! reservoirs! according! to! what! they!
understand!to!be!the!best!strategy;!however,! they!get!a!negative!signal! to!do!so! in!terms!of!
the! reinforcement! learning! approach! if! they! don’t! meet! the! three! conditions! enumerated!
above.! Despite! Question! 1! can! be! relaxed,! indeed! very! frequently! hydros! have! been!
coordinating!to!bid!sufficient!quantities!to!satisfy!total!demand.!
Question!2!addresses!the!individual!rationality.!To!give!an!example!in!classical!electricity!shortS
term!markets,!agents!with! lower!marginal!generation!costs! should!enhance! their! chances! to!
have! successful! bids! by! submitting! lowerSprice! bids!while! agents!with! higher!marginal! costs!
have! to! bid! at! higher! prices! in! order! to! avoid! losses.! Drawing! a! parallel! with! the! proposed!
model,!hydros!operating!under!the!VRM!should!choose!their!best!strategies!to!optimize!their!




Question!2.2. Do! agents! offer! intelligent! bids! (e.g.! save! water! in! certain!moments! to! be!





capable! of! acting! on! their! own! in! order! to! seek! the! best! action! to! endure! their! bilateral!
contracts.! Agents! always! adopt! action! a12! (which!means! to! endure! the! total! amount! of! exS
ante!contracts!at!the!lowest!price)!in!state!s1!(ERA!>!qCE).!In!state!s2!(ERA!≤!qCE),!agents!also!
continuously!decide!to!sustain!their!bilateral!contracts!as!much!as!possible!by!offering!a!qBID!
equal! to! the! available! quantity.! In! state! s2,! the! bid! price! (pBID)! can! vary!mainly! due! to! the!
influence! of! the! annual! hydrological! pattern.!When!moving! from!a! good! year! to! a! bad! one,!
agents! suffer!more!often!with! the! situation! featured!by! state! s2! (ERA!≤!qCE),!and! then! they!
tend! to! mitigate! their! losses! by! offering! bid! prices! with! the! highest! probability! of! being!






• The! agents! are! capable! of! fulfilling! the! purpose! of! BID1,! which! is! to! learn! the! best!
strategies! to! avoid! ending!up!with! a! quantity! bid! (qBID)! that!will! bring! them!negative!
exposed!positions;!




level! due! to! the! abundance! of! this! resource! and! the! need! to! compete! to! endure!
contracts;!and!
• When! there! is! severe!water! scarcity! (e.g.! the! dry!months! of! the! year!with! bad!water!
flows),!pBID!is!also!at!the!lowest!level!because,!even!though!the!resource!is!rare,!there!is!
the! need! to! compete! to! endure! contracts.! In! a! situation! like! this,! there! is! no! leftover!
energy!to!be!used!in!BID2.!The!agent!has!little!amount!of!energy!in!his!ERA!and!has!to!
use! it!wisely.!Additionally,! it! is!more! important! for!him! to! fulfill! the!exSante!contracts.!
Then,!the!best!way!to!use!the!available!energy!is!to!offer!it!at!a!lower!price!in!order!to!
be!dispatched!(and!sustain!contracts).!
After! complying! with! the! bilateral! contracts,! the! results! of! this! simulation! also! reveal! that!
agents!can!manage!their!reservoirs!in!order!to!optimize!the!leftover!stored!energy.!This!part!of!
the!algorithm!(as!shown!in!Section!4.5.2)!combines!a!goalSoriented!scheme,!built!through!the!
mentioned! linear!programming,!with!a!goalSoriented! learner! from!the!QSlearning.!These! two!
characteristics! correspond! to! two! important! required! features! of! software! agents! from! the!
artificial!intelligence!world:!agents!are!goalSoriented!in!that!they!seek!to!maximize!an!assigned!
value! like! payoff,! fitness! or! utility;! and! agents! are! adaptive,!meaning! that! they! learn!which!
actions! to! take! in! order! to! increase! this! value! over! time,! and! so! reach! their! goal! [Weidlich,!
2008].!
Through!the!performed!simulations,!we!can!notice!that!both!quantity!and!price!bid!strategies!
are! consistent! with! what! is! expected! in! real! electricity!markets.! Regarding! the! quantity! bid!
behavior,!the!factorgoal_t!plays!a!relevant!role.!It!takes!into!account!that!agents!will!offer!in!BID1!
a!qBID!equal!to!qCE!or!as!closer!as!possible!to!qCE.!Then,!this!factorgoal_t!guides!agents!in!BID2!
to! the! closest! possible! to! the! ideal! reservoir! level.!Nevertheless,! due! to! competition,! agents!
have! to! adapt! to! the! trajectory! previously! laid! down! by! factorgoal_t.! So,! at! the! end! of! the!
learning!process,!agents!end!up!with! the!best!action! to!be! taken!considering! the! interaction!
with!other!players.!
When!there!is!not!enough!energy!from!BID1!to!supply!the!total!demand,!price!bids!from!BID2!
(pBID2)! are! responsible! for! the! formation! of! the! hydro! shortSterm! market! price! (PLDh).!
Otherwise,!when!all! demand! is! supplied!by!BID1,! it! is! the!pBID1! that!will! influence! the! final!
price.! Bearing! in!mind! the! overview! of! the! price! profile! in! different! scenarios,! the! obtained!
results!were!consistent!with!what!should!be!expected:!when!the!water!flows!decrease,!prices!






















Besides! the! data! about! hydros,! there! is! also!market! data! embracing! the! 3! last! years! (2012,!
2013!and!2014)!as!the!monthly!total!demand!(Qtotal)!supplied!by!all!power!plants!in!the!country!
into! SIN51,! as!well! as! its! corresponding! total! demand! supplied!by! all! hydropower!plants! (Qh)!
and!nonShydropower!plants!(Qnh).!In!addition,!it!also!considers!for!each!month!of!these!three!
years! the! variable! cost! of! the! last! nonShydropower! dispatched! plant! (PLDnh_SIN),! the!
regulatory!ceiling!price!(PLDreg_uplim),!the!total!physical!guarantee!of!the!hydros!(PGtotal),!the!
total! hydro! physical! guarantee! into! each! submarket! (PG_N! for! the! North,! PG_NE! for! the!
Northeast,!PG_SESCO!for!the!Southeast&Midwest+and!PG_S!for!the!South!submarket),!and!the!
total! natural! affluent! energy! that! flowed!monthly! into! the! SIN! (NAE_SIN)! and! its! consonant!
values! for! each! geographic! area! (NAE_N,!NAE_NE,!NAE_SESCO,! and!NAE_S).!All! these! values!




allocated! bearing! in! mind! weights! determined! by! the! water! inflow;! and+ FLAT,+ where! the!
annual!energy!committed!through!contracts!is!monthly!distributed!in!equal!amounts),!and!two!


















had! a! LongSTerm! Average! (known! in! Brazil! by! the! acronym!MLT)! equals! to! 80,04%,! which!
means!that!the!amount!of!water!that! flowed! into!the!SIN!during!one!year!was!equivalent!to!
80,04%!of! the!average!calculated!by! the!historic!of!82!years!of!equivalent!data.! In!2013!and!








Actual data from the 
current Brazilian market 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 18 32 117 188 181 119 91 119 183 288 376 256 163,9 
PLDreg_uplim 727,52 




Seaso. qCE level no. 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 
FLAT 
95% 1 2 3 37 29 31 18 33 44 147 178 172 112 67,1 
50% 2 2 3 37 69 68 18 52 94 110 233 240 112 86,6 
0% 3 2 3 37 69 106 43 52 94 183 178 172 160 91,7 
NAE 
95% 4 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 74 288 240 160 77,7 
50% 5 2 3 11 69 68 43 33 94 183 288 308 208 109,1 
0% 6 2 3 90 69 68 68 33 119 183 288 240 256 118,3 
Fixed 
FLAT 
95% 7 2 3 176 29 182 18 169 172 182 346 236 201 142,9 
50% 8 2 3 176 29 182 18 169 172 327 484 367 201 177,4 
0% 9 2 167 176 183 182 18 169 326 327 623 498 337 250,6 
NAE 
95% 10 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 326 471 484 236 337 163,4 
50% 11 2 3 176 183 333 18 324 326 615 484 236 473 264,4 
0% 12 2 3 176 183 182 172 324 326 471 623 630 337 285,6 
!






Fixed!ceiling!price!rule,!where!the!regulatory!price! (PLDreg_uplim)! is!equal! to!R$!727,52,! the!
resulting!monthly!PLDs!are!at!a!considerable!low!levels!during!several!months.!
As! it! was! already! noticed! during! the! validation! phase! of! the! algorithm! (in! particular! when!
analyzing! the!price!bid!behavior,! in! Section!5.1.2.2),! annual! average!prices! increase!when:! i)!
the! ceiling!price!moves! from! the!PLDnh! rule! to! the!Fixed! one;! and! ii)! there! is!more! leftover!














scenario! no.! 4! is! indeed! close! to! the! current! Brazilian! electricity! market.! This! fact! makes!
scenario!no.!4!(cells!shaded!in!gray!in!Table!5.17)!the!most!important!one.!So,!now!focusing!in!
scenario!no.!4,! the!comparison!between! the!actual!annual!PLDaverage! (163,9!R$/MWh)!and!
the!resulting!annual!PLDaverage!(77,7!R$/MWh)!emphasizes!a!sharply!decrease!of!price!when!
the!VRM!is!used.!This!finding!also!occurs!when!comparing!the!monthly!price!values.!
In! the! following,! the! results! regarding! qBID1! and! qBID2! from! the! Brazilian! nine! largest! (in!
terms!of! installed!capacity)!hydropower! reservoir!plants!are!presented.!As!can!be!noticed! in!
Figure! 5.8! (lines! are! qCEs! and! dots! are! qBID1s),! hydros! are! able! to! learn! to! sustain! their!
bilateral! contracts.! This! is!done!once!hydros!are! choosing!qBID1!as! close!as!possible! to!qCE.!




























































As! presented! in! Table! 5.18,! during! the! year! 2013! all! resulting! PLDaverage! are! lower! than! the!
actual!PLDaverage.!The!results!for!scenario!no.!4!(the!most!representative!scenario!of!the!current!




Actual data from the 
current Brazilian market 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 412 214 340 196 345 207 117 159 263 252 331 291 260,5 
PLDreg_uplim 727,52 




Seaso. qCE level nº 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 
FLAT 
95% 1 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 65 62 209 68 77,1 
50% 2 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89,1 
0% 3 102 51 78 46 91 56 50 129 164 252 209 124 112,6 
NAE 
95% 4 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89,1 
50% 5 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 164 157 270 124 100,5 
0% 6 102 51 78 46 91 56 50 100 214 204 209 180 114,9 
Fixed 
FLAT 
95% 7 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 212 356 375 68 125,2 
50% 8 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 186 359 356 375 218 162,0 
0% 9 102 51 78 46 91 198 176 186 359 209 375 218 173,9 
NAE 
95% 10 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 186 212 209 375 68 125,1 
50% 11 102 51 78 46 91 56 176 186 359 356 375 68 161,9 
0% 12 102 51 78 46 91 56 176 186 359 209 519 218 174,1 
!
Figures! 5.10! and! 5.11! present,! respectively,! how! hydros! (through! BID1)! sustained! their!
contracts!and!what!is!the!best!strategy!to!use!the!leftover!energy!(through!BID2).!Again,!hydro!
Tucuruí,!due!the!same!reasons!already!enumerated! for!2012! (reservoir! level!at!25,35%,!MLT!
equal!to!92,97%,!and!qCE!equal!to!95%),!was!not!able!to!uphold!100%!of!its!bilateral!contract!













































As! shown! in! Table! 5.19,! in! 2014! and! regarding! the! price! bids! there! is! no! resulting!PLDaverage!
higher!than!actual!PLDaverage.!Focusing!only!on!scenario!no.!4,!it!is!also!possible!to!realize!how!
low!the!monthly!prices!coming!from!the!VRM!are!if!comparing!them!to!the!actual!data.!Again,!
even!considering! the! scenarios!with! the!Fixed! ceiling!price! rule! (scenarios!no.!7,!8,!9,!10,!11!
and!12)!the!annual!PLDaverage!is!lower!than!the!actual!one!(R$!653,5).!
Table%5.19%–%Year%2014:%Actual%monthly%PLD%versus%new%PLD%%
Actual data from the 
current Brazilian market 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 375 714 775 758 680 361 570 710 729 766 805 601 653,5 
PLDreg_uplim 727,52 




Seaso. qCE level nº 
monthly!PLD!(R$/MWh)!
PLDaverage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
PLDnh 
FLAT 
95% 1 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 270 544 212 258,4 
50% 2 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 368 370 518 544 212 287,2 
0% 3 156 447 216 215 331 116 278 596 609 766 413 309 370,9 
NAE 
95% 4 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 518 413 212 267,1 
50% 5 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 642 674 212 299,1 
0% 6 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 596 609 766 413 212 335,9 
Fixed 
FLAT 
95% 7 82 488 216 215 215 116 181 254 250 536 550 212 276,1 
50% 8 243 642 216 215 215 116 181 518 385 403 683 212 335,6 
0% 9 243 334 216 362 355 116 462 386 385 403 416 345 335,3 
NAE 
95% 10 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 386 520 403 683 212 284,1 
50% 11 82 488 216 215 215 116 321 518 520 669 550 212 343,5 







1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11! 12!
Tucuruí! 100%! 100%! 89%! 97%! 100%! 94%! 100%! 77%! 73%! 73%! 73%! 73%!
Luiz!Gonzaga!! 100%! 100%! 76%! 75%! 88%! 60%! 72%! 60%! 60%! 60%! 60%! 60%!
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of!view!of! the!VRM,!there! is!no!complexity! in! terms!of!strategy! for! this!kind!of!hydros.!They!
don’t! have! a! reservoir! to! be!managed,! so!what! they! just! have! to! do! is! to! sustain! contracts!








with!reservoir! in!terms!of! installed!capacity.! Indeed,!among!them!there!are!some!that!are! in!
the! list! of! the! largest! hydropower! plants! in! the! world! (e.g.! Itaipú,! with! 14! GW! of! installed!
capacity,!is!the!world’s!second!largest!hydropower!plant,!just!behind!Three!Gorges!Dam).!Still,!
the! results! indicate! that! this! kind! of! hydros! act! the! same!way! as! the! hydros!with! reservoir:!
offer!(through!qBID1)!as!much!as!possible!of!energy!to!endure!the!bilateral!contracts!(qCE).!
5.2.4.2+Virtual+reservoir+versus+Physical+reservoir+
Now! considering! both! the! runSofStheSriver! and! with! reservoir! hydros,! the! resulting! best!
strategies! to! sustain! contracts! (set! of! actions! regarding! BID1)! and! to! optimize! the! leftover!
energy!(set!of!actions!regarding!BID2)!guide!the!company!to!a!reservoir!level!curve!throughout!







































4.4),! different! from!what!was! decided! by! the! ISO.! So,! strictly! speaking,! the! virtual! reservoir!
levels!can!diverge!from!the!physical!reservoir! levels.! In!order!to!compare!these!two! levels!of!
the! reservoir,! the!virtual!and! the!physical!one,!Appendix!C!presents! the!graphics!of! the!nine!
largest!(regarding!installed!capacity)!hydropower!plants!with!reservoir!in!Brazil!in!2012,!2013,!
and!2014.!
To! recap,! the! linear! programming! inside! of! the! algorithm! (addressed! in! Section! 4.5.2)! was!
designed!to!ensure!that!the!reservoir!will!reach!as!much!as!possible!25%!of!its!total!capacity!in!
the! last!month!of! the! simulation! (month!12).! This!was! formulated! to! guarantee! that! hydros!
have!a!safety!stock!of!water!to!start!the!next!year.!Going!back!to!the!Appendix!C,!we!observe!
that,! in! these! three! years,! there! is! a! large! occurrence! of! virtual! levels! close! to! the! physical!
levels.!More!than!50%!of!the!hydros!in!the!sample!have!similar!monthly!patterns,!and!among!
these!more!than!half!ended!the!year!with!the!virtual!level!close!to!the!physical!one.!!
In! this! sample,!only!Tucuruí!hydro!presents!a! large!gap!between!the!virtual!and! the!physical!











at! the!end!of! the!dry!season!and!during!the!peak!hours!As!explained!by!the! ISO! in!his!
Energy!Operation!Plan!2012/2016:!
o “The! hydrological! behavior! of! the! Tocantins! River! basin,! with! large! inflows!











4.4! (Section! 4.2.1).!On!balance,! from! the! commercial! point! of! view! the!Agent! took! the!best!






based! on! certain! requirements! in! order! to! ensure! a! proper! service.! At! the! end,! the! overall!
picture!confirms!that! the!VRM!is!able!to!provide! flexibility! to!sustain!the!contracts!while! the!
operation!of!the!power!system!remains!the!same.!
5.2.4.3+Generation+Scaling+Factor+(GSF)+
In! the!previous! section! it!was!pointed!out! that! in! the!VRM!hydros!have! flexibility! to! comply!
with! their! contracts! while! the! ISO! continues! his! work! as! it! is! currently! done! (ensuring! the!
adequate! supply! of! electricity,! regarding! the! efficiency! in! the! use! of! energy! resources! and!
security!of!supply!of!the!power!system).!So,!once!the!“individual”!performances!are!optimized,!
from!both!the!commercial!point!of!view!of!the!agents!and!the!ISO!physical!system!operation,!
in! this! section!we! examine,! under! a! "global"! point! of! view,!whether! the! VRM! is! capable! of!
providing!a! framework! in!which!hydros!operate!more!efficiently! in!periods!of! low!hydrology!
when!compared!with!the!current!model.!
The! indicator! that! embodies! this! overview! about! the!market! is! the! GSF! (Generation! Scaling!
Factor),!described!by!equation!3.6!in!Section!3.3.3.!Currently!in!Brazil,!the!GSF!is!used!to!check!
the! amount! of! energy! generated! by! MRE! hydropower! plants! compared! to! their! physical!




dispatches! hydros! lower! than! what! historically! they! are! able! to! generate.! As! previously!
explained,!Brazil!has!gone!through!an!extended!period!of!water!scarcity!in!recent!years!(2012!
has! a!MLT! equal! to! 80,04%,! 2013! 92,97%,! and! 2014! 88,52%),! which! is! leading! the! ISO! to!









2013! VRM! 0,98! 99,0%!
Brazil! 0,99!
















When!moving! from! the! annual! analysis! to! a!monthly! examination! of! this! indicator,!we! also!
observe! that! during! a! period! the! VRM! performances! better,! while! in! other! periods! its!






















































“global”! point! of! view,! the! VRM! is! neither! better! nor! worse! than! the! current! model.! This!


















than!the!threshold.! In! this!case,! the! function!F! is! the!annual!PLDaverage!and!a!threshold!of!1%!




! ! ! !1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11! 12! PLDaverage! σ! N! β!
2012!
VRM! 2! 3! 11! 31! 46! 18! 27! 60! 127! 246! 230! 115! 76,3! 7,0! 85! 0,99%!
Brazil! 18! 32! 117! 188! 181! 119! 91! 119! 183! 288! 376! 256! 164,0! S!
VRM/Brazil!(%)! 11%! 9%! 9%! 16%! 25%! 15%! 30%! 50%! 69%! 85%! 61%! 45%! 47%! S!
2013!
VRM! 102! 51! 78! 46! 91! 56! 28! 59! 126! 139! 228! 68! 89,3! 5,0! 32! 0,99%!
Brazil! 412! 214! 340! 196! 345! 207! 117! 159! 263! 252! 331! 291! 260,6! S!
VRM/Brazil!(%)! 25%! 24%! 23%! 23%! 26%! 27%! 24%! 37%! 48%! 55%! 69%! 23%! 34%! S!
2014!
VRM! 82! 242! 216! 215! 215! 116! 191! 371! 394! 467! 477! 212! 266,5! 16,3! 39! 0,98%!
Brazil! 375! 714! 775! 758! 680! 361! 570! 710! 729! 766! 805! 601! 653,6! S!






The!data!coming! from!this!MonteSCarlo! sample! is!provided! in!Appendix!D.!The!monthly!PLD!
value! from! the! simulation! of! the! VRM! presented! in! this! table! is! the! monthly! mean! of! all!





lower! than!1%!(total!of!85!simulations! for!2012,!32! for!2013,!and!39! for!2014),! the!previous!
conclusion!is!confirmed:!prices!indeed!decrease!with!the!implementation!of!the!VRM.!!
Furthermore,!we!notice! prices! significantly! lower! compared! to! the! current!model.! The!VRM!
annual!PLDaverage! of! the! three! years! are! about! 60%! lower! than! the! corresponding! data! from!
Brazil,! and! the! standard!deviations! (σ)!of! these!values!are!10%! lower! than! their!mean!value!
(e.g.!in!2014!16,3!represents!6%!of!the!mean!266,5).!In!addition,!the!VRM!monthly!values!are!
also!notable!lower:!about!70%!lower!in!the!two!trimester!of!the!year,!and!50%!lower!in!the!last!




























As! stated! in! Chapter! 1,! this! research! aimed! to! develop! a! new! market! design,! the! Virtual!
Reservoir!Model!(VRM),!in!which!the!ISO!operates!the!power!system!from!a!physical!point!of!





Regarding! Brazil,! the! VRM! is! an! alternative! to! improve! the! shortSterm! market! (where! the!
differences! between! the! contracted! energy! and! the! amount! of! electricity! generated! /!
consumed! are! calculated! and! settled),! and! it! is! in! line! with! the! existing! bilateral! contract!




Through! the! VRM,! the! price! in! Brazil! would! no! longer! primarily! result! from! a! chain! of!





at! (i)! avoiding! negative! exposures! in! case! of! ending! up! providing! successful! bids! lower! than!








After! validating! the! algorithm,! several! simulations! of! the! Brazilian! electricity! market!
(embracing!the!last!three!years!and!with!data!representing!more!than!98%!of!the!total!hydro!
installed! capacity! of! the! country)! were! performed,! and! the! main! findings! that! answer! the!
above!Research!Question!are!provided!below.!
6.1.Main.findings.
The! results! indicate! that! the! proposed! market! design! maintains! the! current! efficiency! and!
security! levels! ,!while!enhancing! the! level!of! flexibility! regarding! the!commercial!behavior!of!






so,! the!operation!of! the!physical! system! is!not!affected,!ensuring! the!efficiency! in! the!hydro!
cascade!and!maintaining!the!current!level!of!the!security!of!supply.!
The! proposed! VRM! operates! as! a! market! based! on! bids.! So,! notably! this! market! design!
contains!an!increased!degree!of!freedom!when!compared!to!the!rules!of!the!seasonalization!of!
the!physical!guarantee!(namely!regarding!its!annual!“window”!for!the!monthly!allocation)!and!




a! kind! of! sharing! arrangement! among! hydros.! However,! whereas! in! the! MRE! the! power!
generated! is! shared,! in! the! VRM! it! is! shared! the! natural! affluent! energy! that! arrives! in! the!
system!(in!the!simulation,!it!was!represented!by!the!acronym!NAE).!The!NAE!is!the!main!input!
resource!to!produce!electricity.!So,!the!VRM!shares!an!input!of!the!system!(water),!while!the!
MRE! shares! its! output! (electricity).! Consequently,! the!VRM!allows! a! greater!management!of!





The! comparison! between! the! virtual! reservoirs! resulting! from! the! VRM! simulation! of! the!
Brazilian! market! and! the! actual! physical! reservoir! levels! (Section! 5.2.4.2)! highlights! the!








The! results! obtained! also! demonstrate! that! the! final! monthly! shortSterm! market! prices! (in!
Brazil,!PLD)! substantially! decrease! in! comparison!with! the! current! price! (PLD).! As! verified! in!
Section! 5.2.4.2,! the! new!monthly! prices! are! about! 70%! lower! in! the! two! trimesters! of! the!
simulated!years,!and!50%! lower! in! the! last! trimester.!Considering! the! last! three!years! (2012,!
2013!and!2014),! in!annual!bases!and!with!a!relative!uncertainty!β! lower!than!1%,!new!prices!
are! 60%! lower.! This! represents! astonished! very! relevant! finding,! and! positive! affects! could!
then!be!observed!in!the!market.!
Chapter!3!presented!the!main!aspects!of!the!Brazilian!power!system!and!its!electricity!market.!
In!a! few!words,!an! important! rule! to!be!appropriately!summarized!here! is! the! following:! the!
electricity! demand! of! both! distribution! utilities! (on! behalf! of! captive! consumers)! and! free!
consumers!must!ensure!the!compliance!of!100%!of!their!consumptions!by!energy!and!power!







So,! generation! companies! tend! to! sign! bilateral! contracts! and! recover! their! cost! (fixed! and!
variable! costs).! In! the! shortSterm! there! is! the! accounting! and! settlement! of! differences!
between!the!contracted!and!the!delivered!energy.!On!balance,!when!companies!don’t!deliver!
the! quantity! needed! to! comply!with! their! contracts,! they! have! to! buy! the! difference! in! the!
shortSterm!market!at!PLD.!By!definition,!during!2012,!2013!and!3014!the!PLD!varies!between!
the!maximum!value!between!cost!of! the! last!nonShydro!dispatched!resource! (PLDnh)!and!the!
minimum!regulatory!price!(when!there!wasn’t!any!dispatched!thermal!power!plant).!
In! the! last! part! of! section! 3.3.3! it! was! reported! that! Brazil! nowadays! faces! a! situation!
characterized!by!hydros!with!their!physical!guarantee!extensively!committed!though!contracts,!
a!widespread!water!shortage!across!the!country,!a!large!thermal!dispatch,!a!sharply!decrease!
of!hydro!production,!and!skySrocketing!shortSterm!market!prices.! Indeed,! the!MLT+values! for!
2012,! 2013! and! 2014! presented! in! the! previous! chapter! endorse! this! condition.! It! was! also!
indicated! that! nowadays!hydro! generators! are! facing! losses! of! billions! of! Reais! (R$)! due! the!
exposure!to!high!PLDs.!
With! the! implementation! of! the! VRM,! the!PLD! shall! be! calculated! by! the!weighted! average!
considering!the!most!expensive!successful!hydro!price!bid!and!the!variable!cost!of!the!last!nonS
hydro!resource!dispatched!by!the!ISO!(equation!4.6!in!Chapter!4).!In!scenario!no.!4!the!ceiling!




In!other!words,! the! results! from! the! simulation! could! show!a!PLD! equal! to! the! ceiling!price.!
However,! instead!of! that! the! results! show!monthly!PLDs! equal! to,! at!maximum,! 50%!of! the!
ceiling!price.! In!annual!basis,! the!average!PLD! is!60%! lower! than! the!current!annual!average!
PLD.! This! can! be! explained! by! the! presence! of! two! elements:! competition! among! hydros! to!




After! all,! the! PLD! goes! down! driven! by! natural! market! forces.! During! the! years! of! water!
scarcity,! this!decrease!of!PLD! creates!a! financial! relief! in! accounts! of!hydros! companies! that!
have!to!buy!electricity!to!recompose!their!exposed!positions.!In!contrast,!in!good!hydrological!
years,!when! there! is!more! energy! than!necessary! to! comply!with! contracts,! the!decrease! in!
prices! will! limit! the! gains! of! the! hydros,! which! appears! to! be! quite! reasonable! given! the!
mitigation!of!losses!in!bad!years.!As!we!can!conclude,!the!VRM!could!also!be!seen!as!a!tool!to!
deal!with!the!financial!crises!that!hydros!companies!are!facing!nowadays!in!Brazil.!








• Standardized! products:! the! VRM! offers! standard! products! for! shortSterm! agreements,!
e.g.!it!can!be!a!daySahead!or!a!weekShead!market!as!a!sequence!of!call!markets!for!every!
delivery!period,!and!where!agents!submit!bids!as!a!standardized!product;!





participants! and,! thus,! the! whole! sector! can! assess! valuable! price! information! .! In!




This! section! is! dedicated! to! comment! some!pertinent! questions! regarding! the! design! of! the!
VRM,!the! implementation!of! the!QSlearning!algorithm,!and!thoughts!about! the!simulation!of!
the!Brazilian!electricity!market!suggested!by!the!developed!work.!
First!of!all,!it!must!be!said!that!the!VRM!was!conceived!and!tested!as!a!monthlySahead!market!
because! Brazil! nowadays! has! a! settlement! process! carried! on! by! the! market! operator! on!
monthly!basis.!Nevertheless,!the!VRM!can!also!be!implemented!as!a!daySahead!market.!To!do!
so,! the! deposit! (DEP)! in! the! energy! right! accounts! (ERAs)!must! be! done! on! a! daily! basis.! In!
addition,! the! implementation! of! such! shortSterm!market! can! be! seen! as! a! final! step! of! the!
whole!process!that!the!market!will!eventually!undergo!in!the!next!years.!A!daySahead!market!
with!hourly!prices!would!then!contribute!to!create!a!shortSterm!price!closer!to!the!generation!
operation! of! the! power! system! and! with! characteristics! that! better! foster! the! demand!
response.!
Regarding!the!learning!algorithm,!as!can!be!noted!in!Section!4.5.2!(Table!4.3),!the!QSlearning!
matrix! includes!a!discrete! set!of!actions.! For! instance,! for!BID2! the!discretization!of!bids!are!
divided!at!intervals!of!20%!of!the!quantity!bid!(qBID)!and!25%!of!the!price!bid!(pBID).!In!other!
words,! the! set!of!actions! is! limited!by!values!of!qBID!equal! to!0%,!20%,!40%,!60%,!80%!and!
100%!of!the!available!energy,!and!by!values!of!pBID!equal!to!0%,!25%,!50%,!75%!and!100%!of!
the! ceiling! price.! So,! an! increase! in! the! number! of! possible! actions! (and! the! consequent!
adoption! of! smaller! intervals! in! qBID! and! pBID)! can! be! seen! as! an! improvement! of! the!
algorithm.!Nevertheless,!with! the!current!27!possible!actions! for!BID2,! the!QSlearning!matrix!
and! the! simulation! of! 155! hydropower! plants,! the! algorithm! takes! around! 10! minutes! to!
converge.!!
An!increase!in!the!number!of!possible!actions!dramatically!increases!the!processing!time.!It!is!
estimated! that! if! the! interval! of! possible! actions! for! BID2! decrease! to! 5%! of! the! available!





hours! to!converge.! If! the!gap!between!two!adjacent!quantity!and!price!bids!decrease!to!1%,!
one! single! simulation! of! the! Brazilian! electricity!market! could! take!more! than! 2,5! days.! The!
current! set! of! 27! actions!was! chosen! in! order! to! turn! the! use! of! the! algorithm!manageable!
considering!both!the!processing!time!and!the!quality!of!the!results.!!
With! respect! to! the! Brazilian! electricity!market,! some! questions!may! still! be! commented! to!
enhance!the!sensitiveness!of!the!performed!simulations.!In!real!life,!each!agent!can!perform!a!
different!seasonalization!of! the!exSante!contracts.!Nevertheless,! it! is!expected!that,!as! it!was!





consider! that! this! value! is! quite! consistent! with! what! the! companies! adopted! in! the! years!
2012,!2013!and!2014.!
Finally,!in!the!VRM!each!agent!can!manage!his!reservoir!according!to!his!own!risk!perception.!
Thus,! he! can! use! a! variety! of! target! reservoir! levels! for! the! last! month! of! the! period.! The!














rules! implemented! in! the! algorithm! to! execute! the! financial! settlement! of! the! bids! can! be!
modified!to!allow!the!paySasSbid!procedure.! In!this!case,!the!equation!of!the!final!shortSterm!
market!price!must!be!adapted.!Instead!of!the!weighted!average!considering!the!clearing!price!
from!the!VRM!and!the!variable!cost!of! the! last!nonShydro!resource!dispatched!by!the! ISO,! it!
can!be!used! the!weighted!average!of!each! successful!bid! into! the!VRM!and!each!nonShydro!
resource!dispatched!by!the!ISO.!







to! the! current! definition! of! the! Brazilian! submarkets:! North! (N),! Northeast! (NE),! SoutheastS
Midwest!(SE&CO)!and!South!(S).!
Nowadays! in! Brazil! most! of! the! hydros! have! the! capacity! to! store! water! for! one! year.!
Nevertheless,!there!are!some!exceptions:!those!with!very!large!reservoirs!where!water!can!be!
stored! for! two,! three!and! four!years!ahead.!Therefore,! for! these!cases! the!algorithm!can!be!
upgraded! to! allow! the! representation! of! a!multiSannual! reservoir.! Strictly! speaking,! as! they!




concerns!are! the! following:! large!scale! implementation!of!distributed! renewable!generations!
and!use!of!more!efficient!energy!demand!side!management.!
Distributed! renewable! generation! sources! and! demand! side! management! will! create! new!
opportunities!associated!with!the!renewal!of!the!value!preposition!of!the!consumers,!followed!




of! the! simulations! developed! in! this! work.! The! new! shortSterm! price! profile! that! will! come!
from! the! VRM,! as! previously! mentioned,! can! be! further! designed! to! have! an! hourly! basis,!
which!gets!closer!to!the!generation!operation!cost.!
By! using! an! hourly! price! profile,! which! drastically! differs! from! the! current! practice! in! Brazil!
(calculated!on!a!weeklySahead!basis! for! three! load!periods),! the!overlap!between!peak!hour!
prices! and! periods! with! large! production! can! encourage! the! installation! of! PV! panels! and!
increase! the! profitability! of! this! business.! So,! the! new! price! profile! emerging! from! a! VRM!
operating!as!a!daySahead!market!can!attract!investments!by!itself.!If!that!does!not!occur,!this!
would!mean!that!prices!are!not!sufficiently!attractive,!and!then!different!measures!should!be!





case! of! wind! power! with! emphasis! on! the! wind! forecast! and! electricity! production! in! wind!
parks!distributed!by!different!areas!of!Brazil! in!order!to!identify!the!most!promising!locations!
considering! the! price! and! the! production! profiles,! or! to! combine! them! with! storage!
technologies,!as!for!instance!a!wind!farm!and!a!pumping!hydro!power!plant!with!reservoir.!
Lastly,! regarding! the! energy! demand! side!management,! taking! into! account! a! VRM! running!
with!both!the!supply!and!demand!curves!meet!on!an!hourly!basis,!it!is!possible!to!test!different!








When! running! the! model! with! a! shed! light! on! the! policies! to! induce! energy! savings,! it! is!
possible!to!find!which!measure!is!more!effective!in!decreasing!price,!and!how!much!price!can!
be! reduced.! This! sensitivity! analysis! provides! useful! insights! to! particular! consumers,! when!
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1 Tucuruí 1984 wr N N 8,370.0 4,140.0 7,631.8 44.23 25.35 35.73 
2 Ilha Solteira 1993 wr SE-CO SE-CO 4,252 1,949.0 5,591.9 57.33 45.83 57.94 
3 Itumbiara 1980 wr SE-CO SE-CO 2,082 1,015.0 15,917.0 37.21 10.01 36.03 








1988 wr NE NE 1,480 959.0 3,433.9 42.02 41.05 54.89 
7 Marimbondo 1975 wr SE-CO SE-CO 1,440 726.0 5,494.1 38.86 16.13 34.60 
8 Salto Santiago 1980 wr S S 1,420 703.3 3,239.2 68.08 16.32 72.96 
9 Água Vermelha 1978 wr SE-CO SE-CO 1,396 746.0 4,482,5 41.51 15.96 48.58 
10 Serra da Mesa 1998 wr N N 1,275 671.0 35,112.7 31.34 39.68 50.00 
11 
Gov, Ney Braga 
(Segredo) 
1992 wr S S 1,260 603.0 455.6 49.86 61.68 75.91 
12 Furnas 1963 wr SE-CO SE-CO 1,216 598.0 35,228.2 49.89 12.35 71.44 
13 Emborcação 1982 wr SE-CO SE-CO 1,192 497,0 21,834.5 37.92 35.03 63.76 
14 Machadinho 2002 wr S S 1,140 529,0 916.3 39.69 16.60 28.95 




1926 wr SE-CO SE-CO 889 127.7 2,506.7 68.37 63.85 65.68 
17 Campos Novos 2007 wr S S 880 377.9 232.7 43.00 69.60 36.00 
18 Três Irmãos 1993 wr SE-CO SE-CO 807.5 217.5 624.0 58.27 55.41 54.80 
19 Barra Grande 2005 wr S S 708 380.6 3,023.2 48.12 37.17 32.75 
20 Capivara 1977 wr SE-CO SE-CO 619 330.0 3,981.3 80.37 28.39 76.26 
21 Nova Ponte 1994 wr SE-CO SE-CO 510 276.0 22,976.8 35.81 28.83 62.21 




1956 wr SE-CO SE-CO 476 295.0 4,404.7 87.59 75.66 82.12 
24 Chavantes 1970 wr SE-CO SE-CO 414 172.0 3,320.3 53.17 27.47 61.29 
25 Miranda 1998 wr SE-CO SE-CO 408 202.0 270.9 67.41 61.33 69.79 
26 Três Marias 1962 wr SE-CO SE-CO 396 239.0 2,314.9 29.72 39.20 78.19 
27 Corumbá I 1997 wr SE-CO SE-CO 375.3 209.0 1,541.0 83.82 24.70 77.24 
28 Mauá 2012 wr SE-CO SE-CO 361 197.7 255.0 26.24 51.99 - 
29 Irapé 2006 wr SE-CO SE-CO 360 206.3 2,037.8 86.04 48.41 86.79 
30 Promissão 1975 wr SE-CO SE-CO 264 104.0 1,848.3 40.12 47.75 33.72 
31 
Gov, Parigot de 
Souza (Capivari/ 
Cachoeira) 
1970 wr S S 260 109.0 385.1 80.37 28.39 76.26 




1970 wr NE NE 237.3 143.0 264.0 45.07 67.14 35.52 













































35 Samuel 1989 wr N SE-CO 216.8 85.2 252.3 43.72 0.00 7.11 
36 Funil - Furnas 1969 wr SE-CO SE-CO 216 121.0 793.6 49.10 46.03 39.23 
37 Serra do Facão 2010 wr SE-CO SE-CO 212.6 182.4 6,613.4 53.87 30.76 84.61 
38 Passo Real 1973 wr S S 158 68.0 2,984.9 84.25 75.29 71.36 
39 Barra Bonita 1963 wr SE-CO SE-CO 140.8 45.0 2,748.0 78.93 67.70 49.42 
40 Corumbá IV 2006 wr SE-CO SE-CO 129.6 76.0 1,710.4 14.14 21.89 16.38 
41 Santa Clara 2005 wr S S 120 69.6 367.5 61.42 88.26 50.34 
42 Quebra Queixo 2003 wr S S 120 59.7 10.1 77.37 84.98 93.02 
43 Porto Estrela 2001 wr SE-CO SE-CO 112 55.8 12.6 100.00 72.00 94.44 
44 Queimado 2004 wr SE-CO SE-CO 105 58.0 277.0 56.60 31.21 65.04 
45 Jurumirim 1962 wr SE-CO SE-CO 101 47.0 4,070.0 68.51 30.49 66.71 




2010 wr SE-CO SE-CO 90 57.3 43.5 23.49 - - 
48 Paraibuna 1978 wr SE-CO SE-CO 85 50.0 4,459.2 50.20 36.48 67.45 
49 Caconde 1966 wr SE-CO SE-CO 80.4 33.0 857.6 54.18 39.24 61.73 
50 Caçu 2010 wr SE-CO SE-CO 65 42.9 34.5 28.48 - - 
51 Camargos 1960 wr SE-CO SE-CO 46 21.0 1,571.4 25.98 31.21 54.00 
52 Espora 2006 wr SE-CO SE-CO 32 23.5 116.1 28.56 16.94 19.69 
53 Jaguari 1973 wr SE-CO SE-CO 27.6 14.0 1,183.3 51.05 47.60 84.19 
54 Jordão 1997 wr S S 6.5 5.9 19.7 26.38 71.31 50.12 
55 Ernestina 1950 wr S S 5 3.2 211.2 92.42 81.81 26.32 




1979 rr NE NE 4,279.6 2,225.0 - - - - 
58 Jirau 2013 rr N SE-CO 3,750 2,184.6 - - - - 
59 Xingó 1994 rr NE NE 3,162 2,139.0 - - - - 
60 Santo Antônio 2012 rr N SE-CO 3,150.4 2,218.0 - - - - 
61 Jupiá 1969 rr SE-CO SE-CO 1,551.2 886.0 - - - - 
62 Porto Primavera 1999 rr SE-CO SE-CO 1,540 1,017.0 - - - - 
63 Itá 2000 rr S S 1,450 969.9 - - - - 
64 Gov, José Richa 1999 rr S S 1,240 605.0 - - - - 
65 Salto Osório 1975 rr S S 1,078 507.3 - - - - 
66 
Estreito (Luiz 
Carlos Barreto de 
Carvalho) 





1998 rr N N 902.5 527.0 - - - - 




1958 rr SE-CO SE-CO 658 415.0 - - - - 
70 Taquaruçu 1992 rr SE-CO SE-CO 525 201.0 - - - - 













































72 Itapebi 2003 rr NE NE 462 214.3 - - - - 
73 Cana Brava 2002 rr N N 450 264.6 - - - - 
74 Estreito 2011 rr N N 435.6 235.2 - - - - 
75 Jaguara 1971 rr SE-CO SE-CO 424 336.0 - - - - 
76 Nilo Peçanha 1953 rr SE-CO SE-CO 380 335.0 - - - - 
77 Volta grande 1974 rr SE-CO SE-CO 380 229.0 - - - - 




1982 rr SE-CO SE-CO 347.4 139.0 - - - - 
80 Simplicio 2013 rr SE-CO SE-CO 333.7 191.3 - - - - 
81 Aimorés 2005 rr SE-CO SE-CO 330 172.0 - - - - 
82 Porto Colômbia 1973 rr SE-CO SE-CO 319.2 185.0 - - - - 
83 Dardanelos 2011 rr N SE-CO 261 154.9 - - - - 
84 São Salvador 2009 rr N N 243.2 141.6 - - - - 
85 Amador Aguiar I 2006 rr SE-CO SE-CO 240 155.0 - - - - 
86 Funil - Cemig 2002 rr SE-CO SE-CO 216 121.0 - - - - 
87 Funil - Chesf 1962 rr NE NE 216 121.0 - - - - 
88 Igarapava 1999 rr SE-CO SE-CO 210 136.0 - - - - 
89 Amador Aguiar II 2007 rr SE-CO SE-CO 210 131.0 - - - - 
90 Mascarenhas 1974 rr SE-CO SE-CO 193.5 134.7 - - - - 
91 Garibaldi 2013 rr S S 191.9 83.1 - - - - 
92 Ilha dos Pombos 1924 rr SE-CO SE-CO 187.2 115.0 - - - - 
93 Jacuí 1962 rr S S 180 123.0 - - - - 
94 Ponte de Pedra 2005 rr SE-CO SE-CO 176.1 123.5 - - - - 
95 Pedra do Cavalo 2004 rr NE NE 160 56.4 - - - - 
96 Bariri 1965 rr SE-CO SE-CO 143.1 66.0 - - - - 
97 Baguari 2009 rr SE-CO SE-CO 140 80.2 - - - - 




2004 rr SE-CO SE-CO 140 64.5 - - - - 
100 Fontes Nova 1940 rr SE-CO SE-CO 132 104.0 - - - - 
101 Ibitinga 1969 rr SE-CO SE-CO 131.5 74.0 - - - - 
102 Castro Alves 2008 rr S S 130 64.0 - - - - 
103 Dona Francisca 2001 rr S S 125 80.0 - - - - 
104 Fundão 2006 rr S S 120 65.8 - - - - 
105 Guaporé 2003 rr S S 120 60.2 - - - - 
106 Salto 2010 rr SE-CO SE-CO 116 67.8 - - - - 




1960 rr SE-CO SE-CO 108.8 49.0 - - - - 
109 Salto Grande 1956 rr SE-CO SE-CO 102 75.0 - - - - 













































111 14 de Julho 2008 rr S S 100 50.0 - - - - 
112 Monte Claro 2004 rr S S 100 59.0 - - - - 




2010 rr SE-CO SE-CO 93 58.2 - - - - 
115 Canoas 1 1999 rr SE-CO SE-CO 82.5 57.0 - - - - 




2009 rr S S 74 43.1 - - - - 
118 Canoas 2 1999 rr SE-CO SE-CO 72 48.0 - - - - 
119 Piraju 2002 rr SE-CO SE-CO 70 42.5 - - - - 
120 
Eng, José Luiz 
Muller de Godoy 
Pereira 
2010 rr SE-CO SE-CO 68.4 41.0 - - - - 
121 Sobragi 1998 rr SE-CO SE-CO 60 38.0 - - - - 
122 Itutinga 1955 rr SE-CO SE-CO 52 28.0 - - - - 
123 Picada 2006 rr SE-CO SE-CO 50 27.0 - - - - 

















jan/12 feb/12 mar/12 apr/12 may/12 jun/12 jul/12 aug/12 sep/12 oct/12 nov/12 dec/12 
Qtotal     (MWaverage) 59,342 62,546 63,019 60,574 58,891 58,164 58,295 59,771 60,289 62,224 61,035 62,549 
Qnh          (MWaverage) 6,093 6,061 5,757 9,296 9,986 8,965 8,575 9,298 12,424 14,774 16,955 15,694 
Qh            (MWaverage) 53,249 56,485 57,262 51,278 48,905 49,199 49,720 50,473 47,865 47,450 44,080 46,855 
PLDnh_SIN        (R$/MWh) 18.03 31.62 117.05 188.45 180.66 118.53 91.24 119.07 183.12 287.61 375.54 256.41 
PLDreg_uplim    (R$/MWh) 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 727.52 
PGtotal                (MWaverage) 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 46,180.04 
PG_N           (MWaverage) 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 7,717.52 
PG_NE        (MWaverage) 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 
PG_SE-CO  (MWaverage) 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 25,223.76 
PG_S           (MWaverage) 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 6,850.07 
NAE_SIN       (MWaverage) 107,837.29 83,968.79 60,711.00 51,386.72 43,610.20 58,752.00 40,039.03 28,279.00 22,572.00 24,784.00 34,485.27 43,261.03 
NAE_N          (MWaverage) 11,493.97 14,208.24 13,470.00 9,312.43 4,855.26 2,879.00 2,073.65 1,279.00 1,065.00 1,139.00 2,322.73 4,924.45 
NAE_NE       (MWaverage) 17,452.23 15,452.90 6,639.00 6,392.93 3,628.26 3,286.00 2,564.55 2,115.00 1,843.00 1,443.00 4,595.87 6,958.13 
NAE_SE-CO (MWaverage) 72,278.19 48,945.31 36,757.00 31,966.93 29,683.29 38,526.00 25,728.06 17,020.00 14,914.00 14,803.00 22,883.67 26,868.39 










jan/13 feb/13 mar/13 apr/13 may/13 jun/13 jul/13 aug/13 sep/13 oct/13 nov/13 dec/13 
Qtotal     (MWaverage) 61,570 64,381 63,470 62,450 60,815 60,164 61,002 62,728 63,422 64,453 64,999 64,279 
Qnh          (MWaverage) 15,322 15,313 14,528 14,498 15,963 16,272 14,727 15,657 15,709 15,790 16,931 15,091 
Qh            (MWaverage) 46,248 49,068 48,942 47,952 44,852 43,892 46,275 47,071 47,714 48,663 48,068 49,188 
PLDnh_SIN        (R$/MWh) 411.86 213.57 339.69 196.44 344.87 206.83 116.71 159.25 263.18 251.91 331.07 291.01 
PLDreg_uplim    (R$/MWh) 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 780.03 
PGtotal                (MWaverage) 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639,04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 48,639.04 
PG_N           (MWaverage) 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902,12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 9,902.12 
PG_NE        (MWaverage) 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388,.0 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388,70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 
PG_SE-CO  (MWaverage) 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415,06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 
PG_S           (MWaverage) 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933,17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 
NAE_SIN       (MWaverage) 65,671.00 84,737.30 78,253.03 80,099.77 47,208.00 63,535,.4 51,457.00 40,750,96 37,126.84 40,891.78 34,151.20 59,941.00 
NAE_N          (MWaverage) 6,668.00 11,885.20 11,726.55 14,008.20 9,467.00 3,990.97 2,366.00 1,595,61 1,317.97 1,402.26 2,545.70 5,550.00 
NAE_NE       (MWaverage) 4,532.00 10,706.20 5,136.77 8,020.67 4,284.00 3,073.00 2,336.00 1,837,42 1,614.17 2,044.68 2,481.20 8,569.00 
NAE_SE-CO (MWaverage) 45,513.00 55,199.50 48,811.29 50,500.67 28,561.00 37,856.57 31,001.00 19,340,90 17,109.87 23,846.65 22,480.13 39,281.00 












jan/14 feb/14 mar/14 apr/14 may/14 jun/14 jul/14 aug/14 sep/14 oct/14 nov/14 dec/14 
Qtotal     (MWaverage) 67,945 69,870 66,355 64,748 62,824 61,170 61,114 63,168 65,329 67,147 66,472 65,602 
Qnh          (MWaverage) 14,939 17,719 18,489 18,334 19,818 19,577 19,379 22,599 22,379 23,689 23,383 23,123 
Qh            (MWaverage) 53,006 52,151 47,866 46,414 43,006 41,593 41,735 40,569 42,950 43,458 43,089 42,479 
PLDnh_SIN        (R$/MWh) 375.15 713.50 774.56 757.67 680.19 361.21 570.18 709.53 728.95 765.54 804.54 601.21 
PLDreg_uplim    (R$/MWh) 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 822.83 
PGtotal                (MWaverage) 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 48,749.04 
PG_N           (MWaverage) 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 10,012.12 
PG_NE        (MWaverage) 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 6,388.70 
PG_SE-CO  (MWaverage) 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 25,415.06 
PG_S           (MWaverage) 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 6,933.17 
NAE_SIN       (MWaverage) 61,791.32 44,697.35 67,430.91 62,600.73 47,215.74 73,983.07 39,359.91 25,946.83 31,234.13 34,463.77 31,804.03 53,859.00 
NAE_N          (MWaverage) 10,084.03 12,974.14 17,435.32 15,403.73 9,748.84 4,182.87 2,364.23 1,561.32 1,261.23 1,435.42 2,294.30 4,709.00 
NAE_NE       (MWaverage) 11,008.35 3,971.29 3,830.65 4,712.33 2,999.94 2,040.60 1,851.42 1,906.06 1,627.47 1,230.06 2,250.17 6,625.00 
NAE_SE-CO (MWaverage) 30,152.13 22,541.71 34,700.68 34,008.37 22,857.90 26,169.73 18,748.45 15,651.90 15,120.33 13,347.55 18,641.73 34,715.00 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 74 288 240 160 77.7 77.66 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
2 2 3 11 29 68 18 52 69 183 233 240 160 89.0 83.34 64.51 6.81% 
3 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 147 233 172 64 67.0 77.90 121.26 8.16% 
4 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 69 110 233 240 64 71.8 76.38 90.02 6.21% 
5 2 3 11 69 68 18 13 69 183 288 308 160 99.3 80.97 172.78 7.26% 
6 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 110 288 240 160 84.3 81.52 140.06 5.93% 
7 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 69 147 233 240 256 90.9 82.86 129.20 5.19% 
8 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 147 288 240 112 79.7 82.47 111.98 4.54% 
9 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 110 233 240 64 69.6 81.04 116.30 4.44% 
10 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 44 74 288 240 112 72.0 80.14 111.48 4.17% 
11 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 233 240 112 75.6 79.73 102.18 3.82% 
12 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 94 147 288 308 64 87.1 80.34 97.37 3.55% 
13 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 233 172 64 66.0 79.23 105.14 3.59% 
14 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 94 147 288 240 160 87.9 79.85 102.43 3.39% 
15 2 3 11 29 68 18 52 44 110 178 308 64 73.9 79.46 97.44 3.21% 
16 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 74 178 240 112 69.7 78.85 96.84 3.12% 
17 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 147 233 172 160 73.5 78.54 92.48 2.97% 
18 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 94 147 178 308 64 74.8 78.33 87.81 2.82% 
19 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 147 288 240 112 81.8 78.51 83.57 2.67% 
20 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 110 233 172 112 70.1 78.09 82.74 2.60% 
21 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 147 233 240 112 77.2 78.05 78.64 2.48% 
22 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 147 178 172 64 66.1 77.51 81.33 2.48% 
23 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 288 308 160 89.8 78.05 84.25 2.45% 
24 2 3 11 69 31 18 13 44 147 288 308 112 87.1 78.42 83.98 2.39% 
25 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 147 233 240 112 77.2 78.38 80.54 2.29% 
26 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 110 288 240 208 84.7 78.62 78.85 2.22% 
27 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 110 233 240 112 77.3 78.57 75.88 2.13% 
28 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 147 233 240 112 76.7 78.50 73.20 2.06% 
29 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 233 240 160 79.6 78.54 70.63 1.99% 
30 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 147 233 240 64 73.2 78.36 69.13 1.94% 
31 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 110 288 240 112 76.7 78.31 66.91 1.88% 
32 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 110 233 240 160 76.1 78.24 64.91 1.82% 
33 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 110 123 240 112 66.6 77.89 67.00 1.83% 
34 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 183 288 172 112 79.2 77.93 65.02 1.77% 







monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
36 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 110 233 240 112 74.2 77.65 62.77 1.70% 
37 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 110 288 376 160 94.1 78.09 68.33 1.74% 
38 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 110 288 308 64 80.4 78.15 66.62 1.69% 
39 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 44 147 233 308 112 83.9 78.30 65.72 1.66% 
40 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 44 147 288 172 64 73.2 78.17 64.69 1.63% 
41 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 147 178 240 112 72.7 78.04 63.81 1.60% 
42 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 233 240 160 79.6 78.08 62.32 1.56% 
43 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 44 147 178 240 112 69.0 77.87 62.77 1.55% 
44 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 74 288 240 160 79.2 77.90 61.34 1.52% 
45 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 110 233 172 64 67.7 77.67 62.26 1.51% 
46 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 94 147 233 240 112 79.3 77.70 60.94 1.48% 
47 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 44 74 288 240 112 72.0 77.58 60.30 1.46% 
48 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 94 74 233 240 64 70.8 77.44 59.98 1.44% 
49 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 119 110 233 308 208 92.1 77.74 63.09 1.46% 
50 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 147 288 240 64 77.2 77.73 61.81 1.43% 
51 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 110 233 172 160 74.1 77.66 60.83 1.41% 
52 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 44 147 233 240 112 76.8 77.64 59.66 1.38% 
53 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 44 74 233 240 208 75.5 77.60 58.60 1.35% 
54 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 69 110 233 240 112 74.2 77.54 57.70 1.33% 
55 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 288 240 64 76.2 77.51 56.67 1.31% 
56 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 38 288 240 112 75.9 77.48 55.69 1.29% 
57 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 19 110 233 240 160 72.4 77.39 55.15 1.27% 
58 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 44 147 233 172 64 67.0 77.22 56.04 1.27% 
59 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 69 110 233 104 160 70.0 77.09 55.95 1.26% 
60 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 183 233 172 112 72.5 77.02 55.35 1.25% 
61 2 3 11 69 68 18 33 44 74 178 172 112 65.3 76.83 56.67 1.25% 
62 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 94 183 233 104 112 74.2 76.78 55.85 1.24% 
63 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 147 288 172 112 74.1 76.74 55.07 1.22% 
64 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 69 110 288 240 64 76.4 76.74 54.19 1.20% 
65 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 44 147 288 104 64 67.5 76.59 54.65 1.20% 
66 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 19 110 178 240 160 69.5 76.49 54.58 1.19% 
67 2 3 11 69 68 18 13 44 147 288 172 112 78.9 76.52 53.84 1.17% 
68 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 110 288 172 112 71.0 76.44 53.48 1.16% 
69 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 147 288 240 64 79.3 76.48 52.81 1.14% 
70 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 19 147 288 240 112 79.2 76.52 52.15 1.13% 
71 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 74 233 308 64 70.7 76.44 51.88 1.12% 
72 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 74 233 308 64 70.7 76.36 51.60 1.11% 
73 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 147 288 240 112 83.3 76.46 51.54 1.10% 
74 2 3 11 29 68 18 33 44 110 288 240 64 75.8 76.45 50.84 1.08% 







monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
76 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 94 110 178 172 160 70.1 76.54 52.29 1.08% 
77 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 147 233 240 112 75.1 76.52 51.63 1.07% 
78 2 3 11 29 31 18 52 44 147 288 172 64 71.7 76.46 51.25 1.06% 
79 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 94 147 233 240 160 81.7 76.52 50.95 1.05% 
80 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 178 308 64 72.7 76.48 50.49 1.04% 
81 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 183 178 172 160 75.6 76.46 49.86 1.03% 
82 2 3 11 29 68 18 13 69 74 233 240 112 72.7 76.42 49.42 1.02% 
83 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 110 288 172 112 71.0 76.35 49.17 1.01% 
84 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 69 147 288 240 112 80.2 76.40 48.75 1.00% 






























monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89.1 89.11 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
2 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 209 68 85.2 87.13 7.85 2.27% 
3 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 209 68 93.2 89.17 16.35 2.62% 
4 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 209 68 85.2 88.16 14.94 2.19% 
5 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 209 68 85.2 87.56 13.02 1.84% 
6 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 270 68 90.3 88.01 11.62 1.58% 
7 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 209 68 93.2 88.76 13.59 1.57% 
8 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 209 68 85.2 88.31 13.27 1.46% 
9 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 65 157 209 68 82.5 87.66 15.36 1.49% 
10 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 109 209 68 82.7 87.16 16.15 1.46% 
11 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 204 270 68 98.2 88.16 25.57 1.73% 
12 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 157 270 68 91.7 88.46 24.30 1.61% 
13 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 209 68 93.2 88.83 24.03 1.53% 
14 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 157 270 68 91.7 89.03 22.79 1.43% 
15 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 157 331 68 96.8 89.55 25.20 1.45% 
16 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89.1 89.53 23.54 1.35% 
17 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 109 209 68 82.7 89.12 24.84 1.36% 
18 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 147 68 88.1 89.07 23.43 1.28% 
19 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 157 270 68 91.7 89.21 22.50 1.22% 
20 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 109 147 68 84.2 88.96 22.58 1.19% 
21 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 204 270 68 95.7 89.28 23.61 1.19% 
22 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 109 209 68 82.7 88.98 24.47 1.19% 
23 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 204 270 68 98.2 89.38 27.04 1.21% 
24 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 147 68 88.1 89.32 25.93 1.16% 
25 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 209 68 85.2 89.16 25.55 1.13% 
26 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89.1 89.16 24.53 1.09% 
27 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 270 68 94.2 89.34 24.53 1.07% 
28 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 115 109 209 68 82.7 89.10 25.22 1.07% 
29 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 164 157 270 68 98.3 89.42 27.26 1.08% 
30 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 109 270 68 90.3 89.45 26.34 1.05% 
31 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 62 270 68 86.3 89.35 25.78 1.02% 













monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 518 413 212 267.1 267.08 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
2 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 609 518 544 212 287.9 277.50 217.35 3.76% 
3 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 482 489 518 413 212 276.6 277.19 108.96 2.17% 
4 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 254 489 642 544 212 278.8 277.59 73.27 1.54% 
5 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 413 212 246.8 271.43 244.87 2.58% 
6 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 482 489 394 544 212 288.2 274.22 242.85 2.32% 
7 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 394 544 212 278.7 274.87 205.26 1.97% 
8 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 482 250 518 544 212 267.5 273.94 182.78 1.74% 
9 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 250 394 413 212 247.9 271.05 235.37 1.89% 
10 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 482 250 642 413 212 278.0 271.74 214.09 1.70% 
11 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 283 212 235.9 268.49 309.42 1.98% 
12 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 544 212 279.1 269.37 290.60 1.83% 
13 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 254 250 394 544 212 238.2 266.97 341.29 1.92% 
14 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 250 394 544 212 247.7 265.59 341.68 1.86% 
15 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 609 518 413 212 277.1 266.35 326.05 1.75% 
16 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 482 489 642 544 212 297.8 268.31 365.97 1.78% 
17 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 254 370 394 544 212 259.2 267.78 347.95 1.69% 
18 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 368 489 394 413 212 276.0 268.24 331.20 1.60% 
19 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 413 212 246.8 267.11 337.04 1.58% 
20 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 482 489 394 413 212 285.5 268.02 336.14 1.53% 
21 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 413 212 246.8 267.01 340.84 1.51% 
22 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 544 212 268.7 267.09 324.74 1.44% 
23 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 413 212 257.1 266.66 314.33 1.39% 
24 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 413 212 257.9 266.29 303.88 1.34% 
25 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 544 212 279.1 266.80 297.73 1.29% 
26 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 250 394 544 212 247.7 266.06 299.92 1.28% 
27 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 544 212 279.1 266.54 294.64 1.24% 
28 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 413 212 257.1 266.21 286.92 1.20% 
29 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 254 370 518 674 212 280.4 266.70 283.64 1.17% 
30 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 518 413 212 267.1 266.71 273.87 1.13% 
31 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 283 212 246.2 266.05 278.27 1.13% 







monthly PLD (R$) 
F E(F) V(F) β 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
33 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 394 544 212 268.7 266.20 261.22 1.06% 
34 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 518 674 212 289.9 266.89 269.86 1.06% 
35 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 254 489 270 544 212 247.8 266.35 272.33 1.05% 
36 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 482 489 518 283 212 265.7 266.33 264.56 1.02% 
37 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 254 370 394 413 212 248.4 265.85 265.93 1.01% 
38 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 642 544 212 289.4 266.46 273.31 1.01% 
39 82 181 216 215 215 116 375 368 250 394 544 212 263.9 266.40 266.29 0.98% 
!
